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Abstract
BENEFIT RECIPIENCY RATES UNDER
THE FEDERAL/STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAM:
EXPLAINING AND REVERSING DECLINE
by
Marc Baldwin
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
on June 23, 1993 in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Urban Studies and Planning
This paper explores the responsiveness of one essential
welfare state program, the federal/state unemployment
insurance system, to the changing economic context in which
it operates. At its core is an explanation of the most
telling evidence of program inadequacy, the declining
percentage of the unemployed receiving benefits. To what
extent does changes in state programs explain the decline in
the percentage of the unemployed receiving benefits during
the 1980s?
The federal/state program was designed in the 1930s,
guided by assumptions about economic reality that were
operative at that time. For decades, the existing mix of
program attributes at least produced an actuarily sound
program and provided modest benefits for most of those
unemployed in covered employment. After 1975, however,
benefit and payroll tax calculations were largely unchanged
while the demands on the system increased as unemployment
shifted from temporary layoffs to sustained unemployment and
transitions to new work.
State governments, faced with heightened demands on
resources, operating in a context of intensified competition
and a unique federal/state distribution of roles, adopted
tighter eligibility standards and reduced benefits to
protect their trust funds from insolvency. These
strategies, which may have made sense on a state by state
basis, have effectively dismantled the current unemployment
insurance system. Taken together, changes in the legal
factors which exclude claimants from receiving benefits
account for 70.6 percent of the drop in recipiency rates
between 1979 and 1984. Legal variables also explain 10.9
percent of the decline in application rates. Reversing that
decline requires federal action linking unemployment
insurance to an active labor market policy that accounts for
the changed context of the program.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Edwin Melendez
Title: Associate Professor
In Memory of
Michael Harrington and
Irving Howe.
We are, all of us,
diminished by your absence.
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Introduction
The unemployment insurance (UI) system was established
over 50 years ago in a specific economic context. Since
that time, the economic environment has changed
dramatically, but the UI system has been altered only
marginally. The story that follows is thus about the
mismatch between a social insurance program and the economic
context within which it operates, a program caught between
the Scylla of declining resources and the Charybdis of
heightened program demands. It is a story about a pattern
of counter-productive responses to crisis. In the end,
hopefully, it is also a story about what can be done.
The Changing Economy
Various authors, of diverse political persuasions, have
identified a transformation of economic relationships in the
United States since the early 1970s (Bartlett and Steele,
1992; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Marglin and Schor, 1990;
Bluestone and Harrison, 1988; Bluestone and Harrison, 1982;
Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf, 1983; Lash and Urry, 1987;
Best, 1990; Levy, 1988; Hirst and Zeitlin, 1990). The
decline of mass production, the rise of an information age,
a Second Industrial Divide, a Great U-Turn -- by whatever
name, and however overstated, numerous authors argue that
the United States is witnessing a fundamental shift in
labor-capital, governmental, and international
relationships. Evaluating the merits or inadequacies of
each of these theories is beyond the scope of this
discussion. But they are all efforts to understand a
transformation which is apparent in four trends that are of
concern here, trends which link economic transformation, the
labor market, and unemployment insurance.
First, the U.S. economy has, since the early 1970s,
faced increased international trade pressures. Graph One
shows the merchandise trade balance from 1946 to 1991.
[ Graph One ]
Trade pressures, particularly from low wage producers (Mead,
1991), intensify productivity requirements and restrict wage
gains. The impact of trade competition hit manufacturing
particularly hard during the 1980s, with attendant impact on
wages and unionization. This environment is known to have a
disproportionate effect on women, youth, Hispanics, African-
Americans, and less educated workers, meaning that "the
workers most likely to loser their jobs in a more open
trading environment are those who have the most difficulty
relocating" and, hence, suffer long unemployment spells
(Bednarzik, 1993).
Second, profit rates have fallen throughout the
Organization for Economic Coordination and Development
(OECD) countries (Glyn, Hughes, Lipietz, Singh, 1990;
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Bluestone and Harrison, 1988; Bowles, Gordon, Weisskopf,
1986). One response has been reduced employment, with
obvious impact on programs financed through payroll taxes,
including unemployment insurance. The fall of profit rates
also increases political action by business interests to
reduce unemployment tax rates, limit benefits, and increase
disqualifications in an effort to limit payroll tax
expenses.
Third, related to trade and low profit margins,
business failure rates have climbed throughout recent years.
[ Graph Two I
Business failures limit trust fund reserves by increasing
outlays for benefits without providing an opportunity to
reclaim revenues through experience rating.
Fourth, all of the above -- business failures,
international competition, falling profits -- heighten the
competition among states for the few industrial relocations
that do occur, increase state efforts to minimize business
costs, and allow companies to play states against each other
in the name of "business climate". This heightened
competition, spreading from product markets to interstate
legislative competition, had dire consequences for
unemployment insurance in the 1980s, and most other state
programs as well (Albelda and MacEwan, 1992; Gramlich,
1991).
The four broad trends identified above result, among
other things, in some new and challenging patterns in the
labor market. Although unemployment insurance cannot be
expected to reverse all aspects of economic decline, it
should be called upon to ameliorate some of the labor market
results of that decline. The labor market implications of
the four trends discussed above are not difficult to
uncover. Paramount among the effects throughout the late
1970s and into the 1980s was the shift of employment between
occupations and industries, causing dislocation and changing
skill needs. The most commonly cited change is the
declining share of total employment that is in
manufacturing. In 1965, manufacturing held 30 percent of
nonagricultural payrolls. By 1979, that figure had slipped
to 23 percent and by 1990 it was only 17 percent.
A changing occupation and industry mix means changing
skill needs within and across industries and occupations.
This point has controversial interpretations, with bold
statements asserting that skill requirements will explode in
the future (Hudson Institute, 1987) and more convincing
counter findings that the trend is badly overstated (Mishel
and Teixeira, 1990; National Center on Education and the
Economy, 1990). Although the macro stories of vast skill
transformation are debateable, data on training requirements
shows evidence of changing, if not heightened, skill
requirements (Topel, 1993; Bishop, 1992; Useem, 1993; Katz
and Keefe, 1993; Industrial Technology Institute, 1991).
Without access to training for new jobs, various categories
of workers are at risk of lengthy unemployment spells.
The risk of lengthy unemployment spells due to changes
in industry, occupation, and skill mix is heightened given
the growth of plant closings and mass layoffs. Bureau of
Labor Statistics mass layoff data has only been gathered
since the early 1980s, and even then not all states
participated.1 Graph Three shows figures for those states
and years which are available.
[ Graph Three ]
It is noteworthy that this steep increase corresponds to an
economic recovery, of sorts. This trend can be expected to
continue, or deepen, in future years as workers brace for
defense cuts and the proposed North American Free Trade
Agreement. During each year of the 1980s, almost two
million workers were laid off by their employers with no
hope of recall (Congressional Budget Office, 1993).
1 The funding for the mass layoff survey is in jeopardy
as this is written. Also, Michigan, a state with
numerous mass layoffs and plant closing, is not
surveyed.
The hostile new economic context has also increased the
number of discouraged workers. Discouraged workers are
defined as not seeking work because they think they cannot
find a job. Between 1979 and 1990, the most recent business
cycle peak, the number of discouraged workers rose by
100,000, or 13.2 percent, while the number of unemployed
rose 10.7 percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employment
and Earnings", January 1980, 1991). The rise of discouraged
workers is troubling because it indicates that people want
to be attached to the labor force but feel they won't find
work (Buss and Redburn, 1988). Their specific needs are
unanswered by current programs.
Declining unionization is another element of the new
labor market scene. In 1950, unionization rates peaked at
34.7 percent. Between 1979 and 1990, the portion of all
wage and salaried employees who were members of unions or
employee associations declined from 24.1 percent to 16.1
percent, a loss of 4.2 million union workers. In 1973,
about 22 workers joined unions for every union worker lost
through decertifications. By 1988, unions added only 4.5
members for every member lost through decertification
(Bronars and Deere, 1989). This "zapping" of labor
(Bluestone and Harrison, 1988) weakens an essential force
for workers, including those hoping to claim unemployment
benefits.
A final important change is the expansion of contingent
employment. Numerous authors have dissected the effects of
reduced connection between employer and employee (Tilly,
1992; Callaghan and Hartmann, 1991; Belous, 1989; Abraham,
1987). For a time in the early 1980s, management journals
stressed the value of commitment to employees and the
corporation as family. That trend was short lived while the
trend toward contingent work has continued into the 1990s
(Kilborn, 1993). Temporary-help employment grew 10 times
faster than overall employment between 1982 and 1990 until,
in 1992, temporary jobs accounted for two-thirds of new
private sector jobs (Ansberry, 1993).
These labor market trends (industry and occupation
shifts, dislocated workers, changing skill requirements,
contingent work) have caused a marked growth in long term
unemployment. Graph Four shows the increasing trend toward
lengthy unemployment spells.
[ Graph Four ]
With each business cycle trough since the early 1970s, the
median unemployment duration has risen. The same is true of
unemployment rates. Moreover, the relationship between
unemployment rates and unemployment durations has
deteriorated. Comparing lagged unemployment durations and
unemployment rates gives a ratio of the average number of
weeks unemployment for each percentage point increase in
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unemployment rates. That ratio increased steadily from 1975
to 1979 to 1992: 1.9, 2.1, 2.4. Because lengthy
unemployment spells stretch scarce resource and sharpen the
conflict between the UI program and its economic context,
addressing the problem of lengthening unemployment durations
holds the key to understanding both the decline and
potential resurrection of the UI system.
Briefly, there are several potential connections to
explore between the labor market trends discussed above and
the UI system that must address them. For example,
manufacturing employment has special characteristics that
relate to important UI program parameters, namely high
wages, unique layoff patterns that affect experience rating,
and seniority layoff systems. Increases in discouraged
workers and contingent employment are relevant to UI because
of "suitable work" and discharges relating to it, monetary
earnings requirements, penalties for quitting, and the range
of potential labor market states entered by exhaustees.
Declining unionization may be the most important labor
market change for unemployment insurance because unions are
a social structure that facilitates benefit recipiency by
claimants both politically and at the point of unemployment.
Where Supplemental Unemployment Benefits (SUB) are written
into collective bargaining agreements, they are a powerful
incentive to seek regular state unemployment compensation.
SUB typically replaces up to 95 percent of previous wages,
but only if regular UI is being received.
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Falling unionization raises issues around "suitable
work," the ability of claimants to understand the UI
program's complexities and receive fair hearings, and the
political power of claimants versus employers affecting
overall program design. The decline of reverse seniority
layoffs, which most unions have supported, may also be
relevant as workers with long tenure in firm-specific jobs
return to the labor market. Moreover, higher union wage
rates, particularly for younger workers (Blackburn, Bloom,
and Freeman, 1989), improve the odds that a claimant will
meet tougher monetary eligibility requirements.
Dissertation Design
The core of this study is an attempt to measure the
ability of the existing federal/state program to address
this labor market transformation given the legislative
changes instituted by state and federal actors during the
1980s. The changing pattern of unemployment shows that,
taken together, the increasing ranks of discouraged workers,
the decline of unionization, the expansion of contingent
employment, and worker dislocation in the face of shifting
industry and occupation employment add up to growth in
secular, structural unemployment making new demands on a
program that (not getting too far ahead of the story) is
designed to support workers through brief periods of
cyclical unemployment.
It is not inevitable that these large economic
transformations and their labor market counterparts should
derail the unemployment insurance system. To understand how
benefit recipiency rates were driven down as states
responded to these new economic demands, one must first
understand the origins and structure of the UI system which
mediated these trends. Chapter One is thus a review of how
the program was modified--or not--by federal actors as the
identified economic changes developed. Chapter Two explores
patterns of state responses in the 1980s when the gap
between the program and its context widened, facilitated by
the virtual inactivity noted at the federal level between
1935 and 1979 in Chapter One. Chapter Three tests
assumptions about the role of identified legal and economic
changes in declining UI recipiency rates, essentially
assigning blame. Finally, the closing chapter returns more
directly to issues of economic context and responses,
suggesting means to rebuild the failing UI system.
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Mass layoff events affect 50 of more workers.
1987 is the first year that more than half the
states were surveyed. 1991 is the last full year
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Chapter One
You Can Only Get Here From There:
The Ill-Fated History of Federal
Unemployment Insurance Legislation
From the Social Security Act of 1935 to the report of
the National Commission on Unemployment Compensation in
1980, the basic state/federal structure of unemployment
insurance in the United States remained unchanged, perhaps
even unchallenged. Many observers tell the story of
unemployment insurance in the U.S. as if it were a gradual,
constant march forward (Rubin, 1983; Rosbrow, 1985). In
fact, the program history is riddled with blind alleys and
dead-ends, frustrated attempts at uniformity across states,
and repeated calls for claimants' rights that go unheeded.2
The second chapter will focus on activity by the states
in recent years. First, these pages will chart the federal
legislative history of unemployment insurance in the United
States, with special attention to the contest between state
and federal actors for control over program boundaries. It
begins with a look at the program environment before 1935
and debate around the design of the Social Security Act.
These debates are then carried forward through time, from
administration to administration. Tensions around program
2 Rosbrow's history of federal legislation does not
mention the establishment of the National Commission on
Unemployment Compensation in 1976 even though he served
as Executive Director. The Committee met for 28
months, and virtually once a month, before releasing
its final report and three volumes of supporting
research. No major recommendation of the Commission,
as this chapter and the next discusses, was
implemented.
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boundaries come and go with the rise and fall of
unemployment rates or labor market shocks, but the essential
federal/state character of the program remains constant.
The debates which arise throughout the history of the
program culminate in the report of the National Commission
on Unemployment Compensation, a body which had all the
makings of a latter-day Committee on Economic Security.
Chapters that follow will show the fate of the Commission's
recommendations--and the consequences of what transpired.
Unemployment Insurance Before 1935
No sea change of the scale of the Social Security Act
of 1935 can come about without antecedents. In the case of
unemployment insurance, three strains of unemployment
compensation were present before the Committee on Economic
Security began meeting. The most influential approach was
the Wisconsin strategy, advocated with particular
forcefulness by Dr. John Commons of the University of
Wisconsin and advanced by Senator Henry Huber in that
state's legislature. This plan was characterized by four
main elements: 1) funds held in distinct pools from each
employer, 2) contributions from employers alone, 3) an
"experience rating" system to link tax rates and layoff
history for employers, 4) benefit durations dependent upon
pre-layoff employment history. The plan was adopted in
1932, but included a proviso that it would only take effect
if there were insufficient progress toward voluntary plans
on the part of employers within one and a half years.
Second, the "Ohio Plan", though never adopted, rallied
reform elements in that state, galvanized trade union
support to an extent that other plans did not, and differed
markedly from the Wisconsin plan. The Ohio plan contained:
employer and employee contributions to the benefit fund, a
pooling of money from all employers into one source for
benefits, and some experience rating of taxes.3 Advocates
for the Ohio plan, most notably Isaac Rubinow, believed that
their structure better represented the social insurance
function of an unemployment compensation system. In
contrast, the Wisconsin plan, modeled after workers
compensation law, was intended to discourage unemployment
from occurring by varying tax rates. To advocates of the
Ohio plan, such efforts were doomed to fail given the lack
of control that most employers have over their markets and,
hence, employment demands (Nelson, 1969).
A third strain of the activity around unemployment
insurance was the various voluntary programs run by trade
unions or employer associations. On the trade union side,
45 local unions and three national unions had unemployment
insurance funds in 1931 (Haber and Murray, 1965). The
"Ghent System," originating in Belgium in 1916, found favor
with many unions because it relied on existing "friendly
3 In a foreshadowing of events to come, Ohio employers
withheld their support for the plan until it included
more liberal experience rating.
organizations" or trade union support networks, though it
was not adopted in American cities. In many European cities
well before the Depression, municipal governments agreed to
supplement trade union unemployment insurance funds. On the
employer side, the "New Emphasis" (Nelson, 1969) encouraged
employers to establish their own unemployment insurance
funds, either alone or in concert with other employers in
their industry. The most famous of these efforts, the
"Rochester Plan", linked 14 firms in a voluntary agreement.
Each of the firms paid two percent of payroll into a fund,
which it administered and which it alone funded.4 General
Electric and J.I. Case had similar plans of their own, with
each including employee contributions. Whether employer-
driven or linked to trade unions, these voluntary plans were
usually conscious efforts to avoid governmental restrictions
on private control over social insurance.
Until 1935, Wisconsin was the only state to adopt
unemployment insurance, but it wasn't for want of trying in
the other states. Legislators in 17 states introduced 52
bills in 1931 (Haber and Murray, 1966). In 1933, 68 bills
were introduced in 25 states (Witte, 1945). But throughout
the period, even though study commissions and one side of
several state legislatures voted for bills, progress was
slow until federal action loomed large in 1935.
4 Officials from eight of the 14 "Rochester Plan" firms
testified in favor of general unemployment insurance
before federal or state hearings (Haber and Murray,
1966).
The Social Security Act Debates
Obviously, at the time of the Social Security Act, the
economic context of the Great Depression was the dominant
concern. Franklin Roosevelt had been a vociferous advocate
of unemployment insurance as Governor of New York even
before the Depression, sending then-Labor Commissioner
Perkins to Great Britain to study their system and
sponsoring an Interstate Conference on unemployment
insurance. As president, Roosevelt first endorsed the
Wagner-Lewis bill of 1934, but no action was taken when
employer resistance proved too strong and Roosevelt decided
the proposed reserves were too large.
In June of 1934, Roosevelt announced his intention to
advance a comprehensive social insurance plan and to
establish a Committee on Economic Security to develop such a
plan. The Committee had Francis Perkins as Chair, Edwin
Witte of Wisconsin as executive director, and Thomas Eliot
as counsel. The Committee employed a range of "experts" and
established various advisory committees to survey the
opinions of constituencies.
The unemployment insurance portion of the Committee's
work was dominated by one overarching concern--
constitutionality. There was some question at the time of
the Committee's deliberations of whether any federal effort
to establish unemployment compensation would be allowed by
the Supreme Court. In the shadow of the Schechter decision,
which ruled the National Reconstruction Act
unconstitutional5, many advocates feared that a national
unemployment insurance law would be struck down.
By several accounts, the turning point for the future
legislation was a Christmas holiday party in 1933 where
Supreme Court Justice Brandeis casually suggested to his
son-in-law, Paul Raushenbusch, an advocate for unemployment
insurance in Wisconsin, that a particular federal real
estate law case (Melon v. Florida) had set an excellent
precedent for federal legislation to induce states to adopt
insurance plans. The federal law imposed a uniform
inheritance tax, 80 percent of which was refunded if states
adopted certain behaviors. Raushenbusch took the hint and
worked with Thomas Eliot on the Wagner-Lewis Act of 1934,
drafting a financing provision that would follow the example
of the Federal Estate Tax Act of 1926 (Eliot, 1960; Haber
and Murray, 1966). Later, Eliot would be "tiresomely
persistent" that such provisions emerge from the Commission
deliberations, knowing in advance that the Supreme Court
would be favorably disposed toward that mechanism (Eliot,
1960).
In retrospect, the federal/state framework advocated in
the Committee's final report was a forgone conclusion.
Roosevelt, who gave notably little guidance to the
5 About the Schechter poultry case, one Roosevelt
administration official is said to have commented, "If
the Court said we couldn't do this with a dead chicken,
what else could we do?" (Leuchtenburg, 1963).
Committee's deliberations, suggested from the start that the
federal government should retain control over fund
investments and that state powers should be maximized. The
fear of Supreme Court action was always prevalent. Leading
members of the House Ways and Means Committee and Senate
Finance Committee agreed that only a federal/state program
would survive a test of constitutionality and secure state
cooperation (Witte, 1945). And the need for
"experimentation," a genuine concern given the virtual
absence of existing programs in the United States, weighed
heavily.
Nevertheless, debate raged within the Committee. Three
potential plans emerged: 1) a fully federal program, 2) a
subsidy plan, and 3) a tax incentive plan. The Subcommittee
on Unemployment Insurance of the Technical Committee on
Economic Security initially decided to recommend a fully
federal system, but in the end couldn't agree on a design
(Witte, 1945). The subsidy plan was supported as an
alternative by advocates of a federal program because it put
heavy emphasis on standards with minimal risk of
unconstitutionality. The subsidy plan would collect
employer taxes into a federal fund and disperse payments if
a state met prescribed standards.6 Some Committee members
6 Witte, the staff director of the Committee, was
fundamentally opposed to federalization and the subsidy
plan and used his influence accordingly. He would
later write that the subsidy plan "would not have given
the states any aid whatsoever, but would have made it
virtually obligatory for them to observe the standards
and staff believed there was not enough practical experience
to set federal standards in the subsidy plan (Haber and
Murray, 1966). Ultimately, the federal-state plan was sent
forward, though, as will be shown below, advocates of
federalization continued their efforts in other forums.
Along with constitutionality, two other concerns are
prevalent in the Committee's final report. First, the
Committee was concerned about interstate competition
restricting the program. They advocated a federal tax "to
remove the unfair competitive advantage that employers
operating in States which have failed to adopt a
compensation system enjoy over employers operating in States
which give such protection to their wage earners". Later,
they write, "So long as there is danger that business in
some States will gain a competitive advantage through
failure of the State to enact an unemployment compensation
law, few such laws will be enacted" (Committee on Economic
Security, 1935).
Second, they believed the states needed "wide
latitude..in order to conclude what types [of provisions]
are most practicable in this country." They argued the need
to "learn through demonstration what is best." At numerous
places in the draft, the overall uncertainty of the endeavor
to design an entire social security system comes through
clearly. Calls for experimentation are driven both by
for unemployment compensation prescribed by the
national government" (Witte, 1945).
technical uncertainty and by fear of constitutional
challenge.
The obvious conflict between the need to limit
interstate competition and the need to allow experimentation
was never reconciled by the Committee. Instead, they offer
the intellectual equivalent of a "punt": they stress that
"it may be possible that experimentation under the proposed
statute will show that at some time in the future a plan
built upon the other alternative suggestion [federalization]
should be substituted, in whole or in part, for that which
we are proposing." Along the same lines they optimistically
suggest that "should these fears expressed by the champions
of a federally administered system prove true, it is always
possible by subsequent legislation to establish such a
system." The Committee drove the point home further:
"Accordingly, Congress can at any time increase the
requirements which State laws must fulfill and may, if it
sees fit, at some future time, substitute a federally
administered system for the cooperative Federal-State system
we recommend" (Committee on Economic Security, 1935).7
The report of the Committee on Economic Security
advanced programs for employment assurance, unemployment
compensation, old-age security, security for children,
"risks arising out of ill health", and residual relief. It
7 Here and elsewhere in the report, it is apparent that
the Committee was more concerned with administrative
competency than with a state's potential for
infringement on claimants rights.
is a remarkable statement of the principles of social
insurance. By proposing, first, an "employment assurance"
program and then an unemployment insurance plan, it links
the desirability of full employment and the reality that
unemployment, however temporary, is unavoidable.8 The only
remnant of that insight that remains is the payment of
unemployment insurance benefits from Employment Service
offices.
The final report made five recommendations that found
their way into legislation: 1) a federal payroll tax,
offset for employers in states that pass unemployment
insurance legislation, to induce action by states, 2)
federal responsibility for safeguarding funds, 3) allowance
for experience rating of state tax rates, 4) a Social
Insurance Board in the Department of Labor to monitor state
compliance, 5) suggestions to states that they adopt waiting
periods, maximum benefit rates, work tests, and provisions
for seasonal workers.
The Federal/State Framework of the Social Security Act
The section of the Committee report that dealt with
unemployment insurance closed with a plea to Congress to
pass legislation in time for states to act before January
1936. The Committee's report was completed on January 15th
and on January 17, 1935, President Roosevelt sent a special
8 One interesting suggestion is the idea that exhaustion
of benefits should lead to public sector employment.
message to Congress urging prompt action. By August of
1935, the Social Security Act had passed.
Deliberations surrounding the Social Security Act were
anti-climactic at best, and most of the debate centered on
provisions besides unemployment insurance. The first bills
passed by 371 to 33 in the House and 77 to six in the
Senate.9 But there was a crucial difference between the two
bills.
In House hearings, Representative Coopers spotted the
inconsistency between using a federal tax to equalize state
burdens and also allowing states to have experience rating.
The following exchange occurred between Coopers and Dr.
Edwin Witte, testifying for the measure:
Coopers: Doctor, if I understand the underlying
principle supporting the idea of a Federal tax, it
is to make it uniform throughout the entire
country?
Witte: Yes, sir.
Coopers: Thereby meeting a difficulty that would
naturally arise on account of the element of
competition.
Witte: Certainly.
Coopers: That is, competition between certain
business enterprises. If the system is to make
allowance for certain industries to have special
accounts, does not that strike at the very
principle that is supposed to prevail throughout
the whole system?
9 Thomas Eliot tells a funny story that the Wagner-
Doughton Bill was actually filed in the House by David
Lewis. Chairman Doughton persuaded the House clerk to
give his copy of the bill a lower number than Lewis',
making it seem that he had introduced it first.
Witte: It does to a very slight extent, possibly;
I will grant you that. But there is a balancing
of that against the other factor that everybody
realizes -- that unemployment compensation should
be something more than merely a payment of
benefits on an insurance basis... (Committee on
Ways and Means, 1935).
Witte went on to stress the stabilizing effect of experience
rating, and Coopers maintained the position that it defeated
the purpose of a uniform tax. Coopers' position briefly
carried the day when the "additional credit" provisions were
summarily removed from the House version. Employer
witnesses in the Senate forcefully advocated experience
rating, and Senator LaFollette, oddly enough, offered a
supportive amendment, which passed the committee
unanimously.
No standards for benefit levels were included in the
Social Security Act. In 1959, Wilbur Mills, then Chairman
of the Ways and Means Committee, and James Carey, then
Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO, would reminisce about
the issue of a 50 percent wage replacement rate in the 1935
discussions. Both recalled widespread agreement and a
feeling that there was no need to legislate a 50 percent
standard. According to Carey, members of the Senate told
him, "Everybody accepts this so why do you have to legislate
on it?... (It is) the accepted philosophy in the States, in
the Congress, and there is no need to write it in" (Carey,
1959). In the early days, that was a sincere belief, but
the fact that benefit standards weren't written into law
would prove devastating to the principle.
The conference bill included experience rating
provisions, with no minimum tax rates. It also eliminated
provisions that linked federal tax rates to an index of
industrial production, substituting set federal rates
through 1938. Coverage provisions were reduced to employers
with eight or more workers for 20 weeks, excluding
agricultural workers, domestic servants, maritime workers,
nonprofit organizations, family members and government
workers. Provisions that allowed the Social Security Board
to enforce merit personnel policies in state agencies were
removed.
As finally passed, the unemployment insurance portions
of the Social Security Act are surprisingly sparse. Title
IX specifies employees covered by the Act and set a federal
tax of one percent of payroll in 1936, two percent in 1937,
and three percent in 1938. It set minimal conditions for a
state's employer to receive the 90 percent credit on the
federal tax in return for federal approval of the state law.
It set limits on experience rating. It established the
Unemployment Trust Fund in the Treasury and gave the Social
Security Board limited authority to review state laws.
Title III established federal grants to states for
program administration. Money to cover administrative costs
was to be distributed by a formula based on population,
coverage, and "other factors as the Board found relevant."
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Tax credits would only flow if the state met Title IX
criteria and the full grant for administrative costs would
be granted if the state had sufficient administrative
guidelines as determined by the Board, provisions for fair
hearings, provided reports when requested by the Board, and
provided any information requested by federal agencies.
These titles established several federal powers. The
definition of "covered employment" was established as a
federal prerogative. A federal tax with credits was set,
without indexing. The Social Security Board was granted
review authority, but its scope was limited. For their
employers to receive tax credits, states had to: 1) pay
benefits through employment offices, 2) wait two years after
collecting taxes before paying benefits, 3) immediately
deposit tax revenue in the Federal Unemployment Trust Fund,
and 4) withdraw fund money only for unemployment insurance.
The only requirements for states relating to claimants,
besides the fair hearings of Title III, were restrictions on
denial of continued eligibility. In the so-called "labor
standards" provisions, the Act specifies:
"Compensation will not be denied to any
otherwise eligible unemployed worker for refusing
to accept new work under any of the following
conditions:
A) if the position offered is vacant due
directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor
dispute,
B) if the wages, hours, or other conditions
of the work offered are substantially less
favorable to the individual than those prevailing
for similar work in the locality,
C) if as a condition of being employed the
individual would be required to join a company
union or to resign from or refrain from joining
any bona fide labor organization.
Note that these restrictions on denials are only related to
suitable work requirements, not limitations on initial
eligibility. Federal powers were limited to fund
administration, minimum coverage, federal tax rates, and
review of state law for conformity of continued benefit
denials and fair hearings for claimants. As further
inducement to state action, all program administration costs
were federal. States were granted complete control of
eligibility, duration, benefit levels, state tax rates, and
hiring practices. No lower bound for experience rates was
set.10
The Founding Principles of the Federal/State UI System
The debates within the Committee on Economic Security
and within Congress around the Social Security Act reveal
several founding assumptions:
1. Most importantly, they assumed that most
unemployment spells are brief. The Committee report
suggests a four week waiting period for benefits and maximum
10 The law permitted even further downward pressure on tax
rates by allowing "additional credits" beyond
experience rating. States could grant these to
employers who had established guaranteed employment
accounts or separate reserve accounts, within certain
fiduciary guidelines.
durations of 16 weeks, reduced to 15 wherever possible
(Committee on Economic Security, 1935a). They note that,
though the Depression had lengthened unemployment spells,
"in ordinary industrial periods the great majority of
workers who become unemployed find other work in a much
shorter time" (p. 14). The Committee recommended benefit
durations of up to 16 weeks, followed by public works
employment.
2. Most of the unemployed return to their original
employer. Related to (1) above, the Committee asserts that
"normally the insured worker will return to his old job or
find other work before his right to benefits is exhausted"
(Committee on Economic Security, 1935a). The idea that most
unemployment was temporary and that workers would return to
previous employers became strong elements of program design.
3. Most of the unemployed are "job losers" and the
involuntarily unemployed are clearly recognizable. A
pamphlet designed to explain the new program to workers in
1935 stated, "Unemployment insurance is designed primarily
to protect the great mass of workers who are usually
steadily employed and who lose their jobs for limited
periods" (Committee on Economic Security, 1935b). In its
original report, the Committee notes that the program is
"far from being complete protection" but it is "a valuable
first line of defense for the largest group in our
population, the industrial worker ordinarily steadily
employed" (Committee on Economic Security, 1935a).
4. Experience rating will reduce layoffs. The debate
about experience rating has already been described. The
notion that experience rating will reduce unemployment rests
on two essential conditions. First, that a given employer
has control over employment levels, i.e., temporary layoffs
are determined by small marginal cost considerations.
Second, that the UI tax will be a sufficient cost item to
make it effective at that margin. Toward these ends, the
original Committee report suggested taxation of all payrolls
(no limited taxable wage base) and a minimum tax rate,
regardless of experience, of one percent (Committee on
Economic Security, 1935a). With the addition of experience
rating in the Social Security Act, the role of the federal
tax in reducing state competition and equalizing program
parameters was effectively nullified, as Coopers predicted.
Early Experience: 1937-1950
The primary goal of the Social Security Act was to
induce state action without Supreme Court disapproval -- a
goal reached with surprising alacrity. By 1937, 48 states,
Alaska, Hawaii, and Washington, D.C. had enacted
unemployment insurance legislation. In the process, a basic
misreading of how programs would emerge became apparent.
For many in Congress and in the Committee on Economic
Security, the lack of prior state experience suggested that
a range of state efforts would emerge, providing examples
for later state revisions. As modern usage would phrase it,
the states were to be "laboratories" (Osborne, 1988). In
fact, states, with no prior experience in the area and
fearful of nonconformity with federal law, looked to the
Social Security Board for program guidelines. Draft
unemployment insurance bills, assembled by the Board, were
adopted with minimal changes by most states.1'
Slight variations in program parameters made the
unemployment insurance system a maze of regulations from the
start, yet the basic structures and benefit levels were
almost identical across states.12 In 1939, 48 jurisdictions
had pooled funds instead of individual employer reserves, 45
had employer taxation only, 48 had uniform tax rates of 2.7
percent before experience rating, and 40 had experience
rating. Wide variation in benefit formulas and earnings
requirements had little effect in practice: in 49
jurisdictions, the weekly benefit was about 50 percent of
prior wages; most states paid 14 or 16 weeks of benefits
(regardless of prior employment duration or earnings); 48
jurisdictions set maximum benefits at $15 (in December 1939
the maximum weekly benefit was 50 percent or more of average
11 According to Rubin, one state mistakenly adopted all
the alternatives set forth in the "Draft Bills for
State Unemployment Compensation of Pooled Fund and
Employer Reserve Account Types" (Rubin, 1983).
12 What Haber and Joseph wrote in 1939 is just as accurate
today: "Not one in a hundred workers in Michigan
understands how his benefits are computed."
weekly wages in 49 jurisdictions); and 45 jurisdictions used
prior earnings, not employment duration, to determine
eligibility. Disqualifications were limited to voluntary
quit without just cause, misconduct discharge, refusing
suitable work, and labor disputes (Haber and Joseph, 1939).
The state programs were rapidly established and, just
as rapidly, they developed entrenched advocates and
generated Congressional concern. One year before benefits
were paid in all states, the Interstate Conference of
Employment Security Agencies (ICESA) was established with
federal support. Intended to provide a conduit for
information, ICESA was to prove a powerful advocate for
state autonomy at critical junctures in the federal
standards debate. The rapid establishment of ICESA, and the
federal role in creating the organization, is ironic given
the sanguine appeal of the Committee on Economic Security
that "all states must include in their statutes provisions
to the effect that those acts shall not be deemed to create
any vested interest preventing modification or repeal and
that a similar reservation of power be made by the Federal
Government" (Committee on Economic Security, 1935). This
monumental example of wishful thinking was made moot within
two years of its writing.13
As early as 1939, one year after benefits were first
paid in all states, the House Ways and Means Committee
13 To be fair, the intent of the provision was limited to
leaving open the potential for adjustments. It was not
an appeal against all political organizing.
discussed a bill (HR 6635) which would have changed the
practice of experience rating. The House passed legislation
stating that a statewide reduction plan would be allowed
only if a state met four federal standards for benefit
durations, benefit levels, waiting periods, and partial
benefits for those who fail monetary eligibility
requirements. The Senate struck the provision (Mills,
1959). Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that one year before
and one year after benefits were first paid in all states,
an organization was built to defend existing state programs
and Congressional action was attempted to restrain state
powers.
Many supporters of federal standards who served on the
Committee on Economic Security found employment in the
Social Security Board. In Annual Reports of 1942, 1943, and
1944, the Social Security Board advocated a federal
unemployment insurance system. Throughout the 1940s and
later, Eveline Burns and William Haber, advocating a broader
social insurance perspective, and Edwin Witte, arguing a
more limited role, staked out their political terrain in
articles and essays. Burns and Haber also worked together
in the National Resource Planning Board, producing
"Security, Work, and Relief Policies," which advocated a
federal unemployment insurance system as part of post-war
social policy.
In 1943, with the Murray-Dingell bill (S 1161), the
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) supported a
federal unemployment insurance system. Again in 1945, under
the Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill, the CIO and the Social
Security Board supported federalization. The Interstate
Conference of Employment Security Agencies (ICESA), the
Council of State Governments, and employer organizations
opposed it. Calls for a federal program, whatever their
ideological and technical merit, proved politically
unrealizable.
Fears of post-War recession sparked renewed interest in
program reform. In 1945, Truman advanced a bill to
supplement state benefits, allowing a maximum $25 a week for
up to 26 weeks. Even this modest proposal, passed by the
Senate, brought forth some heavy political artillery. The
National Association of Manufacturers issued a press release
saying, "Unemployment compensation should remain the
responsibility of State governments, without further control
or supplementation by the Federal government" (Congressional
Quarterly, 1945). In the Ways and Means Committee, Wilbur
Mills killed all Administration action with a motion that
"further consideration of S 1274 and related Administration
bills be indefinitely postponed so that the Committee can
receive more concrete information as to what the
unemployment situation is to be during the reconversion
period" (Congressional Quarterly, 1945).
Gauging the political wind, the 1945 and 1946 Social
Security Board annual reports pulled back from
federalization, advocating a plan similar to the subsidy
plan that was the fall-back position of federalization
advocates in the Committee on Economic Security. By 1948,
the Board was advocating federal standards with no change in
federal-state administrative structure. In 1950, both the
CIO and the AFL passed a resolutions continuing support for
a federal unemployment insurance program.
Truman
In 1949, the unemployment rate brushed against six
percent. Between 1945 and 1949, the number of claimants
exhausting state benefits rose from 250,440 to 1,934,709
(Employment and Training Administration, 1983). On April 6,
1950, Truman issued a message to Congress that represented
the first action at the Presidential level to advance
federal standards for unemployment insurance. Truman
advocated extending coverage to firms employing one or more
employees (down from eight), federal civilian employees,
employees on commission, some agricultural workers, and
Puerto Rico. Second, he recommended a 50 percent wage
replacement rate, up to $30 a week, plus dependents
allowances; a minimum 26 weeks of benefits; and, to pay for
it, a taxable wage base of $4,800, up from $3,000. Third,
he requested, but didn't specify, provisions for paying
interstate claims. Fourth, he called for tougher laws on
fraud, but a narrower range of disqualifications. Fifth, he
proposed financial arrangements to provide for "reinsurance
grants" to fund states that approach trust fund insolvency
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(Truman, 1950). All told, his recommendations were a
sweeping, comprehensive appeal for federal control.
In August, Truman signed the Social Security Act
Amendments of 1950, which contained an extension of federal
advances to state trust funds, but no new federal standards.
More significantly, the Amendments included the Knowland
Amendment that limited the power of the Secretary of Labor
to declare state unemployment insurance laws out of
conformity with federal law. The Amendment said that the
federal government could not withhold administrative funds
until the highest state court had ruled on the question of
whether the state's "labor standards" provisions were in
compliance with federal law. Truman signed the Act, but
voiced concern that the Knowland Amendment would force
workers to accept employment "at substandard wages or
working conditions" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1950).
In November, the CIO convention passed a resolution
continuing to advocate a federal unemployment insurance
program and specifically condemning the Knowland
amendment. 14 It included a fall back position that, "if
congressional support for such a national system cannot now
be obtained," an "interim step" would be federal standards,
extended coverage, reinsurance grants, abolition of
experience rating, and additional benefits for servicemen
14 The resolution dealing with unemployment insurance
included a call for national employment services
offices and "effective measures to end discrimination
against Negroes and women" (CIO, 1950).
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and federal employees. That resolution, and subsequent
testimony, also resoundingly condemned the Interstate
Conference of Employment Security Agencies for undermining
the goals of unemployment insurance (CIO, 1950).
It was not until December, 1950, that hearings were
held on HR 8059 which embodied Truman's call for federal
standards. Ten of the speakers were from labor
organizations, three from employers (the Missouri State
Chamber of Commerce, the Tennessee Wholesale Grocers, and a
letter from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce), and the rest from
the Truman administration or civic organizations. In
addition to the rise in benefit exhaustions, many testified
to the fall in wage replacement rates. Table 1.1 compares
wage replacement rates in 1939, the first year for which all
states reported, and 1950.
[ Table 1.1 ]
In 1939, only three states were close to or above a 50
percent wage replacement rate (Utah, New Mexico, and
Wyoming). By 1950, the highest state (Utah) paid only 45.6
percent of lost wages. Between 1942 and 1952, the average
wage replacement rate under state programs dropped about 10
percentage points.
An important development was the presentation by
Administration officials--both Maurice Tobin, Secretary of
Labor and Robert Goodwin, Director of the Bureau of
Employment Security--using Congressional testimony to speak
to the issue of disqualifications and to call for federal
action (Tobin, 1950; Goodwin, 1950). During questioning,
Tobin went so far as to say "I do not believe that a
worker's wage credits should be canceled under any
circumstances" (p. 52). States can treat disallowed
behaviors in three ways. They can 1) impose defined penalty
periods, 2) impose "durational disqualifications" which keep
a claimant from receiving benefits for the duration of their
unemployed spell, or 3) reduce or cancel benefit rights. A
state with durational disqualifications, but no reduction of
benefit rights, would allow an unemployed worker to claim
his or her full prior entitlement after finding new
employment following a disqualifying act. Some states
combine durational disqualifications and benefit reductions
or eliminations, meaning that the benefit reductions follow
the worker to his or her next job. Table 1.2 is a reprint
of Director Goodwin's submission on disqualifications.
[ Table 1.2 ]
It shows that durational disqualifications were increasing
as early as 1950. The trend, as we'll see, continued into
the 1980s without federal intervention.
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A submission from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce made
arguments that would echo throughout the history of the
federal standards debates. 15 First, federal standards were
said to be "a practical invasion of functional areas
traditionally reserved to the States". Second, unemployment
insurance should never extend beyond "temporary periods of
involuntary unemployment." Third, federal action is
unnecessary because "where the need actually exists for
further revision of [state] programs, [states] can be
counted on to take the initiative" (Miles, 1950). These
three defenses (states' rights, insurance not welfare, the
system works) were destined to be repeated at every juncture
in the federal standards debate.
In the end, HR 8059 was doomed by employer and state
agency resistance despite the undeniable slippage of wage
replacement rates and increase in exclusionary practices.
The subcommittee on Unemployment Insurance of the Committee
on Ways and Means never issued a report to the full
Committee. In 1952, bills by Moody and Dingell (S 2504, HR
6174), Mills (HR 4133) and Forand (HR 6954) were advanced to
supplement unemployment insurance for defense workers, for
15 Unlike the Chamber of Commerce arguments, Secretary of
Labor Tobin's belief that unemployment insurance is
anti-communist was not oft-repeated. He said: "Our
private enterprise system has become much stronger, and
there is very little room in America for false
ideologies, certainly very little room for communism
and such philosophies, because the Congress back in
1935 had the courage and the intelligence to go forward
with the kind of a program that has made this a
healthier America" (Tobin, 1950).
federal loans to states, and for grants to states,
respectively. Neither Senate nor House Committees took
action following testimony (Congressional Quarterly Almanac,
1952).16
Eisenhower
Between 1953 and 1954, the unemployment rate spiked
from 2.9 percent to 5.5 percent and average unemployment
durations rose by 3.8 weeks (to 11.8 weeks). Eisenhower's
unemployment insurance program took one step back from the
federal standards debate, but kept the issue alive. The
1954 Economic Report of the President called for extensions
of coverage and non-interest bearing loans to states, but no
federal standards (Council of Economic Advisors, 1954).
Eisenhower did, however, state to Congress that "States
raise these dollar maximums so that the payments to the
great majority of the beneficiaries may equal at least half
their regular earnings" (Eisenhower, 1954). This opened
debate about the meaning of "great majority" and what
federal action would follow if such change did not occur.
Hearing were held in June before the House Ways and
Means Committee on five bills to extend coverage and provide
grants to states suffering insolvency. It is noteworthy
16 Testimony by Emil Mazey of the UAW CIO was
characteristic of the stinging oratory of the period.
He cited federal support for corporations and emergency
food for cattle in South Dakota. "We believe that we
ought to treat human beings at least as well as we
treat cattle" (Mazey, 1952).
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that James Carey, Secretary-Treasurer of the CIO, testified
on behalf of HR 9430, a bill with federal standards for
benefits and disqualifications that was not a formal subject
of the hearings! In 1954, Congress passed a revised Title
XV of the Social Security Act to cover federal employees and
extended coverage to firms with four or more employees. No
action was taken toward federal standards for benefit
levels, durations, eligibility, or penalties.
In 1958, benefit exhaustions were mounting once again.
Senator John Kennedy emerged as an advocate of extended
benefits in all states and coverage extensions (S 3244). In
March, Eisenhower countered with a proposal that states
temporarily extend their benefits by 50 percent. If states
did not, the federal government would take over program
administration in recalcitrant states (HR 11679). 17 In
April, House Ways and Means reported a bill containing a 16-
week extension for exhaustees. On May 1, the House voted
instead for a voluntary plan, granting federal aid to states
that chose to extend benefit durations. Kennedy offered two
amendments to strengthen the measure. Both failed. The
Senate voted 80 to 0 to support the voluntary plan. George
Meany, AFL-CIO President, called it "the biggest hoax ever
perpetrated on the unemployed workers of America"
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1958).
17 The threat was hard to take seriously. In 1958, when
Eisenhower threatened to take action, no state had
matched the goals he had proposed for them in 1954.
In 1959, Kennedy again lead the charge for unemployment
reform. His bill (S 791) went further than what he
attempted in 1958, including uniform benefit duration of 39
weeks and payments of not less than 50 percent of average
weekly earnings. Its companion bill in the House, HR 3547,
sponsored by Representative Karsten, included: a maximum
benefit standard of two-thirds of state average weekly
wages, benefits averaging at least 50 percent of an
individual's average weekly wage up to the maximum, 39 weeks
of benefits, an earnings requirement of 30 times weekly
benefits, coverage of employers with one or more employee,
and reinsurance grants.
Instead of broad reform, the House and Senate voted to
extend the voluntary Temporary Unemployment Compensation Act
for three more months in March of 1959. On March 23, 1959,
Eisenhower reiterated his contention that unemployment
insurance was strictly a state responsibility (Congressional
Quarterly Almanac, 1959). In hearings before the House Ways
and Means Committee, Under Secretary of Labor James
O'Connell stated the same (O'Connell, 1959). On April 8th,
the AFL-CIO held a rally of about 6,000 to support
unemployment insurance reform. Between the 7th and 16th,
the House held eight days of hearings, producing over 1,000
pages of testimony. On May 14th, the Ways and Means
committee voted against HR 3547 and other bills containing
federal standards, despite the fact that the average benefit
amount had slipped to one-third of average weekly wages and
30 percent of claimants exhausted benefits in 1959. On the
18th, the Committee ended discussion without agreeing on
unemployment insurance reform of any kind. It even
rejected, 11-13, a statement calling on states to raise
their standards, as Eisenhower suggested, because opponents
felt that states would feel too much pressure from such a
statement (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1959).
Kennedy-Johnson
As a Senator, Kennedy had been consistently rebuffed in
his efforts for extended benefits and federal standards. As
President, changes in unemployment insurance were a high
priority. Within a month of taking office, Kennedy proposed
a bill to temporarily extend benefit durations by up to 13
weeks on a voluntary basis using federal funds. This passed
both houses and became law on March 24th.
In 1963, Kennedy sent a message to Congress requesting
numerous federal standards for unemployment insurance. His
bill included: coverage extensions; a federal extended
benefits program of an additional 26 weeks for workers with
long prior employment records; benefits of 50 percent of a
worker's weekly wage up to a maximum 50 percent of the state
average wage, increasing to 66 2/3 percent by 1970; grants
to equalize state benefit burdens; a $5,200 taxable wage
base by 1966; and an additional FUTA tax of .3 percent. In
fact, the only unemployment insurance legislation that
passed was two laws to reduce FUTA tax burdens
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1963).
President Johnson tried again in 1965. Much like the
Kennedy proposal of 1963, HR 8282 and S 1991 contained
coverage extensions, benefit level and duration
requirements, federal extended benefits for 26 weeks, a
taxable wage base to match the Social Security wage base,
maximum disqualification periods of six weeks for most
infractions, provisions for interstate claims, and allowance
for unemployed workers enrolled in training programs.
Hearings in the House ran through the entire month of
August, 1965 and concluded in March of 1966, filling six
volumes.
The sixth volume of testimony was gathered in March of
1966 and deals solely with testimony from the Interstate
Conference of Employment Security Agencies (ICESA) regarding
HR 8282. The hearing was a presentation coordinated by the
chair of ICESA, Eldred Hill. Each speaker addressed a
specific aspect of the legislation, presenting the consensus
from the national conference of ICESA in Phoenix. Given the
history of ICESA in resisting federal standards, the
testimony of James Rosbrow, Employment Security Commissioner
of Delaware, is worth quoting at length:
"The feeling of the majority of the members
of the Conference in Phoenix, Arizona and without
much question of the majority of the States
concerned in the program, is that the inequities
between States have become wider and wider.
Twenty States do have a guaranteed 50-percent
benefit. The other 30 States vary, depending on a
variety of benefit formulas. It has been felt by
a great many people for a long time that if
unemployment compensation benefits could not meet
minimum nonenforceable needs, they were shooting
far off target, and not providing the basic
support that the act was originally designed to
meet.. .We believe, and so does the majority of the
state administrators, that the time has come for
the Federal Government to set some minimum
standards in this area" (p. 57).
ICESA recommended a benefit standard of 50 percent of gross
weekly wages. No bill was passed.
Nixon
In July of 1969, Nixon issued a statement on
unemployment insurance to Congress that included numerous
federal standards, coverage extensions, and extended
benefits (Nixon, 1969). Taking a cue from Eisenhower, Nixon
set a standard that "80 percent of insured workers should be
able to receive a benefit equal to one-half of their wages,"
or, said differently, "a maximum of two-thirds of the
average weekly wage in the state" (p. 3). But, as with
Eisenhower, the threat of federalization was veiled: "Up to
now, the responsibility for determining benefit amounts has
been the responsibility of the States... I call upon the
States to act within the next two years to meet this goal,
thereby averting the need for Federal action" (p. 3). The
bill that Nixon advanced did not set a two year timetable
for state action, specify state targets, nor suggest what
federal action around benefit standards would be "averted"
by state action.
HR 12625 was the Nixon Administration's vehicle for
reforming unemployment insurance. It included federal
limits on disqualifications. Section 121(a) barred states
from imposing cancellation or total reduction of wage
credits for any offenses other than fraud, misconduct, or
disqualifying income.'8 It also expanded the taxable wage
base (to $6,000 by 1973) and introduced a federal extended
benefit program with an unemployment rate trigger. At the
same time, it proposed monetary earnings qualifications that
were higher than those in 20 states (US Department of Labor,
1969).
AFL-CIO testimony went straight to the issue of federal
standards. They called for federal standards to match the
appeal of the Nixon administration for a 50 percent benefit
standard. On disqualifications, they said "the provisions
in the bill implies (sic) that the Administration recognizes
the basic injustice of these practices, but the bill would
not eliminate them" (Fair, 1969). They called for federal
standards on disqualifications and a maximum six week
postponement of benefits.
ICESA (Rothell, 1969), the US Chamber of Commerce
(Hibbard, 1969), and the National Association of
Manufacturers (Lumb, 1969) lined up in support of coverage
18 The language on disqualifications was lifted from HR
15119 of 1966.
extensions and an extended benefits program, but opposed the
disqualification provisions. Representative Schneebeli and
Chairman Mills drew out the core of ICESA's resistance.
Schneebeli at one point seems exasperated, saying to Rothell
of ICESA: "If we could differentiate here which provisions
you oppose for the principle and which you oppose merely
because they are becoming Federal standards, I think there
is more meaning to your whole summary" (p. 348). Later,
Chairman Mills and the witness have this dialogue:
Chairman Mills: "Aren't all these matters.. .all
of them really Federal standards?.. .And if there
is opposition to it within your organization, it
is because it is a Federal standard rather than
because of the merits, is that not right?"
Mr. Rothell: "I think in most cases; yes, sir"
(p. 349).
Employer groups consistently characterized the bill as
unnecessary federal intervention. In a strange twist, many
employer representatives stated that federal intervention
was too strong a measure for such easily reached standards--
as if they would favor intervention for really tough
standards!
In the end, the Employment Security Act Amendments of
1970 imposed few restrictions on states and made few demands
on them, except asking them to pay for half of a triggered
Extended Benefits (EB) program. The acts established a
permanent EB program, extended coverage, and expanded the
federal taxable wage base to $4,200. The wage base expanded
by less than half of what Nixon proposed for its 1973 level
and $200 less than what he proposed for the first of several
increases. It was the first increase in the taxable wage
base since 1939. Section 3304(a) (10) prohibited the
cancellation of wage credits or total reduction of benefit
rights except for misconduct in connection with work, fraud
in a claim, or receipt of disqualifying income. These
prohibitions, as will be shown, proved less restrictive than
they might appear.
The 1970 establishment of a permanent EB program proved
a fateful juncture when, five years later, unemployment
rates hit a then post-War high. The reality of the new
world trade situation was coming to bear on the U.S.
economy. In 1975 Nixon returned to the issue of federal
standards for UI. At that time, the Subcommittee on
Unemployment Compensation of the House Ways and Means
Committee held a series of three sets of hearings. The
first and second hearings were on existing programs and
temporary benefit extensions (April and May, 1975). The
third was on permanent changes (July, 1975). In April, John
Dunlop, Secretary of Labor, introduced concepts that he
would later present as legislation. These included new
triggers for a single, permanent extended benefits program;
an unspecified increase in the taxable wage base;
"legislating" to improve benefit amounts; and a federal
commission to study unemployment insurance reform. The
administration introduced HR 8614 to accomplish these goals.
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When Dunlop testified again in August, he explicitly
advocated federal standards for benefit levels, setting the
standard "proposed by all presidents beginning with
Eisenhower"1 9 of at least 80 percent of insured workers
receiving at least half their previous wages.
The president of ICESA, Frank Walsh, testified in
support of the federal benefit standard Dunlop advocated.
Moreover, he stated that "although the state agencies have
long accepted the principle that the maximum should be at
least two-thirds of the statewide average wage, they have
found it difficult to achieve this objective due to the
competitive factor on program costs" (Walsh, 1975).
Although some states in his organization voted against
federal standards, a majority voted in favor of them, a
significant confirmation of ICESA's change of position since
the 1940s.
The AFL-CIO supported HR 8366 which included federal
standards for benefit levels, duration, and
disqualifications (Seidman, 1975).20 The National
Association of Manufacturers counseled the "preferability of
preserving the federal-state structure", citing its
19 Actually, the first was Truman.
20 There were still glimpses of the CIO commitment to a
federal program even in 1975. Leonard Woodcock,
president of the UAW, testified that "the best answer"
for financing was full federal funding through a
uniform national tax, but, given the political
realities, endorsed additional federal support as "a
step in the right direction" (Woodcock, 1975). It is
also interesting that the UAW opposed the National
Commission on the grounds that "this is time for
action--not study."
"flexibility" and "greater responsiveness to the diverse
effects of economic conditions" (Craiger, 1975).
Surprisingly, the Chamber of Commerce spoke for benefit
extensions, though they maintained their opposition to
federal benefit standards (Kreyling, 1975).
The Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976
extended coverage to state and local government employees
and some agricultural household employees, expanded the
taxable wage base, raised the FUTA tax rate, and revised the
Extended Benefit triggers. They contained no federal
standards for benefits, duration, or disqualifications.
Instead, as explored in the next section, they authorized a
National Commission on Unemployment Compensation.
The National Commission on Unemployment Compensation
The Commission chair was Wilbur Cohen, LBJ School of
Public Affairs and its Executive Director was James Rosbow.
Bert Seidman (AFL-CIO Social Security Department), Ken
Morris (UAW Region 1B), Edward Sullivan (SEIU), and Wilbur
Daniels (ILGWU) were labor representatives. Employer
representatives were Beatrice Coleman (Maidenform), Warren
Cooper (Kaiser Aluminum), John Crosier (Massachusetts
Business Roundtable) and Dolores Sanchez (Eastern Group
Publications). Public members were Walter Bevins
(Mississippi Employment Security Commission), Eldred Hill
(Unemployment Benefit Advisors), Alphonse Jackson (Louisiana
House of Representatives), and Mary Rose Oakar (US House of
Representatives).
The Commission released an interim report in 1978 and a
final report, including three volumes of supplementary
research, in July of 1980.21 Their remit was broad: to
review the practice of the entire unemployment insurance
system in the United States for the first time since the
Committee on Economic Security. The final report contains
recommendations for coverage, benefit adequacy, longer-term
unemployment, financing, administration, intergovernmental
regulations, relationships to other programs, and women in
the unemployment insurance program. The Commission offers
recommendations for both state and Congressional action.
The Commission was pivotal for its scope, but for
purposes of this discussion a narrower look is needed. The
Commission was a high water mark for the federal standards
debate, the peak of awareness of the need for quantitative
standards and federal intervention. Unfortunately for
claimants in the 1980s, it is also noteworthy for the
failure of its vision to reach realization. The core
federal standards arguments in the report are around benefit
adequacy:
Earnings requirements. The Commission stopped short of
suggesting federal standards for work requirements, instead
21 The International Union, UAW released a supplemental
report to the National Commission in April, 1979,
presented by president Doug Fraser.
admonishing the states to avoid flat dollar amount earnings
requirements (suggesting weeks of work or percentage of
wages formulas instead), and ideally to adopt a maximum
demand of 39 weeks work with a minimum of 14 weeks. In
their recommendation for benefit duration, a maximum
earnings requirement was included.
Benefit levels. By a vote of seven to five, the
Commission recommended federal standards for benefit levels
equivalent to those repeated since Eisenhower: a maximum of
not less than two-thirds of average weekly wages in covered
employment, with the majority of claimants receiving 50
percent or more or their previous average weekly wage. The
dissenters on the Commission raised the specter of full
federalization if benefit levels were set nationally.
Duration of benefits. The Commission recommended
(seven to five) an "initial" federal standard of no more
than 39 weeks work for 26 weeks benefits. They also
recommended that the standard should move gradually to less
than 39 weeks. They did not set a federal standard for
benefit duration, instead recommending that states provide
at least 26 weeks and have no more than a one week waiting
period. Cooper and Hill dissented on the waiting period.
Daniels, Morris, and Seidman opposed any waiting period.
Disqualifications. The Commission stated that "in the
area of cancellation of benefit rights (other than fraud),
the trend has been so strong that the Congress should
intervene to correct what is widely regarded as a loophole
in the Federal law" (p. 48). Accordingly, by an eight to
two vote with one abstention, the Commission recommended
federal standards to limit reduction of benefit rights to
fraud or receipt of disqualifying income.
The list of recommendations for state action was
lengthy: no disqualification for "good cause" voluntary
quits (including sexual harassment), "misconduct" should be
related to the claimant's employment, "suitable work" should
be decided case-by-case, when a claimant anticipates recall
they should not be disqualified for refusing work during the
first six weeks of unemployment, and that disqualifications
should not include a reemployment and earnings requirement.
The latter would have stricken down durational
disqualifications, about which more will be said below.
These recommendations were adopted by five to four with two
abstentions. Two more blows were struck against durational
disqualifications and reduced benefit rights. First, the
Commission voted against any disqualification that would
apply to a claimant's next job. Second, they recommended
that states disqualify "for a variable period of weeks
within a minimum and maximum" (p. 49). Both recommendations
were directly aimed at durational disqualifications and
passed by nine to zero with two abstentions. It is highly
significant that Cooper and Hill, who voted against almost
all restrictions on states' rights, abstained instead of
voting "nay".
By almost unanimous decision (one nay), the Commission
stated that no state should have laws or regulations "that
would automatically disqualify an individual who had a
recent record of steady part-time employment" (p. 49).
Given the vagueness of "automatically", "recent", and
"steady", the near unanimity of the Commission is surprising
and can only indicate that they believed part-time workers
were badly served by state laws.
By eight to three, they argued that states should not
disqualify a claimant who became temporarily ill or disabled
after filing, provided that no suitable work is offered
them. By eight to two with one abstention, the Commission
recommended against specific "actively seeking work"
requirements, instead supporting a standard of "doing those
things which a reasonably prudent person in his or her
circumstances would do to find work" (p. 49).
Benefit taxation. The Commission recommended repeal of
the then-existing partial taxation of unemployment insurance
benefits.
Despite the fanfare of setting up the Commission, their
recommendations in keeping with 40 years of pressure from
presidential administrations, and the seriousness of debate
and research during their deliberations, the recommendations
of the Commission were never translated into federal
legislation. In fact, ICESA, which had been steadily
endorsing increased federal standards, reversed itself on
many recommendations. Appendix A shows the fate of each of
the Commission's recommendations as of 1993. As the next
chapter will show, throughout the 1980s most state
legislatures acted distinctly contrary to Commission
recommendations.
Summary
The assumptions about economic behavior upon which the
Social Security Act was founded, and which have remained in
effect despite repeated efforts by reformers, were no longer
tenable when the National Commission issued its report, and
they have proven less so during the 1980s. At the same
time, only marginal changes have been made to the program as
the economic situation in which it operates has been vastly
transformed, making the program almost anachronistic. This
has proven particularly true for women as the "male
breadwinner" model of unemployment recipients (Pearce, 1993;
Pearce, 1991) becomes increasingly unrepresentative of the
experience of most workers.
Taking each underlying assumption in turn:
1. It is an insufficient understanding to assume that
most unemployment spells are brief. In 1992, only 34.8
percent of all unemployment spells were less than five weeks
duration and 20.6 percent of the unemployed were out 27
weeks or more. In 1990, before the current recession really
took hold, 21.9 percent of the unemployed were out of work
15 weeks or more.
2. Significant numbers of the unemployed today are not
likely to return to their previous employers. Indeed, as
will be seen in Chapter Four, more and more of the
unemployed are changing industries and/or occupations upon
reemployment.
3. Job losers on layoff are a smaller portion of all
unemployed workers. In 1992, job losers were slightly more
than half of all unemployed workers (56 percent), but job
losers on layoff were less than one-fourth of all job losers
(24 percent). The graph below shows how consistently small
a portion of all job losers are job losers on layoff.
[ Graph 1.1 1
Moreover, as will be seen in Chapter Three, recessionary
increases in job losers as a percentage of all unemployed
are no longer sufficient to boost the percentage of the
unemployed receiving benefits because state programs are
frequently excluding even these "involuntary" unemployed.
In part this is due to an increase in the number of
unemployed who appear, under current criteria, to be "casual
workers" as excluded from the system since the beginning
(Pearce, 1991). Also, job losers' application rates have
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fallen, so they are less likely to receive benefits than
they were in the past (Blank and Card, 1989).
Because the decline in unemployed workers anticipating
recall is central to the analysis and reform proposal
presented here, Graph 1.2 illustrates another aspect of the
changing experience of unemployment.
[ Graph 1.2 ]
The graph shows two important facts. First, during the
preceeding four recessions, it was never true, as the
Committee on Economic Security assumed, that most of
unemployed expected to return to their previous employers.
Second, the most recent experience shows how dramatically
wrong that assumption has become. During the most recent
contraction, only 14 percent of unemployed job losers
expected to be recalled.
4. Experience rating proves increasingly ineffective,
if it ever was effective, as a spur to maintain employment
(Wagman, 1982). This is true because (1) the forces
affecting employment levels are well beyond the control of
most employers, and (2) the wage base has been eroded so
much that UI is a tiny portion of total business cost. The
graph shows UI taxes as a portion of total business cost for
an average Michigan manufacturer.
[ Graph 1.3 1
As tax rates and taxable wage bases have fallen, experience
rating has become less of an incentive to maintain
production. At the same time, the changing economy provides
less firm-level control over employment if a firm did want
to respond to experience rating. Neoclassical economists
acknowledge the incapacity of experience rating and support
higher maximum taxes and broader taxable wage bases to make
experience rating more effective (Kaiser, 1987; Feldstein,
1978; Topel, 1983). But both suggestions run counter to
actual legislative trends. More problems with experience
rating are discussed in Chapter Four.
From its inception, the unemployment insurance program
also had a more fundamental, fatal flaw. Its founders
acknowledged the role of interstate competition in blocking
efforts by states to enact legislation. They countered with
a federal, uniform tax. But they simultaneously allowed
wide variation in state tax rates and granted full power to
states for setting benefit levels and defining most
claimants' rights. In the process, they badly
underestimated the pressures that would be placed on state
legislatures to reduce benefits, durations, and eligibility
in times of economic stress.
Lurching from crisis to crisis, organized on outmoded
assumptions, the unemployment insurance system has not been
fundamentally reformed in the United States since 1935. In
the 1940s, the labor movement and the Social Security Board
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advocated a federal program. In the 1950s, the focus
shifted to federal standards, where debate has remained.
New crises arise with the end of wars (WW II, Korea,
Vietnam) and lengthening recessions (the 1970s, the 1980s),
but the opportunity to comprehensively restructure the
unemployment insurance program--or programs--has never been
realized.
The federal government has, from the beginning, (1)
controlled a federal tax with credits for conforming states,
(2) specified coverage levels, and (3) imposed some
definition of labor standards. The one significant
expansion of the federal role has been Extended Benefits, a
program subject to the vast vicissitudes of political winds.
The states, on the other hand, have always controlled (1)
benefit levels, (2) benefit durations, (3) most aspects of
initial and continuing eligibility, and (4) effective tax
rates under experience rating. Through almost 60 years of
tension, the federal government has merely policed the
borders of a program established on the basis of outmoded
economic assumptions operative before World War II.
The sweep of history shows how accurate this
perspective is. When unemployment soars, temporary
extensions of benefits follow, but more significant federal
action never does.
[ Graph 1.4 1
In the graph above, the legislation in boxes was enacted.
The other bills are attempts to legislate federal standards,
all of which failed. This paper explores the cost of that
failure for most of the unemployed during the 1980s.
When the Committee on Economic Security released its
1935 report, they clearly believed unemployment durations
would be brief, that most workers would return to their
previous jobs, and that a 50 percent wage replacement rate
would prevail without federal intervention. When these
assumptions proved wrong over time, the efforts of powerful
interests that supported state programs insured that
legislation around federal standards would be defeated, even
when ICESA supported a bigger federal role. Thus, the
federal-state unemployment insurance program entered the
1980s without new standards despite decades of effort by
Republican and Democratic Presidents alike and the
recommendations of a National Commission. The next chapter
shows how states used their prerogatives during the 1980s.
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TABLE 1.1
Wage Replacement Rates, 1939, 1950
Average Benefit / Average Weekly Wage (%)
July-Sept. Jan.-Mar.
State 1939 1950
Alabama 41.7 34.6
Arizona 44.5 39.4
Arkansas 40.2 41.1
California 38.1 36.6
Colorado 45.8 36.4
Connecticut 36.3 37.0
D.C. 32.2 32.3
Delaware 35.8 29.6
Florida 47.0 28.5
Georgia 39.1 31.1
Idaho 45.7 37.2
Illinois 45.0 30.1
Indiana 43.3 31.0
Iowa 44.2 36.5
Kansas 43.3 38.2
Kentucky 38.4 32.1
Louisiana 40.5 44.5
Maine 34.2 31.9
Maryland 40.4 41.2
Massachusetts 36.3 45.0
Michigan 46.3 36.3
Minnesota 42.5 34.0
Mississippi 38.8 36.9
Missouri 36.0 31.6
Montana 46.0 35.9
Nebraska 37.8 35.7
Nevada 49.5 39.1
New Hampshire 39.7 39.1
New Jersey 36.3 33.7
New Mexico 52.0 35.0
New York 39.6 35.7
North Carolina 32.7 33.1
North Dakota 44.4 40.7
Ohio 38.1 39.3
Oklahoma 41.1 33.7
Oregon 41.8 36.8
Pennsylvania 47.2 39.7
Rhode Island 44.1 43.6
South Carolina 41.7 39.6
South Dakota 39.5 36.3
Tennessee 38.6 32.0
Texas 72.3 31.3
Utah 49.3 45.6
Vermont 36.3 42.0
Virginia 40.3 34.8
Washington 44.8 36.3
West Virginia 30.3 36.4
Wisconsin 39.1 39.0
Wyoming 59.3 45.2
TERRITORIES
Alaska 38.2 32.3
Hawaii 54.0 41.7
US AVERAGE 42.1 36.9
Source: US Department of Labor, Bureau of Employment Security.
Goodwin, 1950.
TABLE 1.2
Durational Disqualifications, 1937 and 1950
-States which provide (1) disqualikcation for the duration of unem-
ployment or (2) reduction or canceilation of benefit rights, for the three major issues,
specified dates, 1937 and 1950
1. DISQUALIFICATION FOR DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT
VOLUNTARY LEAVING
Dec. 30, 1937 Dec. 1, 1950
None ------------------------------------- 10 States:I Alabama, 3 Delaware, Florida.2 Mary-
!and.2 Massacnusetts, Michigan.4 Missouri,s
New Hampshire. 2 New Jersey,2 Pennsylvania.
DISCHARGE FOR MIsCONDUCT
1 State: Mississippi. . . ...-------------------------- 7 States: I Delaware. Florida,3 Maryland,' 6 Massa.
chusetts, Iichigan,4 Missouri.' Pennsylvania.
REFUSAL Or SUITABLE WORK
4 States: Delaware, California, Oklahoma,' New 11 States:' Alabama. 2 : Delaware. Florida.' Iowa.York. Maryland, Michigan, Missouri,' New York,
Ohio, Pennsylvania. Wisconsin.'
2. REDUCTION OR CANCELL A.TION OF BFNEFIT RIGHTS
VOLUNTARY LzAvNo
5 States: Connecticut, Massachusetts, Missouri, 17 States: Alabama.3 Arizona. Colorado. Georgia,Ohio, Wisconsin. Indiana. Iowa.; Maine. Michigan, New Mexico,North Carolina. Ohio, South Carolina.1 Texas,
Virginia, West Virginia,' Wisconsin, Wyoming.
DISCHARGE FOR MisCONDUCT
6 States: Connecticut. Massachusetts, Missoun, 16 States: 10 Alabama. Ariaona, Colorado. Georgia,North Carolina. Ohio, Wisconsm. Indiana. Iowa, Maine, Michigan.4 New Hamp-
shire. New Mexico. North Carolina, Ohio, Texas,Virginia, West Virginia,' Wisconsin.
REFUSAL or SUITABLE Woa
6 States: Connecticut, Massachusetts,' Missouri, 16 States: Alabama.' Colorado. Florida.' Georgia,Ohio, Rhode Island,# Wisconsin. Indiana, Mame, Massachusetts,' Nebraska, New
Mexico North Carolina. Rhode Island., South
Carolina,' Texas, Virginia, West Virgina,'
Wyoming.
Disqualification continues until individual is reemployed. either for a specified period or has earned
specified wages, usually in relation to his weekly benefit amount.
' Alabama disqualifies for the duration of unemployment and also reduces benefit rights for refusal of
suitable work and under its voluntary leaving provision.
' Excludes Idaho because ineligibility can be removed by reemployment or by a satisfactory showing by aclaimant that he is diligently seeking work after a period of not less than d weeks foilowing separation from
employment.
' Michigan disqualifies for the duration of unemployment and also reduces benefit rights under the volun-
tary-leaving and misconduct disqualifications. b or refusal of suitable work, Michigan also disqualifiesfor the duration of unemployment and reduces benefit rights if the suitable work which has been relused
was offered by a base-period or the last employer. Michigan's reduction of benefit rights under these
special circumstances has not been included in the enumeration of States which reduce benefit rights for
refusal of suitable work.
SDisqualification applies to deliberate and willful misconduct; for disciplinary suspension or discharge for
misconduct, a mamImum 10 weeks postponement is imposed.
' Florida's suitable-work provision disqualine until claimant has earned 10 times his weekly benefit
amount and has an optional reduction m benefit rights.
'By interpretarion by Supreme Court of Iowa.
SOptinnal.
Clam0ants who have been disqualified under these provisions and who return to covered employmentduring the beneat year are recredited with the amount of the previous reduction.
Doe not include South Carolina, which has an optional reduction a oenefits in cases of aggravated
MisconduL
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Chapter Two
State's Rights and State Wrongs
in the 1980s
The report of the National Commission on Unemployment
Compensation could have been a rallying point for
refashioning the unemployment insurance system by increasing
the federal role and bolstering claimants' rights. Instead,
the 1980s were a period of profound backsliding away from
the goals of the Social Security Act of 1935. The
discussion that follows will show how the combined pressures
of a New Right federal partner and intensified economic
competition working through state-level programs drove
efforts to restrict claimants' rights. In the next chapter,
the effects of these punitive efforts on benefit recipiency
rates will be quantified.
The Changing Economy and Trust Fund Reserves.
The loss of manufacturing jobs, declining profit
margins, and high business failure rates identified in the
Introduction have clear ramifications for relationships
within and among state programs. Throughout the years since
the 1970s, states have been engaged in a bidding war for
jobs (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982). That struggle has
taken many forms, related to the nature of the changing
economy, all adding up to pressure on states to reduce
burdens on businesses. For example, the boom in mergers and
acquisitions leads to tax concessions and other relief
efforts to try to maintain production in facilities that are
weaker links in a conglomerate's expanded portfolio. The
growth of overcapacity in basic industry means fewer new
plants are built, so the struggle for a dwindling number of
new plant constructions grows more intense. Falling profit
margins make the minor concessions that states can yield
appear more attractive.
Because economic transformation has had different
effects in different regions of the country, it might be
argued that individual state unemployment insurance programs
face a variety of fiduciary pressures. Table 2.1 shows
trust fund reserves and the uneven pattern of growth and
decline across regions since the 1970s.
[ Table 2.1 ]
Slow employment growth and trust fund difficulties are
clearly related, but the relationship is more complicated
than at first appears.
The implications of plant relocations and shifting
production illustrate some of the issues.22 Table 2.2
summarizes the effects of plant strategies across states.
22 Vroman (1986) provides the background for discussing
the effect of plant relocations on trust funds (the
first row of the table). The logic is extended to
other production arrangements by the author.
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[ Table 2.2 1
The state that loses a production facility will face higher
program demands as unemployed workers claim benefits (even
if they leave the state) and unemployment insurance tax
revenues will be lost as the payroll disappears. The state
that gains a new facility accumulates new trust fund
payments.23 If the new facility lays people off shortly
after opening, those workers may not be eligible for
benefits because they may not exceed the monetary
eligibility requirement of a state program. The new
facility may hire unemployed workers, which lowers the
experience rating of other employers. These effects yield a
pro-cyclical regional component to trust fund reserves:
states that gain plants have higher reserves and need them
less.
If production is shifted and downsizing occurs, through
mergers and acquisitions or rationalization of production,
there are similar relationships, but there is a net loss of
trust fund reserves. Layoffs due to changing production
strategies yield increased benefit claims in State A, where
the layoffs occur. Revenues may increase due to experience
rating in State A, unless the employer has reached the
23 Most states have lower than average tax rates for new
employers, so they will not accumulate reserves as
quickly as they do with current employers.
maximum tax rate prior to the additional layoffs. State B,
where production increases, will not gain unemployment
insurance revenue unless payrolls increase -- an unlikely
event given that rationalizing is usually pursued to limit
labor costs not to increase employment. An economic
landscape characterized by rationalizing and downsizing, as
in the 1980s, will combine increased program demands in
states that lose jobs and no increase in revenue in states
that gain production. Downsizing, rationalization, and
foreign sourcing -- three important trends in the 1980s --
have clear losers and no winners among state unemployment
insurance programs.
These relationships go a long way toward explaining the
link between the economic transformation discussed in the
Introduction, on the one hand, and the changes discussed in
the pages to follow. Clearly, the trend toward
restructuring and downsizing, foreign sourcing, and shifting
production between facilities has had a major impact on
trust fund reserves in all states.
The stagflation and inflation of recent years has also
had damaging effects on state programs. By 1971, half of
the state programs included provisions indexing maximum
benefit amounts to some earnings measure within the state.
By the middle of the decade, 35 states had such provisions
(Vroman, 1986). The revenue side of most state programs --
tax rates and taxable wage bases -- does not usually have
similar automatic escalators. Under conditions of
stagflation and inflation, unemployment and maximum benefit
levels increase, but revenues will not meet the new demands
unless legislatures take specific action. Their willingness
to do so is a question explored in detail below.
By the beginning of the 1980s recession, the demands
made on unemployment insurance trust funds were overwhelming
state efforts to maintain solvency. Graph 2.1 shows the
reserve ratio for all trust funds in the United States from
1938 to 1991. The reserve ratio is the ratio of net
reserves to total wages paid in covered employment.
[ Graph 2.1 ]
Several points are worth noting about Graph 2.1. First, the
reserve ratios of the early years (1940 to 1954) are
exceptionally high. A rule of thumb in the trade is that
funds with reserve ratios of 2.0 or higher are more than
adequately funded to cope with deep recessions. By any
measure, reserve ratios averaging higher than 6.0 for
several decades are exceptional. Second, although the early
experience shows overly-cautious funding, the downward trend
since the 1950s is startling, culminating in ratios lower
than 1.0 in every year from 1976 to 1986. The pivotal
timeperiod, for the U.S. economy, for unemployment insurance
trust funds, and for the unemployment insurance program
generally, is the 1970s. From 1975 on, the unemployment
insurance system was wracked by crises. The story of how
the U.S. unemployment insurance system was reshaped by the
new economic situation is largely the story of how trust
fund reserves were rebuilt after 1984.
Federal Policy Driving State Changes During the 1980s
Beginning in 1979, the federal government weighed in to
the struggle around unemployment insurance, making solvency
demands of its own and pursuing program changes that were
part of a broader assault on inflation.24 In 1979, Congress
began subjecting unemployment insurance benefits to federal
income taxation. Half of that portion of benefits received
which raised a family's income above $25,000 ($20,000 for an
individual) was subject to tax. That change was extended in
1982 to income above $18,000 ($12,000). In 1987, full
income taxation of benefits began.25 This effectively
reduced unemployment benefits in all states (Burtless,
1991b.), reducing effective benefit levels but not aiding
states in their battles with trust fund solvency.
Federal legislation around the Extended Benefit (EB)
program had more direct effects on state legislative action
by (1) virtually eliminating EB payments, and hence the 50
percent state contribution, (2) tightening the monetary
qualification for EB and policy toward waiting weeks, (3)
24 The sections on federal and state policy are derived
from Baldwin and McHugh, 1992a, 1992b.
25 P.L. 95-600, §112(a), 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (November
1978); P.L. 97-34, §103(c) (1), 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(August, 1981) ; P.L. 99-514, §121 (October, 1986).
(Congressional Research Service, 1988).
changing the definition of "suitable work", and (4) raising
requalification demands.
First, the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(OBRA) raised the EB thresholds, making it nearly impossible
for states to qualify for extended benefits.26 Congress
also permitted the temporary Federal Supplemental
Compensation program to expire in April 1986. In addition,
current EB law requires that a state's insured unemployment
rate remain at least 120 percent of the rate for a
comparable period two years earlier. As a result, EB was
not available during a period of dramatic economic slowdown
in many states over the last decade, until the Emergency
Unemployment Compensation program in 1991, making the two
most recent recessions the only ones since the late 1950s in
which the long-term unemployed essentially had no additional
benefits for several months after exhausting basic state
benefits.27 As in the predictable historic pattern shown in
26 Before the changes in 1981, a state could trigger on
extended benefits if its insured unemployment rate
(IUR) was above 4 percent and if its IUR was 120
percent higher than the state rate for the previous
two years, or if the state insured unemployment rate
was above 5 percent. The 1981 changes raised both of
these threshold rates by a full percentage point and
eliminated a national trigger by which all states would
qualify for extended benefits when the national IUR was
above 4.5 percent (Congressional Research Service,
1988).
27 For example, in May 1983, Ohio triggered off Extended
Benefits when its civilian unemployment rate was 12.9
percent. The next month, Michigan triggered off EB
with an unemployment rate of 14.6 percent. In March
1987, during the "oil recession, " Louisiana triggered
off EB with a 12.7 percent unemployment rate and EB was
never available for the remainder of the recession even
Chapter One, calls went out in 1991 and 1992 to reform the
EB program. Instead, a series of additional extensions were
added to a long historic trend of temporary benefit
extensions.
The 1980 and 1981 amendments to the EB program also
acted as federal incentives for the states to adopt
restrictive legislation for their regular state unemployment
insurance programs. States that did not adopt a waiting
week were forced to pay the first week of EB. 2 8 In 1981, 15
states and Puerto Rico adopted waiting weeks in response to
this federal incentive (Runner, 1982). Additional
enticements were provided by requiring certain features in
regular UI programs before claimants could receive EB after
exhausting state UI benefits.2 9 For example, states were
encouraged to require at least 20 credit weeks for basic
state unemployment insurance eligibility since federal law
required at least 20 credit weeks in order to qualify for
EB.30
Third, the definition of "suitable work" was relaxed
under law pertaining to EB. Claimants were ineligible for
EB if they refused suitable work that included any job
though Louisiana's unemployment rate stayed over 10
percent for two more years.
28 P.L. 96-499, §1022; Federal-State Extended Unemployment
Compensation Act, §204(a) (2) (B), 26 U.S.C. §3304 note.
29 Pub. Law 96-499, Subtitle C, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(December 1980); Pub. Law 97-35, Title XXIV, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (August 1981).
30 Federal State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act,
§202(a) (4); 26 U.S.C. §3304 note.
paying more than unemployment benefits.31 It is unclear
what broader effect this relaxation may have had on state
programs, though it is apparent that several states did
alter their suitable work definitions shortly thereafter
(Isaackes, 1982) . The definition of "suitable work" was one
of the very few federal restrictions put on state behavior
in 1935. The gutting of that concept in the only federally-
funded component of the unemployment insurance system, EB,
was a sharp message to claimant advocates. The last of the
important EB amendments increased demands to requalify after
a misconduct discharge, voluntary quit, or suitable work
refusal. As will be seen, this penalty added to an already
strong trend toward durational disqualifications.
The broadest federal incentive for new state
restrictions was a 1981 law requiring interest on federal
loans to state trust funds. Beginning in 1982, states were
required to repay federal loans to their trust funds with up
to 10 percent interest. 32 As a result of this change,
states were no longer able to count on interest-free federal
loans to get through recessionary periods of high benefit
payments. In addition, states with loans made after the
31 The absurdity of this change from the standpoint of
labor market policy is obvious. Testimony by Thomas
Hines on behalf of ICESA in 1992 noted, for example,
that this would require an unemployed airline pilot in
Dade County to cut sugar cane if offered that job.
32 P.L. 97-35, §2407; 42 U.S.C. §1321(b) (1). Like the
federal attack on "suitable work", the assault on
interest free loans undid decades of legislative
effort. The loan system was implemented to allow
states to meet unforeseeable, extreme program demands -
- like those of the 1980s.
1981 amendments were required to maintain "solvency efforts"
in order to avoid further tax penalties upon their
employers. 33 States with interest-bearing trust fund debts
could not liberalize any feature of their programs without a
corresponding revenue increase or benefit reduction.
Another consequence of this federal amendment was added
pressure to avoid loans in debt free states by cutting or
freezing benefits and reducing the scope of state programs
(Vroman, 1986, 1990b; General Accounting Office, 1988;
Congressional Research Service, 1988).
States Respond to the New Pressures.
There are two ways for states to achieve solvency:
they can increase revenues or they can reduce benefit
expenditures. Employers naturally oppose increased taxes
because they view them solely as a cost of doing business
and in almost all states employees make no direct
contributions to trust funds.34 Despite employer opposition
and the competitive pressures from neighboring states, a
number of states did raise tax rates and/or state taxable
wage bases in the 1980s. Graph 2.2 shows the number of
states with taxable wage bases above the federal tax base
and notes federal increases.
33 P.L. 97-35, §2406; 26 U.S.C. §3302(f).
34 Alaska and New Jersey require employee contributions.
Pennsylvania and West Virginia have trigger conditions
for assessing employee contributions.
[ Graph 2.2 1
The graph shows that more states raised their taxable wage
bases above the federal level in the 1980s than in any
previous recession, in part because the federal base was
quite low.
This would appear to indicate that employers were being
sufficiently taxed to maintain trust fund solvency without
reducing claimants' benefits. Yet, because taxable wage
bases have not kept pace with the wage increases, effective
employer tax rates in the 1980s were roughly equal to tax
rates in the 1960s (General Accounting Office, 1988), when
program demands were lower, and effective unemployment tax
rates as a proportion of total wages actually fell after
1984 (Congressional Research Service, 1990). Graph 2.3
shows effective tax rates as a percentage of total wages.
[ Graph 2.3 ]
The ratio of taxes to total wages is a critical program
measure because benefits are typically a function of prior
wages though tax revenues are not so closely linked.35
35 By 1984, only 14 states had indexed their taxable wage
bases to some measure of state wages. It is noteworthy
that only two states, Hawaii and Washington, did so
prior to 1975. Half of the 14 states took such action
in 1978 or more recently (Vroman, 1986) . In 1991, 17
Rising wages, indexed benefits, and the drop in effective
taxes, all else being equal, could have produced many more
insolvencies during the recession of the 1980s. During the
1980s, however, all else was not equal.
Graph 2.1 shows reserves climbing in the late 1980s
while Graph 2.3 shows effective tax rates falling during the
same time period. How can both happen? States can only
maintain or achieve solvency without increasing revenues to
match program demands if they reduce the cost of their
programs. This was the dominant response of the 1980s.
Cost-saving options available to states include making it
cheaper to have workers in the program (by reducing benefits
or durations), harder for workers to get into the program
(through monetary requirements and disqualification
provisions), and harder to stay in the program (through
continued eligibility requirements and disqualifications).
States took action on all these fronts during the 1980s,
with the greatest damage done, as we'll see in Chapter
Three, through complete exclusion of the unemployed from
benefits.
During the 1980s, many states adopted unemployment
benefit freezes or reductions to try to control program
costs. Graph 2.4 measures benefit adequacy in the form of
wage replacement rates (average weekly benefit/ average
weekly wage) since 1938.
states had indexed wage bases (National Foundation for
Unemployment Compensation, 1991).
[ Graph 2.4 1
Not since 1945 have unemployment insurance benefits replaced
more than 40 percent of average weekly wages. But neither
has there been a dramatic decline. For the most part, the
national wage replacement rate has stagnated over time at a
low level, falling slightly after a modest peak of 37.5
percent in 1982.
States can also take action to keep claimants out of
the system. In a September 1988 report, the General
Accounting Office found that 44 states adopted tighter
monetary eligibility standards or stricter disqualification
provisions between 1981 and 1987 (General Accounting Office,
1988). The minimum monetary earnings provision is the
number of weeks of work or the amount of wages that a state
requires for threshold unemployment insurance eligibility.
Thirty-five states adopted one or more increases in their
minimum monetary earnings requirements between 1981 and
1987. Table 2.3 shows minimum earning requirements by state
in 1979 and 1990 and the change in this requirement.
[ Table 2.3 ]
In addition, 18 states enacted stricter formulas for
calculating monetary eligibility (General Accounting Office,
1988). Eligible workers with low base period earnings
receive a correspondingly lower weekly benefit amount and a
shorter duration of benefits. Workers who do not meet the
minimum monetary earnings eligibility requirement receive no
benefits.
Many states also increased the earnings required to
receive the maximum weeks of benefits and/or the maximum
weekly benefit amount. Between 1981 and 1987, seven states
lowered the maximum number of weeks for which they paid
benefits from some higher number to 26 weeks (General
Accounting Office, 1988). While the common understanding is
that most workers receive 26 weeks of basic state benefits,
in fact several states have monetary eligibility standards
which limit payment of the maximum weekly benefit amount and
the maximum duration of benefits to workers with earnings
considerably higher than the average. Table 2.4 shows the
number of weeks benefits actually received by claimants who
had exhausted their benefit rights in 1990, i.e., before the
federal special extension of benefits was enacted.
[ Table 2.4 ]
The wide variation in benefits received prior to exhaustion
is due in part to economic conditions, but is largely due to
variation in earnings requirements. By 1991, there was a
wide range in state monetary qualification provisions both
to receive any benefits and to receive the maximum benefit
for the maximum potential duration. Earnings required for
minimum benefits ranged from $150 in Hawaii to $3,640 in
Oklahoma. The amount required to receive the maximum weekly
benefit for 26 weeks ranged from $3,349 in Indiana to
$23,816 in Colorado. Ten states had earnings requirements
to receive their highest weekly benefit rate for 26 weeks
which exceeded $20,000 in 1991 (House Ways and Means
Committee, 1992).
State legislatures also sought to restrict the scope of
UI programs by adopting stricter disqualification
provisions. Individuals laid off from their jobs form the
basic group of unemployed workers for whom the UI system is
intended to provide benefits, the so-called involuntary
unemployed. All states have statutory disqualification
provisions which govern the circumstances for payment of UI
benefits to workers leaving their jobs voluntarily or as a
result of discharge by their employers. Workers who refuse
an offer of suitable work are also subjected to
disqualifications in all states, based on the notion that
choosing not to accept work makes the claimant voluntarily
unemployed. These three disqualification provisions --
voluntary quits, misconduct discharges, refusing suitable
work -- vary from state to state in terms of their scope and
the severity of their penalty provisions.
The basic distinction in penalty provisions lies
between states which disqualify claimants for a period of
weeks of unemployment ("suspension or denial period") and
those which require a claimant to find work and earn
specified wages, sometimes for a specific number of weeks,
in order to terminate the disqualification ("durational or
full spell disqualification"). This latter type of
disqualification provision is termed a "durational
disqualification" because it deprives claimants of benefits
for the entire duration of a spell of unemployment. In
other words, a disqualified claimant must find work and earn
specified earnings before he or she again qualifies for
unemployment benefits.
Denial periods vary greatly across states that use them
as punishment.36 Depending on the state, claimants face up
to 10 weeks denial period for quitting their jobs, up to 26
weeks for misconduct, and up to 20 weeks for refusing
suitable work. In addition, many states cancel some of a
claimant's benefits. In the previous chapter, the 1970
federal amendment to prevent states from cancelling all
benefit rights was noted. Again in 1979, the National
Commission recommended that federal action be taken to
restrict cuts in benefit rights. The issue remains
pertinent because, to get around the 1970 federal
36 This discussion draws heavily on various UAW
testimonies and background prepared for testimony
around the Downey bills in the early 1990s. See
particularly McHugh, 1991 and Reuther, 1991.
regulation, states cancelled most but not all benefit
rights. Claimants in Louisiana who quit their jobs or have
a misconduct discharge, for example, face a durational
disqualification plus loss of half their benefit rights.
Lengthening denial periods and reductions in benefit rights
occurred in states that had denial periods, but far more
prevalent was a shift toward keeping claimants from
receiving any benefits, through durational
disqualifications, following disallowed behavior.
There is no question that durational disqualifications
and their severity have increased since the beginning of the
federal UI system. In 1937, only one state imposed a
durational disqualification for voluntary quit cases and two
did so for misconduct discharges.37 By January 1976, 19
states imposed durational disqualifications for misconduct
discharges; 31 states imposed durational disqualifications
for voluntarily leaving work (Employment and Training
Administration, 1978). Table 2.5 shows the states that had
durational disqualifications for quits, misconduct, and
suitable work refusal in 1975 and 1990.
37 In the early years of the unemployment insurance
system, virtually all the penalties for
disqualifications involved a suspension or delay in the
payment of benefits. Typically, a six or seven week
denial period was imposed for voluntary quits,
misconduct discharges, or refusals of work. These
types of penalties were found in the model bills
promulgated by the Social Security Board in 1936 and
used as a pattern for state unemployment insurance
legislation (Haber and Murray, 1966).
[ Table 2.5 ]
Under present law, 47 of the 51 jurisdictions impose a
durational disqualification for voluntary quits and 38 do so
in misconduct discharges. Given the National Commission's
advice against durational disqualifications, it is
particularly difficult to argue, as some employer-side
lobbyists have, that this expansion of restrictions is
somehow driven by unique labor market concerns in each
state.
In addition, some states now require fairly long
periods of work to requalify after the imposition of a
disqualification. Several states use 10 or more weeks of
work or 10 or more times the worker's weekly benefit amount,
or both, to end a disqualification. In Florida, a claimant
who is disqualified for voluntarily leaving work without
good cause is denied benefits for the duration of their
spell of unemployment plus having to earn 17 times what
their weekly benefit amount would have been. These
durational disqualifications impact a substantial number of
claimants who are separated from work for reasons other than
layoffs. In 1990, 1,080,244 individuals were disqualified
for voluntarily leaving and 649,968 workers were subject to
misconduct discharge penalties (Employment and Training
Administration, 1991). Given the expansion of durational
disqualifications, the majority of these individuals were
subjected by the states to a complete loss of benefits, not
just to denial periods.
Intra-Regional Comparison and Program Change
It is clear from the previous discussion that many
states faced economic pressures in the 1970s and 1980s and
took steps to limit the impact of those changes on their UI
systems. As the preceeding chapter showed, employer-side
advocates frequently argue that the toughening of state
programs was largely a regional phenomenon due to various
state responses to specific state conditions or, in state
testimony, they cite the competitive position of a state
relative to its neighbors. Similarly, Vroman (1991) found
"pronounced" differences among regions for application rates
and benefit recipiency rates. Blank and Card (1991) note
significant differences in recipiency rates, eligibility,
and "take up" rates for UI across regions.
If these arguments are correct, that states are
responding in unique ways to unique difficulties and
regional economic requirements, then arguments about federal
standards lose some of their power. Moreover, as Table 2.1
illustrated, employment patterns show a shift from
historically high recipiency states (the North) to low
recipiency states (the South). With that in mind, the
decline of unemployment benefit recipiency rates could just
be a function of differences in unemployment rates across
regions, i.e., unemployment shifting toward low recipiency
regions yields low national recipiency rates. The
discussion that follows in this chapter will identify
patterns of state responses. The next chapter will link
those responses to benefit recipiency rates. By looking
more closely at trends and patterns within and across
regions, we gain an understanding of the logic of the calls
for federal standards.
To shed light on the role of interstate competition,
the central revenue and expenditure side changes since the
1970s are quantified and compared over time in four ways.
First, as a rough guide to the relative weight of interstate
variation in explaining differences across the U.S., an
analysis of variance is produced. Second, the minimum,
mean, and standard deviation of program elements within
regions are compared over time to examine the extent of
convergence within regions, i.e., falling standard
deviations. Third, cross tabulations of revenue and benefit
side changes show how changes in program elements are
combined in different regions. This permits the
identification, where present, of distinct regional
strategies for coping with changed economic circumstances.
Finally, minimums, means, and standard deviations across
regions are compared to see whether the downward pressure on
programs is more attributable to pressures affecting all
states than to intra-regional comparisons by legislatures.
The data to compare changes and differences across
regions is derived from Employment and Training
Administration reports and reviews of legal changes in the
annual issues of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly
Labor Review which recount state unemployment insurance law
changes. Revenue side measures are: taxable wage base,
average employer tax rates as a percentage of taxable wages,
and an index that combines the two effects (taxable base x
effective tax rate). Because states can vary tax rates,
wage bases, or both, the index is used to capture the effect
on revenues that results from a given state's overall tax
package. Benefit side measures are: (1) the wage
replacement rate (average weekly benefits/ average weekly
wage; AWB/AWW), (2) minimum earnings required to receive any
benefits, (3) number of behaviors for which durational
disqualifications are the penalty, (4) average maximum
potential duration. The latter measure is calculated by the
Employment and Training Administration to combine the two
program factors that determine maximum benefit durations.
It is the maximum total benefit amount divided by the weekly
maximum benefit. Because states vary in their calculation
of wage credits and maximum possible benefit durations, the
measure used here shows the length of benefits that could
actually have been received given the average wage credits
earned by claimants in a given state.
For the cross tabulations, these revenue and benefit
measures are compared in 1975, 1979, 1984, and 1990. 1975
and 1984 are crucial years for the program history because
1975 was a peak year for the percentage of the unemployed
receiving benefits; 1984 was a trough. 1979 and 1990 are
highlighted for programmatic reasons and as business cycle
peaks. 1979 was also the last business cycle peak before
the new regime of federal unemployment insurance policy.
The comparisons that follow will focus on change between
1975 and 1984. 1984, the most recent trough of unemployment
benefit recipiency, will be an important year in the more
detailed econometric decomposition that follows in the next
chapter.
Table 2.6 provides the regional definitions used
throughout this discussion. They are drawn from census
divisions and subdivisions.
[ Table 2.6 ]
Alaska and Hawaii are excluded because their economies are
notably different from all other states and arguments around
intra-regional competition cite the programs of neighboring
states, of which Alaska and Hawaii have none, as examples
for program change. 38
There are obvious difficulties with identifying
regional boundaries. There are no clear boundaries between
38 My colleague, Richard McHugh, notes that Alaska and
Hawaii are relatively generous with claimants. The
fact that they are generous, and have no negative
examples from neighboring states, is in keeping with
the contention made here regarding inter-state
competition.
regions; each state on the edge of a region has neighbors
that are counted as another region. Nevertheless, there are
economic similarities between states within a given division
that make the comparison worth pursuing, if cautiously.
The first pass at this data is shown in Table 2.7.
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used to isolate the effects
of variation within regions on the variation across the
entire sample of 48 states in 1984.
[ Table 2.7 ]
By this accounting, at most 37 percent of the variation in a
program element (tax rates) is explained by differences
within regions. This is fairly high for cross-sectional
data, but none of the benefit side variables show evidence
of large intra-regional effects on variation across the
country. In other words, variation across regions has a
substantial role to play in explaining the course of program
change across the country, strengthening the argument that
nationwide decline, not isolated change in some regions,
characterizes the system in the 1980s.
More insight about how variation in the program is
explained can be gained through examination of changes over
time. Table 2.8 shows the revenue side changes within
regions for the selected years.
[ Table 2.8 1
The minimum columns show the lowest tax rate, wage base, and
index of a state in the region. The mean column is the
average tax rate, wage base, and index value within each
region. The standard deviation is the range of each
variable within the region in a given year. For now,
remarks will be confined to comparisons within each region.
Although the quantity of numbers is dizzying, there are
some patterns worth noting. Looking at tax rates, there is
some evidence that states look across to their neighbors
within their region in establishing tax rates. The change
in the standard deviation between 1975 and 1984 is quite
small in the Breadbasket and the Cottonbelt, and there is
convergence in the West (a decline in the standard
deviation).
The argument for intra-regional convergence is not as
well sustained by the pattern of wage base changes. First,
in every region for every year, at least one state
maintained the federal tax base as their own taxable wage
base regardless of increases in other states in the region.
Second, in the Cottonbelt in 1975 and in the South Atlantic
in 1975 and 1979, there was no variation within the region.
After those years, however, the intra-regional variation
grew steadily in those regions. Finally, in all regions the
standard deviation grew over time. The variation within the
Breadbasket and the West expanded greatly between 1975 and
1984. The standard deviation of wage bases grew by a factor
of 1.5 or more in every region between 1984 and 1990. These
findings are particularly striking because, unlike the state
tax rates, taxable wage bases are generally not linked to
cyclical factors. Year to year changes in taxable wage
bases are almost always the direct result of conscious state
legislative action, and that action does not indicate intra-
regional cohesiveness.
The final three columns of Table 2.8 show how the mix
of wage base and tax rate changes altered the revenues
raised for each covered employee earning above the taxable
wage base. These figures are inconclusive with one possible
exception. Change in the Cottonbelt states between 1975 and
1984 hints at intra-regional comparisons because the region
witnessed large index increases and a comparatively low
increase in the standard deviation of the index, i.e.,
indexes of state revenues went up without markedly
increasing their divergence. Other regions had no such
distinct pattern.
The overall picture on the revenue side does not bode
well for those who claim intra-regional comparisons have
driven program changes. Tax rates show some convergence or
consistent variation in some regions. Taxable wage bases
offer no support for the contention. And the index measure
supports the intra-regional comparison argument, if at all,
in only one region, the Cottonbelt.
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Table 2.9 repeats the analysis for the benefit side.
[ Table 2.9 ]
The four columns measure the three aspects of program
generosity: benefit adequacy (benefit/wage ratio),
difficulty of receiving benefits (minimum earnings,
durational disqualifications for quitting and misconduct),
and difficulty of continuing to receive benefits (durational
disqualifications for refusing work, maximum duration).
Wage replacement rates converged in the South Atlantic
region between 1975 and 1984, and varied only slightly more
in the Rustbelt during that period. Minimum earnings
requirements diverged substantially in the Breadbasket and
the Cottonbelt, while moving roughly in parallel in the
West. Intra-regional comparisons appear to play a minimal
role in benefit adequacy determinations or earnings
requirements.
Relationships within regions appear, by this measure,
to play a strong role in disqualification provisions and
benefit durations. Every region saw divergence in the
number of durational disqualifications in effect between
1975 and 1984. Likewise, two regions (the Rustbelt and the
Breadbasket) showed convergence around maximum benefit
durations and two more regions (Cottonbelt and West) had a
relatively constant range of durations.
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Tables 2.8 and 2.9 indicate that intra-regional
comparison may be a valid explanation for changes in some
benefit restrictions, but not for revenue-side changes.
They are definitely unconvincing in relation to taxable wage
base changes and minimum earnings requirements.
Although not substantiated by examination of discrete
program measures, it is nevertheless possible that
combinations of changes indicate distinctive regional
strategies for coping with program stress. For example, it
may be that Cottonbelt states look to each other, compare
programs, and adopt similar combinations of revenue
enhancements and benefit restrictions. This behavior would
appear in cross tabulations of program changes, but may be
difficult to discern in the distinct columns previously
assembled.
Cross tabulations of each revenue measure with each
benefit measure are provided in three tables. Tables 2.11,
2.12, and 2.13 tabulate changes in tax rates, taxable wage
bases, and revenue indexes, respectively, with changes in
each of the four benefit measures. The result is 12 2x2
matrixes of revenue and benefit changes. In each case the
row shows the number of states in a given region that had
revenue changes above or below the average change for the
variable and region between 1975 and 1984. The columns are
the number of states with benefit changes (percentage point
change in wage replacement, percentage increase in earnings
required, number of durational disqualifications added,
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percentage increase in benefit duration) above or below the
average change for the region.3 9
In addition to shedding light on intra-regional
behavior, cross tabulations with this structure permit a
more critical assessment of the mix of changes instituted
within each region. Table 2.10 gives a sketch of how these
cross tabulations can be interpreted.
[ Table 2.10 ]
Regions that are driven by solvency concerns but also want
to balance this with claimant's needs will populate the
lower right quadrant of the benefit matrixes, i.e., they
will combine strategies to increase benefits with efforts to
raise taxes. Regions that are trying to be fiscally neutral
while rolling back claimants' rights will most heavily
populate the upper left quadrant, combining low tax rates
and benefit reductions. The upper-right quadrant favors
both employers and claimants, not balancing benefit and tax
changes. The lower left quadrant would be occupied by
states that are facing solvency problems by concessions from
39 Note that the breakpoints of the matrixes are changes
above or below the regional mean change. This is
important because, for example, many states had several
durational disqualifications before 1975. In regions
with many such states, the number of states with
increases in durational disqualifications will appear
small though states in the region share tough
disqualification provisions.
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claimant advocates and employers alike. Obviously, these
matrixes are not predictors of the actual fiduciary impact
of the strategies chosen. They are intended only to
illustrate patterns that may exist in the relationships
between revenue and benefit changes within regions.
Because there is a wide range of unmeasured state
behavior within each region, particularly at the level of
administration, these tables are illustrative but not
conclusive. Nevertheless, there are several interesting
results produced by the cross tabulations. The tax rate
cross tabulations show:
[ Table 2.11 ]
* Most Rustbelt states were on the balanced pro-
employer or pro-claimant axes (five states each)
with respect to wage replacement changes, perhaps
indicating a more equal balance of labor-
management power in that region.
* Most Rustbelt states were on the high/low
solvency axis for minimum earnings requirements
and taxes (five each), suggesting clearer winners
and losers on this count.
* No Breadbasket or Cottonbelt states were in the
balanced pro-employer, pro-claimant quadrant with
respect to wage replacement rates.
* No Breadbasket state added an above average
number of durational disqualifications without
average or lower increases in tax rates. This
indicates particularly heavy use of durational
disqualifications as a cost-saving measure in that
region.
* No South Atlantic states combined above average
maximum potential benefit durations and below
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average tax rates. No Breadbasket states had
above average maximum potential durations and
raised taxes more than average to cover them.
Although these results show some identifiable patterns, it
is hardly convincing that states act in response to the
actions of their regional neighbors with respect to tax
rates. Only the Rustbelt states appear to cluster around
program strategies relative to tax rates.
Turning to Table 2.12 and cross tabulations with tax
base changes, the results are similarly inconclusive.
[ Table 2.12 ]
The only clear relationships are:
* No Cottonbelt states raised their wage
replacement rates by more than the regional
average without also increasing their taxable wage
base.
* No Rustbelt state raised its taxable wage base
without an above average increase in minimum
earnings requirements. No Rustbelt state had
average or lower wage base increases and increased
maximum potential benefit durations.
* No Breadbasket state had above average benefit
durations and average or lower low taxable wage
base increases.
Again, it is only the Rustbelt states that can be said to
change along a distinct regional pattern. But that pattern
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is less pronounced around wage base changes than around tax
rates.
The results using the revenue index (Table 2.13) are
even more discouraging for the intra-regional comparison
argument.
[ Table 2.13 ]
Only three cells are empty, none are heavily populated, and
no diagonals stand out. The empty cells show:
* No Breadbasket state had above average revenue
index growth and wage replacement increases. No
Breadbasket state combined above average revenue
index growth and above average maximum potential
benefit durations.
* No South Atlantic state had above average
maximum potential benefit durations and average or
lower increases in its revenue index.
Again, it is only among the Rustbelt states that we can
identify any unique regional pattern linking the tax index
and other program characteristics.
The paucity of discernible relationships in the ANOVA,
standard deviation tables, and cross tabulations can have
several meanings. It is possible that the regions are
poorly specified, though the cross tabulations are
sufficiently inconclusive to suggest that changing a few
states would not save the argument. It may also be that the
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range of state behaviors to explain is far broader than the
measures used here, meaning that strong intra-regional
patterns exist but they are not correctly illustrated. More
significantly, though, the lack of patterns may show that
states are not responding in regionally distinct ways to
different geographic transformations in the economy, as
state's rights advocates and some research would suggest
(Vroman, 1991; Blank and Card, 1991).
Interstate Competition and the "Race to the Bottom".
An alternative explanation of program patterns is in
order. If the relevant transformation of state programs is
not intra-regional but national, then the convergence
anticipated in Tables 2.8 and 2.9 will not be intra-regional
but inter-regional. In its strongest version, we would
anticipate a convergence of all program characteristics
across regions as state actors look upon all other states,
not just neighbors, as likely con<titors. In this model,
the national decline in unemployment insurance recipiency
rates, which will be shown in the next chapter, results not
from employment movements from generous regions to more
punitive regions, but instead from a convergence of all
regions around a lower overall program standard.
To test for the presence of a pattern across regions,
Table 2.14 shows the seven revenue and benefit
characteristics from previous discussions, expressed in
inter-regional terms.
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[ Table 2.14 1
The minimum or maximum columns are averages for a given
region, not a single state. The standard deviation column
then denotes the range of each variable across regional
means and the last row of each section is the change during
the period of greatest benefit recipiency decline, 1975 to
1984.
Unlike the relationships uncovered within regions, the
pattern across regions is fairly stark. The falling
standard deviation for tax rates shows convergence of this
measure across regions. In the intra-regional comparison,
only the West showed a narrowing range of tax rates. The
expansion of durational disqualifications has also lead to
convergence of this factor across regions, as was true in
all but one intra-regional comparison. Average wage
replacement rates have fallen across regions and their range
has only increased by four-tenths of a percentage point in
the process, indicating that wage replacement rates have
essentially fallen together across regions. In the intra-
regional comparison, the South Atlantic showed convergence
in the range of this measure, but no other intra-regional
grouping had as limited an expansion of wage replacement
rates as is evident across regions. Similarly, despite the
supposed range of regional economic experiences, potential
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maximum unemployment insurance durations varied only
slightly across regions. Between 1975 and 1984 the standard
deviation across regions for maximum potential benefit
durations increased by only one-tenth of a week.
What does it all mean? As the previous chapter showed,
between 1935 and 1979 the relationship between the federal
and state partners was remarkably constant. Periodic crises
lead to calls for increased federal control over program
boundaries, all of which went unheeded, including the
recommendations of a full-scale national review, the
National Commission report of 1980. When the federal
government did make substantial program changes in the
1980s, they added constraints on state programs by raising
the cost of insolvency, adding fuel to a movement already
underway against claimants.
Continued federal non-intervention since 1975 would
have been more defensible if states were maintaining
programs that successfully balanced the competing demands of
program effectiveness (wage replacement rates, access to
benefits) and financial soundness (tax rates and wage
bases). But, as shown above, since 1975 state programs have
made a marked shift away from both program effectiveness
relative to claimants' needs and sufficient revenue
increases. Between 1972 and 1983, 37 of 51 unemployment
insurance jurisdictions required one or more federal loans
to remain solvent. This is hardly surprising when the
revenue increase generated by the index used here was, on
109
average, only $93.00 in real terms between 1975 and 1984.40
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the twin pressures of
solvency and interstate competition are most frequently
resolved in favor of competition.41
Contrary to the claims of state's rights advocates,
this pattern of inadequate funding and restrictive program
characteristics cannot be explained by intra-regional
differences in economic experience being met by responsive,
innovative local legislatures. There is, instead, a nation-
wide convergence around the most stringent
disqualifications, highest eligibility requirements, lowest
wage replacement rates, and lowest taxes.
At the outset of this chapter it was noted that states
could maintain trust fund reserves during periods of stress
through tax increases, reduced benefit levels, or exclusion
of claimants from the system. It was noted that reserves
climbed despite the fact that tax rates fell. Now we can
say more about how this riddle was solved. Table 2.15
summarizes changes in each of these three parameters in the
top five states for benefit payments in 1984.
40 In 1983, eight states had outstanding federal loans.
Five of those states increased their taxable wage
bases, but none taxed half or more of covered wages and
none moved to index their wage base (Vroman, 1986).
41 A striking example: in January, 1993, New Jersey
announced a provision to grant lower unemployment
insurance tax rates to employers who relocate there
(New Jersey P.L. 202, A.672). New Jersey had
outstanding federal loans every year from 1975 to 1984
(Employment and Training Administration, 1992).
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[ Table 2.15
Note the patterns, confirming the trends identified above.
Tax rates declined in two states. The Benefit/Wage ratio
declined in two states. But by far the most dramatic and
sizeable change, evident across all states regardless of
regions, was exclusion of the unemployed from benefits. By
1984, none of the five states with the largest benefit
outlays were paying benefits to more than 36 percent of
their unemployed.
Program Transformation Under Interstate Competition:
Michigan
All regions appear to be reducing program
effectiveness. This "race to the bottom" is clear in the
data, but how does it happen in practice? Chapter Three
will provide a statistical decomposition of the factors
explaining the decline in recipiency rates. First, though,
we must look at a good example of the process of program
change. One of the states that has led the nation in many
program attributes is Michigan. Although it is risky to
extrapolate too broadly from one case, by examining the
process of program change in Michigan during the 1980s, we
gain insight into the pressures and considerations that
shaped state action during the decade.
Michigan is an appropriate state to look at for several
reasons. First, the Michigan economy was virtually the
archetype of the context of the Social Security Act of 1935
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with industrial, relatively stable employment. Second, its
benefits, perhaps surprisingly, have not been historically
high. Michigan's wage replacement rate was actually below
the national average in 1979. But its average wage is high,
potentially improving the functioning of the payroll tax
base of unemployment insurance. Third, Michigan plays a
large role in national unemployment insurance effectiveness.
In 1990, over 11.1 percent of all unemployment benefits paid
were received in Michigan. Michigan's $2.0 million in
benefits was second only to California's $2.2 million.
Michigan, New York, and California paid one-third of all
benefits.4 2 Finally, Michigan was a debtor state during the
1970s and 1980s. As such, the need for reform was apparent
and the response, presumably, openly debated. In the
previous chapter, we saw that major reforms occur only
during periods of program crisis. Michigan in the 1980s
gives a good example of the shaping of state responses and
the issues surrounding them.
Michigan's unemployment insurance system first showed
signs of weakness in 1975 (as one might have guessed given
the story so far). When unemployment hit 12.5 percent in
1975, Michigan drew loans of $571 million over two years.
Tax rates were raised and the wage base expanded so that the
loans were paid off between 1976 and 1979 (Vroman, 1986).
But the state's reserves were badly damaged (Graph 2.5).
42 Author's calculations using Employment and Training
Administration data (ETA, 1992).
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[ Graph 2.5 1
The Michigan legislature in 1980 passed several unemployment
insurance provision changes for 1981. They raised the
monetary eligibility requirement from 14 to 18 weeks and
raised the credit week to 20 times the minimum wage. They
changed the suspension period for voluntary quits into a
durational disqualification. In return, weekly benefits
were increased to 70 percent of after-tax weekly wages
(instead of 60 percent of gross wages) up to a maximum of 58
percent of the state average weekly wage (and indexing of
the maximum instead of the previous fixed maximum plus
dependent's allowances). No tax increases or wage base
increases were part of the package. It was assumed by all
parties that higher eligibility requirements and tougher
disqualifications would pay for the increased benefits and
maintain solvency (Vroman, 1986). If the 1980s economy had
behaved more favorably, it might have worked.
Michigan's unemployment rate hit 12.4 percent in 1980,
then 15.5 percent in 1981, and stayed over 14 percent for
two more years. In short order, the unemployment insurance
trust fund was exhausted. Michigan borrowed over $3.0
billion from 1980 to 1983. At the end of 1982, Michigan had
$2.2 billion in debt outstanding (Employment and Training
113
Administration, 1992). The Michigan legislature again faced
the music.
Unemployment insurance reform in Michigan, until
recently, was largely developed through a tripartite body
called the Economic Alliance.43 This quasi-governmental
agency (which includes input from staff of the Employment
Security Commission) attempts to fashion consensus bills
before state action. The legislative package that they
produced in 1982 was a major revision of Michigan law,
including the following provisions:
* The taxable wage base increased from
$6,000 to $8,000 in 1983, $8,500 in
1984, $9,000 in 1985, and $9,500 in
1986. The wage base had been unchanged
since 1978 when it was raised just $600.
* A surcharge was imposed on negative
balance employers and the maximum tax
rate rose from 9.0 to 10.0 percent of
taxable, covered payroll.
* The maximum weekly benefit was frozen
at $197 through 1986.
* Benefits were reduced to 65 percent
of after-tax wages from the previous 70
percent.
* The monetary eligibility requirement
was raised in two ways. The definition
of a credit week was raised from 20
times the minimum wage to 30 times the
minimum wage, a $33.50 increase. The
number of credit weeks required was
43 The section on Michigan legislation again relies
heavily on various testimonies produced by Richard
McHugh and the author (primarily, McHugh, 1992). It
also derives from conversations with staff of the UAW
Unemployment Insurance Clinic and of the Economic
Alliance. The author is a union representative to the
Alliance.
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raised to 20 from 18.44 The credit week
of 30 times minimum wage was intended to
sunset in 1986, reverting to a 20 hours
and 20 weeks qualification.
These changes had mixed results. Benefit expenditures
from 1983 to 1986 were $2.1 billion lower than anticipated
in 1982 before legislation was passed. The wage replacement
rate fell from 41.5 percent in 1982 to 34.3 percent in 1985,
before the benefit freeze ended. More importantly, in
anticipation of the chapter that follows, in the year
following the 1982 legislation the percentage of the
unemployed receiving benefits in Michigan fell from 38
percent to 28 percent.4 5 The tax revenue gains fell quite
heavily on negative balance employers and proved
insufficient. Despite increased maximum tax rates and
higher wage bases, tax revenues were actually $1.4 billion
lower than anticipated before the 1982 actions (Economic
Alliance, 1986).
In 1986, when some of the legislative package was to
sunset, the Economic Alliance developed another consensus
proposal. It would have limited benefit increases and
raised taxes if specified trust fund thresholds were
reached. Senate Republicans demanded more claimant
concessions and the bill was never brought forward. The
44 Recall that the 20 credit week requirement was also
part of federal Extended Benefit amendments. Its
adoption in Michigan shows the confluence of solvency
issues, federal pressure, and interstate competition.
45 By 1987, only 22 percent of the unemployed in Michigan
were receiving benefits.
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average weekly benefit provision of the 1982 law expired and
benefits returned to 70 percent of average weekly wages
(subject to the indexed maximum).46
In 1988, organized labor and employer representatives
revisited the issue of solvency in light of the experience
since 1982. Employers proposed further benefit reductions.
Labor representatives proposed employer tax increases as
well. In mid-1989, talks were broken off. In 1991, with
federal penalty taxes looming on unpaid loan balances, talks
resumed and again broke off. In late 1991, the Employers'
Unemployment Compensation Council (EUCC) produced
"Michigan's Unemployment Insurance Law: An Action Agenda
for Legislative Reform" (1991) that included four proposals
to cut benefits and no suggestions for revenue
enhancement.47
Although trust reserves have climbed steadily since
1983 (Graph 2.5), the health of the fund is easily
overestimated. It is true that reserves were built up
steadily, but in 1990, before the recession took hold, the
trust fund reserve ratio was just .41. Penalty taxes on
outstanding loans were avoided throughout the 1980s by
46 The raised credit week definition was also to sunset,
but the Michigan Attorney General declared the sunset
provision unlawful. A court challenge lead to its
eventual sunsetting, four years later than the labor-
management agreement had intended (McHugh, 1992).
47 Although the EUCC made no proposals to increase
revenue, it ironically concluded that "Fiscal
responsibility is more important now than ever". It
also sanguinely noted that fiscal responsibility "can
be achieved with minimal hardship on those involved in
the UI process" -- particularly employers, apparently.
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making voluntary payments from the trust fund, making the
minimum payment necessary to avoid FUTA penalty taxes on
Michigan employers. This was no longer an option when, at
the end of 1991, revenues fell short of benefit payments.
In the fall of 1992, Senate Bill 1067 proposed
returning to the 1982-1986 definition of credit weeks and
benefits, eliminating indexing, and requiring a waiting
week. As in discussions in 1988, 1989, and 1991, the
employer-side advocates of the bill included no revenue
enhancing provisions. The bill passed the Senate, but the
House sent labor and employer representatives to the
bargaining table rather than vote on the bill. As this is
being written, those talks have broken down as, once again,
the employer representatives refuse to consider revenue
increases to go along with benefit reductions.
There are several lessons to be drawn from this brief
look at the Michigan case. The shortfall in unemployment
insurance revenue is not surprising given resistance to tax
increases. But what is less commonly understood is the link
between benefits and taxes. The record in Michigan since
1982 shows that cutting benefits will not, by itself,
promote solvency because the experience rating system
reduces tax burdens in response to reduced benefits. Graph
2.6 shows how this effect worked in Michigan.
[ Graph 2.6 ]
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Falling benefit demands yield some drop in tax demands,
after a lag, so revenues don't fully catch up to outlays
even at the new reduced benefit level. This relationship is
systematic under experience rating in all states, but its
effects can be mitigated through changes in taxable wage
bases, raising maximum and/or minimum tax rates, or
eliminating experience rating when benefits are reduced.
The more extreme steps taken by states to reduce benefit
outlays may have an impetus in this anomaly of experience
rating. The adverse effect of experience rating only holds
when benefits are reduced and tax rates are unchanged, not
when claimants are disqualified. Victims of durational
disqualifications or higher earnings requirements receive no
benefits and trust fund reserves are maintained.
Some other lessons from the Michigan case are broadly
applicable. First, the existence of a strong labor presence
to argue the case for claimants played a crucial role in
establishing which trade offs would be incorporated in state
legislation. Second, even with that presence, it is
exceedingly difficult to convince legislatures to increase
taxes on employers. Since 1982, no legislative proposal has
included revenue increases under any circumstance. No
proposal has been seriously advanced to increase revenues
even along with concessions from claimants. The increase in
benefits that was part of the 1980 legislation occurred when
the wage replacement ratio was at its lowest point since
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1962 (31.6 percent). The obvious inadequacy of benefits
that replace less than one-third of lost wages was not cause
enough for action; benefit increases only came when they
could be linked to a durational disqualification and tougher
monetary eligibility. In 1992 and 1993, the only
legislative proposals to address the solvency crisis were
for more benefit cuts without revenue increases, even though
average weekly benefits were less than 80 percent of the
poverty level for a family of four.48 Finally, the role of
competitive pressure in limiting unemployment insurance
reform was shown in its extreme. At hearings in February,
1993, a Republican state senator asked a representative
testifying for the AFL-CIO how Michigan could compete with
Mexico if unemployment insurance taxes were raised.
Summary
The issues raised by the convergence of anti-claimant
legislation across all regions of the country and the
example of Michigan go deep to the heart of the decline of
unemployment insurance in the United States. The question
is not just which revenue and benefit components are traded
against each other in a given state, but whether the role of
unemployment insurance as an economic stabilizer and support
48 Author's calculation using Michigan Employment Security
Commission data on benefits and the Census Bureau, P-60
Series, poverty threshold for 1991. In 1991,
Michigan's average weekly benefit was 79.3 percent of
the U.S. poverty threshold for a family of four. It
never exceeded 80 percent of the poverty threshold
after the 1982 solvency package went into effect.
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for the unemployed is lost in the process. It may be that
durational disqualifications for quitting are worth $200
million, as Michigan employers estimated they were, so a
package of durational disqualifications, tougher eligibility
standards, and improved benefits would be financially sound
and politically feasible. But there is no programmatic
connection, no overall vision of the unemployment insurance
program, that supports the specific combination of
increasing durational disqualifications and reducing benefit
levels.
Throughout the country in the 1980s, states engaged in
such trading and claimants and the unemployment insurance
program paid a heavy price. What emerged was more than just
a pattern of states comparing themselves to their neighbors
within a given region. It was a national response, one
state at a time, to a combination of increased program
demands and reduced power or willingness to extract tax
revenue.
Some trade-offs are unavoidable. Any system, with
whatever level of federal intervention, will have to balance
benefit needs and revenue capacity. But the lesson of the
1980s is that such balancing cannot occur in state
governments without the potential for doing serious harm to
the underlying national goals of the program. During the
1980s, states grappled with federal policy that only
heightened their vulnerability, interstate competition that
was constantly raised as a threat, and economic change that
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consistently outran the policy levers available to them.
Falling benefit levels, insufficient revenue raising, and
tougher eligibility and disqualification provisions were the
predictable result. Now we must assess the most egregious
damage, the role of state legal changes in the decline of
unemployment insurance beneficiary rates during the 1980s.
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TABLE 2.1
Economic Performance and Trust Fund Reserves
Regional Variation, 1949-1983
* Employment Growth Rate:
Total U.S.
North
South and West
** Trust Fund Reserves at
Start of Timeperiod:
Total U.S.
North
South and West
1949-59 1960-69 1970-79 1979-1983
1.4
0.8
2.4
7.9
7.6
8.5
2.5
1.4
3.8
3.4
3.4
3.5
* Employment growth rate is from BLS, "Employment and Eamings."
** Trust Fund Reserves are reserves as percent of prior year payroll.
Trust fund data from Employment and Training Administration, "Unemployment
Insurance Financial Data," 1984.
Source: Vroman (1986), Table 1-4.
a:regres.wq!
c:\dissert\two\regres.wq!
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-0.1
-1.0
0.9
0.9
-0.1
2.0
TABLE 2.2
Corporate Strategy and
Corporate Strateav
Plant Closing and
New Opening *
Production Shifting
Between Facilities
Downsizing
Foreign Sourcing
Inter-Regional Trust Fund Changes
LOSING STATE I GAINING STATE
Exnenditures;
Increase
Increase
Increase
Increase
Revenues
Decrease
Increased Rate
(Unless Maximum
Rate Already)
But Less
Payroll to Tax
As Above
As Above.
ExDenditures
Decrease
if Unemployed
Hired
No Change
Potential
Rapid Increase
No Change
No Gaining State
No Gaining State
Revenues
* The row for plant closings is derived from Vroman (1986). The relationships and
logic are extended to other areas by the author.
a:tbl22.wq!
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Reserve Ratio
All State Programs
Graph 2.1
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TABLE 2.3
Minimum Earning Requirements
50 States, 1979, 1990, Change
State
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
1979
$750
$522
$450
$937
$750
$750
$600
$720
$400
$412
$150
$600
$520
$1,000
$500
$900
$1,000
$300
$1,200
$360
$900
$350
$900
$450
$360
1990
$1,000
$1,032
$1,140
$1,500
$1,125
$1,000
$600
$966
$400
$1,350
$150
$900
$1,430
$1,600
$2,500
$1,620
$1,500
$1,200
$1,200
$900
$2,081
$2,010
$1,250
$1,125
$1,200
Change
$250
$510
$690
$563
$375
$250
$0
$246
$0
$938
$0
$300
$910
$600
$2,000
$720
$500
$900
$0
$540
$1,181
$1,660
$350
$675
$840
State 1979
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
$1,150
$565
$1,440
$600
$1,200
$600
$633
$562
$800
$400
$1,000
$700
$440
$1,060
$300
$1,160
$504
$500
$700
$1,368
$700
$1,800
$780
$1,150
$960
1990 Change
$1,098 ($52)
$2,052 $1,487
$2,795 $1,355
$1,200 $600
$2,800 $1,600
$1,980 $1,380
$1,109 $476
$600 $38
$1,600 $800
$1,702 $1,302
$3,640 $2,640
$1,000 $300
$1,320 $880
$1,700 $640
$900 $600
$1,568 $408
$1,560 $1,056
$1,332 $832
$1,500 $800
$2,800 $1,432
$1,400 $700
$1,500 ($300)
$1,428 $648
$2,200 $1,050
$1,500 $540
Source: House Ways and Means Committee, 1992
a:bmin.wq!
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TABLE 2.4
Actual Benefit Weeks Received By Benefit Exhaustees
1990
State
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
Weeks
19.8
22.7
23.3
21.8
23.4
16.5
26.0
25.9
19.1
20.9
26.0
21.2
16.7
26.0
20.4
21.6
26.0
26.0
26.9
26.0
21.0
21.1
21.7
20.8
22.5
State
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
Weeks
18.0
21.2
16.1
16.9
26.0
23.1
25.2
22.6
26.0
25.3
21.3
24.9
25.8
21.2
24.8
24.8
18.3
20.0
19.0
19.8
25.7
24.1
20.8
25.6
20.1
Source: Employment and Training Adminstration, 1992.
a:wkex.wq!
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TABLE 2.5
Durational Disqualifications
1975 and 1990
1975 1990
Quit Wrk Refusal Discharge Quit Wrk Refusal Discharge
AK 0 0 0 0 0 0
AL 1 0 0 1 0 0
AR 1 0 0 1 0 0
AZ 1 1 0 1 1 1
CA 1 0 1 1 0 1
CO 1 0 1 1 0 1
CT 0 0 0 1 1 1
DE 1 1 1 1 1 1
FL 1 1 1 1 1 1
GA 0 0 0 1 1 1
HI 0 0 0 1 1 1
IA 1 1 0 1 1 1
ID 1 1 1 1 1 1
IL 1 1 1 1 1 1
IN 1 0 1 1 1 1
KS 0 0 0 1 1 1
KY 1 0 0 1 1 1
LA 1 1 1 1 1 1
MA 0 0 0 1 0 1
MD 1 0 0 0 0 0
ME 1 1 1 1 1 1
MI 0 0 0 1 1 1
MN 0 0 0 1 1 1
MO 1 1 0 1 1 0
MS 1 0 0 1 0 1
MT 0 0 0 1 1 1
NB 0 0 0 1 1 1
NC 0 0 0 1 0 1
ND 1 0 1 0 0 0
NH 1 0 1 1 1 1
NJ 1 0 0 1 0 0
NM 1 0 0 1 1 1
NV 0 0 0 1 1 0
NY 1 1 1 1 1 1
OH 1 1 1 1 1 1
OK 0 0 0 1 1 1
OR 1 0 1 1 1 1
PA 1 1 1 1 1 1
RI 1 0 0 1 1 1
SC 0 0 0 1 1 0
SD 0 0 0 1 1 1
TN 1 1 1 1 1 1
TX 0 0 0 1 1 1
UT 0 0 0 1 1 1
VA 1 1 1 1 1 1
VT 1 1 1 1 1 0
WA 1 1 1 1 1 1
WI 1 1 0 1 0 0
WV 0 0 0 1 0 0
WY 0 0 1 1 1 1
TOTAL 31 17 20 47 37 38
0 = not a durational disqualification.
Sources: 1975 DATA - Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration,
"Unemployment Insurance: State Laws and Experience," 1975;
Monthly Labor Review, January 1975 and 1976.
1990 DATA - Monthly Labor Review, various years.
A*\durl990.wq!
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TABLE 2.6
Census Divisions for U.l. Program Comparison
Grouping
RUSTBELT
17 States
Census Divisions
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
BREADBASKET
7 States
SOUTH ATLANTIC
8 States
COTTONBELT
8 States
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
MountainWEST
11 States
Pacific
Arkansas
Louisiana
Oklahoma
Texas
Arizona
Colorado
Idaho
Montana
Nevada
New Mexico
Utah
Wyoming
California
Oregon
Washington
Source: Adapted from Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Geographic Profile
of Employment and Unemployment, 1991," Table C-1, p. 154.
Excludes Alaska, Hawaii, and District of Columbia.
c:\dissertcensus.wqi
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States
Connecticut
Maine
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
Rhode Island
Vermont
New Jersey
New York
Pennsylvania
Illinois
Indiana
Ohio
Michigan
Wisconsin
Iowa
Kansas
Minnesota
Missouri
Nebraska
North Dakota
South Dakota
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Maryland
North Carolina
South Carolina
Virginia
West Virginia
Alabama
Kentucky
Mississippi
Tennessee
TABLE 2.7
Role of Intra-Regional Variation in National Program Variation
1984 Program Statistics, Analysis of Variance
WITHIN REGION EFFECT
Variance
REVENUE SIDE VARIABLES Explained F-test Sign.
Taxable Wage Base 36.9% 6.29 0.000
Tax as Percent of Taxable Wages 25.0% 2.78 0.039
Index of Wage Base and Tax Rate 17.4% 2.27 0.078
BENEFIT SIDE VARIABLES
Maximum Potential Duration of Benefits 14.5% 1.83 0.141
Average Wkly Benefit/ Average Wkly Wage 13.0% 1.62 0.187
Minimum Earnings Requirement 7.2% 0.83 0.514
Number of Durational Disqualifications 5.3% 0.60 0.664
Note: ANOVA compares sample variation to population variation.
In this application, ANOVA measures the relationship between
variation within regions and change across the nation.
The variance explained column shows that variation of the
benefit-side variables within regions does not significantly
explain national variation (less than 15 percent of the total).
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review, various issues.
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TABLE 2.8
Intra-Regional Revenue Side Comparisons
TAX RATE WAGE BASE
RUSTBELT
BREADBASKET
1975
1979
1984
1990
1984-1975
1975
1979
1984
1990
1984-1975
SOUTH ATLANTIC 1975
1979
1984
1990
1984-1975
COTTONBELT 1975
1979
1984
1990
1984-1975
WEST 1975
1979
1984
1990
1984-1975
MIN MEAN St.D.
0.0106 0.0246 0.0088
0.0159 0.0298 0.0070
0.0157 0.0371 0.0109
0.0074 0.0229 0.0073
0.0051 0.0125 0.0021
0.0074
0.0127
0.0168
0.0066
0.0094
0.0027
0.0105
0.0156
0.0073
0.0129
0.0035
0.0058
0.0215
0.0123
0.0180
0.0042
0.0129
0.0194
0.0114
0.0152
0.0150
0.0214
0.0270
0.0146
0.0120
0.0113
0.0219
0.0262
0.0137
0.0148
0.0132
0.0204
0.0325
0.0175
0.0192
0.0196
0.0241
0.0290
0.0185
0.0053
0.0046
0.0059
0.0044
0.0006
0.0052
0.0081
0.0099
0.0051
0.0047
0.0062
0.0074
0.0068
0.0033
0.0006
0.0077
0.0075
0.0057
0.0063
0.0094 -0.0019
MIN
$4,200
$6,000
$7,000
$7,000
$2,800
$4,200
$6,000
$7,000
$7,000
$2,800
$4,200
$6,000
$7,000
$7,000
$2,800
$4,200
$6,000
$7,000
$7,000
$2,800
MEAN
$4,414
$6,043
$7,979
$8,771
$3,564
$4,286
$6,557
$8,514
$9,329
$4,229
$4,200
$6,000
$7,400
$8,013
$3,200
$4,200
$6,075
$7,313
$8,100
$3,113
St.D.
$487
$155
$1,030
$2,321
$544
$210
$721
$1,508
$2,453
$1,298
$0
$0
$520
$1,328
$520
$0
$198
$428
$826
$428
$4,200 $4,691 $779
$6,000 $7,636 $1,647
$7,000 $10,296 $2,477
$7,000 $12,364 $3,375
$2,800 $5,605 $1,698
MIN MEAN St.D.
$44.5 $109.8 $43.4
$95.4 $180.6 $43.8
$109.9 $301.8 $108.8
$51.8 $203.5 $83.4
$65.4 $192.0 $65.4
$31.1 $64.3
$76.2 $141.7
$117.6 $232.0
$46.2 $139.1
$86.5 $167.7
$11.3 $47.6
$63.0 $131.1
$109.2 $195.8
$51.1 $110.0
$97.9 $148.2
$14.7 $55.5
$34.8 $124.5
$150.5 $238.9
$86.1 $142.4
$135.8 $183.4
$23.1
$37.6
$71.5
$62.7
$48.4
$21.8
$48.5
$82.6
$42.9
$60.8
$26.1
$46.5
$58.1
$33.8
$32.1
$17.6 $95.3 $48.4
$77.4 $185.8 $71.8
$135.8 $305.7 $111.5
$79.8 $233.1 $108.5
$118.2 $210.4 $63.1
SOURCE: Employment and Training Administration, 1992.
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TABLE 2.9
Intra-Regional Expenditure Side Comparisons
AWBIAWW
RUSTBELT
BREADBASKET
SOUTH ATLANTIC
COTTONBELT
WEST
1975
1979
1984
1990
1984-1975
1975
1979
1984
1990
1984-1975
1975
1979
1984
1990
1984-1975
1975
1979
1984
1990
1984-1975
1975
1979
1984
1990
1984-1975
MIN MEAN
0.333 0.385
0.310 0.375
0.270 0.366
0.283 0.391
-0.063 -0.019
0.363 0.391
0.326 0.420
0.277 0.399
0.338 0.408
-0.086 0.008
0.309 0 369
0.305 0.360
0.318 0.345
0.352 0.379
0.009 -0.025
0.301 0.348
0.302 0.356
0.283 0.353
0.272 0.350
-0.018 0.005
0.334 0.372
0.292 0.367
0.295 0.378
0.273 0.389
-0.039 0.006
St.D.
0.029
0.035
0.039
0.052
0.009
0.020
0.047
0.060
0.046
0.040
0.028
0.025
0.022
0.020
-0.006
0.027
0.036
0.052
0.047
0.025
0.032
0.039
0.044
0.047
0.012
MINIMUM EARNINGS
MAX MEAN
$1,200 $595
$1,200 $752
$2,106 $1,412
$2,800 $1,709
$906 $816
$600 $526
$1,440 $864
$2,340 $1,176
$2,795 $1,494
$1,740 $650
$720 $480
$1,368 $659
$2,200 $1,006
$2,800 $1,446
$1,480 $527
$525 $435
$1,000 $580
$3,000 $1,292
$3,640 $1,576
$2,475 $857
$1,300 $684
$1,800 $860
$1,716 $1,118
$1,500 $1,215
$416 $434
DURATIONAL
DISQUALIFICATIONS
St.D.
$204
$277
$489
$532
$285
MAX
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
0.0
$100
$324
$603
$579
$503
$151
$371
$548
$766
$396
$82
$253
$739
$798
$657
$228
$346
$293
$282
$65
MEAN
1.9
2.4
2.6
2.6
0.7
0.9
2.3
2.3
2.3
1.4
1.3
1.6
2.1
2.3
0.9
1.3
1.6
2.3
2.4
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.6
2.7
1.2
St.D.
1.2
0.7
0.7
0.7
-0.5
MAXIMUM DURATION
MIN
19.8
16.9
20.9
21.7
1.1
21.5
20.3
21.4
19.3
-0.1
19.7
14.6
20.0
20.6
0.3
21.2
16.2
20.6
20.8
-0.6
19.3
17.9
17.8
18.5
-1.5
MEAN
24.8
22.2
24.6
24.8
-0.2
22.9
22.8
22.4
22.6
-0.5
23.3
22.8
23.5
24.2
0.1
22.9
22.1
23.3
23.7
0.4
23.4
22.6
22.4
22.8
-0.9
SOURCE: Employment and Training Administration, 1992; BLS, Monthly Labor Review, various.
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St.D.
2.6
3.0
1.8
1.7
-0.8
1.2
1.9
1.1
1.6
-0.1
2.2
3.6
2.8
2.0
0.6
1.1
2.4
1.4
1.7
0.2
2.7
3.5
2.8
2.4
0.2
TABLE 2.10
Interpreting Intra-Regional Cross Tabulations
LOW BENEFIT or
LOW DURATION
HIGH BENEFIT or
HIGH DURATION
Anti-Claimant Pro-Claimant
Pro-Employer Pro-Employer
Balanced Low Solvency
Anti-Claimant Pro-Claimant
Anti-Employer Anti-Employer
High Solvency Balanced
LOW DISQUALIFICATIONS HIGH
or DISQUALIFICATIONS or
LOW MINIMUM EARNINGS HIGH MINIMUM EARNINGS
Pro-Claimant Anti-Claimant
Pro-Employer Pro-Employer
Low Solvency Balanced
Pro-Claimant Anti-Claimant
Anti-Employer Anti-Employer
Balanced High Solvency
c:\dissert\two\expcros.wql
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LOW TAX
HIGH TAX
LOW TAX
HIGH TAX
TABLE 2.11
Comparison of Tax Rate and Benefit Changes
Crosstabs Based on Regional Mean Changes
1. Change in Average Tax Rate (row) BY
Change in Benefit/Wage Ratio (column).
Below Average Above Average
=< Xr > Xr
=< Xr
> Xr
2. Change in Average Tax Rate (row) BY
Change in Min. Earning Requirement.
=< Xr
> Xr
Below Average Above Average
=<Xr >Xr
5 3 Rustbelt
2 3 Breadbasket
3 2 South Atlantic
3 1 Cotton Belt
3 3 West
1 5 Rustbelt
1 1 Breadbasket
1 2 South Atlantic
2 2 Cotton Belt
3 2 West
3. Change in Average Tax Rate (row) BY
Change in Durational Disqualifications.
Below Average Above Average
=<e Yr y Yr
Rustbelt
Breadbasket
South Atlantic
Cotton Belt
West
Rustbelt
Breadbasket
South Atlantic
Coton Belt
West
=< Xr
> Xr
4. Change in Average Tax Rate (row) BY
Change in Average Maximum Benefit Duration.
=< Xr
> Xr
Below Average
=< Xr
Above Average
> Xr
5 3
2 3
3 2
1 33
1 5
2
2 1
4
2 31
4 4
1 4
2 3
2 2
3 3
4 2
2
2 1
3 1
3 2.
Rustbelt
Breadbasket
South Atlantic
Cotton Belt
West
Rustbelt
Breadbasket
South Atlantic
Cotton Belt
West
1 7
3 2
5
1 3
3 3_
3 3
2
2 1
2 2
1 4.
Rustbelt
Breadbasket
South Atlantic
Cotton Belt
West
Rustbelt
Breadbasket
South Atlantic
Cotton Belt
West
TABLE 2.12
Comparison of Tax Base and Benefit Changes
Crosstabs Based on Regional Mean Changes
1. Change in Average Tax Base (row) BY Change in Benefit/Wage Ratio.
Below Average Above Average
=< Xr >Xr
4 2
3 1
4 1
2 3
4 2
2 6
1 2
1 2
3
1 41
Rustbelt
Breadbasket
South Atlantic
Cotton Belt
West
Rustbelt
Breadbasket
South Atlantic
Cotton Belt
West
2. Change in Average Tax Base (row) BY Change in Minimum Earning
Requirement.
3. Change in Average Tax Base (row) BY
Change in Durational Disqualifications.
=< Xr
> Xr
Below Average
=< Xr
Above Average
Rustbelt
Breadbasket
South Atlantic
Cotton Belt
West
Rustbelt
Breadbasket
South Atlantic
Cotton Belt
West
4. Change in Average Tax Base (row) BY Change in
Average Maximum Benefit Duration.
Below Average Above Average
=< Xr >Xr
3 1
2 3
3 2
3 2
4 2
3
2 1
2 1
2 1
2 3
Rustbelt
Breadbasket
South Atlantic
Cotton Belt
West
Rustbelt
Breadbasket
South Atlantic
Cotton Belt
West
=< Xr
> Xr
Below Average Above Average
=< Xr >Xr
6
4
1 4
1 4
2 4
4 4
1 2
2 1
2 1
2 31
=< Xr
> Xr
2 4
2 2
3 2
3 2
4 2
6 2
1 2
1 2
2 1
2 31
=< Xr
> Xr
Rustbelt
Breadbasket
South Atlantic
Cotton Belt
West
Rustbelt
Breadbasket
South Atlantic
Cotton Belt
West
a:crosstbl.wq!
TABLE 2.13
Comparison of Revenue Index and Benefit Changes
Crosstabs Based on Regional Mean Changes
1. Change in Average Index (row) BY Change in Benefit/Wage Ratio.
=< Xr
> Xr
Below Average Above Average
=<Xr >Xr
4 3
1 3
4 2
1 2
3 3
2 5
3
1 1
4 1
2 31
3. Change in Average Index (row) BY Change in Durational
Disqualifications.
Rustbelt
Breadbasket
South Atlantic
Cotton Belt
West
Rustbelt
Breadbasket
South Atlantic
Cotton Belt
West
2. Change in Average Index (row) BY Change in Minimum Eaming
Requirement.
Below Average Above Average
=<Xr >Xr
4 3
2 2
=< Xr 3 3
2 1
3 3
2 5
1 2
> Xr 1 1
3 2
3 21
Rustbelt
Breadbasket
South Atlantic
Cotton Belt
West
Rustbelt
Breadbasket
South Atlantic
Cotton Belt
West
=< Xr
> Xr
Below Average Above Average
=<Xr >Xr
Rustbelt
Breadbasket
South Atlantic
Cotton Belt
West
Rustbelt
Breadbasket
South Atlantic
Cotton Belt
West
4. Change in Average Index (row) BY Change in
Average Maximum Benefit Duration.
=< Xr
> Xr
Below Average Above Average
=<Xr >Xr
1 6
2 2
6
1 2
3 3
3 4
3
1 1
2 3
1 4
Rustbelt
Breadbasket
South Atlantic
Cotton Belt
West
Rustbelt
Breadbasket
South Atlantic
Cotton Belt
West
acrossibl.wq!
5 2
2 1
1 1
3 2
3 2
TABLE 2.14
Inter-Regional Comparison of Minimums, Means, and Standard Deviations
Average
Tax
Rate
Average
Taxable
Wage
Base
Average
Revenue
Index
Average
Wage
Replacement
All Regions
Mean St.D.
0.0167 0.0048
0.0235 0.0034
0.0303 0.0040
0.0174 0.0033
0.0136 -0.0008
All Regions
Mean St.D.
$4,358 $184
$6,462 $621
$8,300 $1,088
$9,315 $1,598
$3,942 $904
1975
1979
1984
1990
1984-1975
1975
1979
1984
1990
1984-1975
1975
1979
1984
1990
1984-1975
1975
1979
1984
1990
1984-1975
Lowest
Regional Mean
0.0113
0.0204
0.0262
0.0137
0.0148
Lowest
Regional Mean
$4,200
$60
$7.313
$8,0 3 a
$3,113
Lowest
Regional Mean
$48
$125
$196
$110
$148
Lowest
Regional Mean
0.348
0.356
0.345
0.350
-0.003
Highest
Regional Mean
$684
$864
$1,412
$1,709
$728
Highest
Regional Mean
1.9
2.4
2.6
2.7
0.8
Lowest
Regional Mean
22.9
22.1
22.4
22.6
-0.5
All Regions
Mean St.D.
0.373 0.015
0.375 0.023
0.368 0.019
0.383 0.019
-0.005 0.004
All Regions
Mean St.D.
$544 $88
$743 $112
$1,201 $140
$1,488 $163
$657 $52
All Regions
Mean
1.3
2.0
2.4
2.4
1.0
All Regions
Mean
23.5
22.5
23.2
23.6
-0.2
StD.
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2
-0.1
St.D.
0.7
0.3
0.8
0.8
0.1
SOURCE: Employment and Training Administration, 1992;
BLS, Monthly Labor Review, various years.
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All Regions
Mean
$74
$153
$255
$166
$180
Average
Minimum
Eaming
Requirement
Average
Durational
Disquali-
fication
Average
Maximum
Potential
Duration
St.D.
$24
$26
$43
$45
$19
1975
1979
1984
1990
1984-1975
1975
1979
1984
1990
1984-1975
1975
1979
1984
1990
1984-1975
TABLE 2.15
STATE TRUST FUND STRATEGIES
1984 versus 1979
Note: Illinois taxes paid as percentage of total payrolls not reported
by Employment and Training Administration.
Source: US Dept. of Labor, Employment and Training Administration,
"Unemployment Insurance Financial Data," various years.
IU/TU ratio from Employment and Training Administration, unpublished.
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Change in
Change in Change in Insured Unemp/
Value of Taxes as % Benefit/Wage Total Unemp.
1984 Claims Total Payrolls Ratio Ratio
State (Thousands) (Point Change) (Point Change) (Point Change)
California $120,736 -0.30 0.3 -7.0
New York $64,946 -0.39 -1.7 -8.0
Illinois $50,859 N.A. -2.9 -22.0
Pennsylvania $44,493 1.01 0.9 -14.0
Michigan $33,810 0.56 3.0 -10.0
Graph 2.5
CI)
0
1970 1975 1980 1985
Source: Employment and Training Administration, 1992.
1990
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Net Trust Fund Reserves
Michigan, 1970-1990
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Michigan Employment
Commission, 1992.
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Chapter Three
The Effect of Legal and Economic
Change on Beneficiary Rates, Application
Rates, and Unemployment Duration
Since the 1970s, the transformation of the US economy
has plagued the UI system, and the states have responded
with tightened eligibility requirements, lower maximum
benefits, and tougher disqualification penalties. The
pattern of downward convergence among state programs and the
failure of federal and state actors to come to grips with a
new economic reality has been explored in the preceding
chapters. This chapter explores the cost of that failure
for most of the unemployed during the 1980s by isolating the
linkages among state and federal actions, economic change,
and declining recipiency rates and application rates.
In the pages that follow, a brief survey of the
literature on falling recipiency rates will be presented.
After looking at current explanations, an alternative
analysis will be offered, focusing on particu-Ar changes in
state law that may improve our understanding of the assault
on the unemployed. An analysis of application rates,
thought by many to hold the key to declining benefit
recipiency rates, follows, relying on the same data as the
beneficiary rate regression. The theory here is that many
of the "chilling effects" that reduce beneficiary rates are,
in fact, acting first against applications. Turning briefly
to the literature on work disincentives, regressions examine
the fact that one of the key variables in beneficiary rate
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regressions (duration of unemployment) may have endogenous
effects.
Previous Studies.
There is a notable dearth of literature on the topic of
declining benefit recipiency rates. Far more prevalent, as
will be touched on briefly below, are studies of work
disincentive effects. But beginning in the early 1980s,
awareness of the widening gap between the insured and total
unemployment rates sparked a flurry of activity.
Investigations of the shrinking portion of the unemployed
receiving benefits split in two directions: those looking
at application rates specifically, and those that focused on
statutory changes that directly reduced the insured/total
unemployment ratio. Studies of declining application rates
can, in turn, be usefully divided into those looking at
microdata and those pursuing macroeconomic and legal
explanations for trends in application rates.
Application rate studies (macro). Burtless (1983) was
among the first to ponder the source of the growing divide.
At the time of Burtless' essay, the combination of
lengthening unemployment durations and divergence between
the insured and total unemployment rate was just beginning
to raise concern about the counter-cyclical capacity of the
UI program. As Burtless shows, to some extent the
divergence is a product of definitions.
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The algebra of the ratio of insured unemployment rates
(IUR) to total unemployment rates (TUR) is this:
(1) IURt = (IUt / CEt) * 100
t-7
where CEt=. 7- (CEi / 12
i=t-18
(2) TURt = (Ut / (Et + Ut)) * 100
IUt is the sum of insured and uninsured unemployed in month
t; CEt is a moving average of the number of employed workers
in covered employment in month i; Ut is the total number of
civilian unemployed; and Et is total civilian employment.
The insured unemployed includes those who have applied for
benefits but not received a determination and those serving
waiting weeks. It usually excludes recipients of federal
extended benefits.
By definition, the numerator of the IUR/TUR is smaller
than the denominator because the former excludes exhaustees
and most job leavers. The denominator excludes the self-
employed and the few others not working in covered
employment. Moreover, as Burtless notes, the total
unemployment rate is based on a lagged employment measure.
When unemployment is growing, the measure will be a few
percentage points too small.
Following the algebra, as the definition of covered
employment expanded, the ranks of the insured unemployed
should have grown as well. But the opposite proved true.
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From 1951 to 1980, the IUR/TUR fell 40 percentage points4 9
while the portion of the civilian labor force in covered
employment rose by one-third.
Prior to the 1980s, most of the decline in the IUR/TUR
ratio may be attributable to the changing demographic and
industrial composition of the unemployed. Burtless asserts
that younger men and women are less likely to receive
benefits and were a growing portion of the unemployed. The
unemployed from manufacturing and construction industries
are also thought to be more likely to receive benefits and,
with coverage expanding beyond these industries, they were a
declining portion of the denominator, total unemployment.
No similar pattern of demographic or coverage changes can
explain the 1980s.
Cyclical patterns do come into play. Burtless notes
that early in a downward cycle, the portion of job losers
rises. Job losers have always been the primary
beneficiaries of unemployment insurance, so the IUR/TUR
rises as the portion of the unemployed who are job losers
rises. As a slump lengthens, benefit exhaustions reduce the
IUR while the TUR stays the same. This part of Burtless'
portrayal is only partially correct, however, because those
who exhaust benefits may join the ranks of discouraged
workers, falling outside the defined labor force, and
reducing both the IUR and the TUR.
49 This finding is reported as a percentage decline but is
actually in percentage points.
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Turning to the 1980s, Burtless runs two regressions
using job losers with less than 26 weeks unemployment as a
regressor on the IU/U ratio. In one specification, he uses
the number of job losers unemployed less than 26 weeks
divided by total unemployment, explaining 90 percent of the
variation in the IU/U ratio. Running the same equation with
dummies for quarters in 1980 through 1982, he finds
negative, significant coefficients on the dummies for the
1980s. This result indicates that the primary target of
unemployment insurance, short term job losers, were markedly
less likely to be insured during the 1980s.
Looking at data on initial claims, Burtless again finds
significant, negative coefficients on dummies for quarters
in the 1980s when trying to explain initial claims rates
using the number of new job losers each month. This result
indicates that unemployed job losers where less likely to
apply for benefits in the 1980s than in previous periods
since 1968. Again, demographic changes, industrial
attachment, and work history did not change significantly
enough in the early 1980s to explain the change.
Two additional sources of declining IUR/TUR rates are
suggested, but not thoroughly tested. Although denial rates
did not climb, benefit duration declined. This may increase
exhaustions and reduce the IUR. Also, reduced benefit rates
and taxation of benefits may be reducing the work
disincentive effect of unemployment insurance. This would
reduce only the unemployment spells of insured workers.
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Thus, the ratio of insured to total unemployed will fall
during the weeks which insured workers would previously have
remained on UI instead of finding work.
These preliminary observations set the stage for a more
thorough look at declining beneficiary rates by Burtless and
Saks (1984), resulting in the "Brookings analysis" (Vroman,
1991) or "crackdown hypothesis" (Kane, 1988). Burtless and
Saks chart time-series data on insured unemployment trends
and application rates. They also discuss legislative and
administrative crackdowns and hypothesize that the crackdown
and the decline in applications are linked. They note that,
beginning in 1976 and 1977, unemployment insurance offices
began denying claimants benefits at a dramatically increased
rate. One observations from their work sparked a series of
later research:
"If workers perceive that they have to
demonstrate more initiative in searching for work
and reporting for interviews at the Job Service or
UI office, they might be less inclined to apply
for UI benefits. The extent of this deterrent
effect is, unfortunately, largely unmeasurable"
(p. 38).
Measuring this effect was central to work by Blank and Card
(1988, 1989) and the data analysis reported below. There
is, in the Burtless and Saks analysis, little room for a
regional component to declining beneficiary rates as found
by other researchers. As found in the preceeding chapter,
they argue that all regions had declining benefit recipiency
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rates and all regions had administrative "crackdowns" on the
unemployed.
Kane (1988) also finds that declining application rates
are the primary source of declining jobless beneficiary
rates, noting "a 25 percent decline in applications by new
job losers between 1976 and 1984" (p. 1). Kane's work is
admittedly a preliminary draft without recent updating, but
like Burtless (1983) it raises fundamental issues.50 Kane
finds, among other things:
* The ratio of first payments to initial claims
was unchanged between 1976 and 1984. And the
percentage of weekly beneficiaries denied benefits
for work search, not reporting, or not "able and
available" was unchanged. But the ratio of
average weekly new claims to average job losers
with less than 5 weeks unemployment rose 25
percent.
* Denial rates never rose during the period of
decline in UI receipt.5 1
* The timing of increased denials for job search
and failure to report does not match the decline
in recipiency rates, calling into question the
effect of "hassles" on IU/TU decline.52
* The link between manufacturing and higher UI
recipiency rates lies in higher portions of job
losers among the unemployed from manufacturing.
Kane does not report regressions containing both.
* The portion of the unemployed who were members
of multiple earner families actually declined
slightly during the period of falling IU/TU rates.
50 Kane's draft includes the usual request "Please do not
cite." Even so, it is one of the most cited studies in
the field.
51 As will be seen below, denial rates are only part of
the story. The duration of denials also has to be
considered.
52 Kane assumes denials should be concurrent with
declining insured unemployment; Burtless and Saks
assume the crackdown precedes declining applications.
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This is contrary to theories that link multiple
earners and reduced claims for UI.53
Blank and Card (1989, 1991) pursue two lines of inquiry
into the problem of declining applications rates. Their
first inquiry decomposes change in the benefit recipiency
rate into three parts: (1) change in state UI law, (2)
change in the demographic and industrial character of the
unemployed, and (3) change in "take up" rates (essentially
applications). Looking at state-level data, they note a
plummeting rate of applications between 1980 and 1982.
Blank and Card are the first to attempt an estimate of
eligible unemployment. Because state laws vary regarding
earnings and base period work requirements, it is no simple
task to calculate how many of the unemployed would actually
be eligible for unemployment insurance if they were to
apply. Blank and Card attempt such an estimate, simplifying
somewhat the range of restrictions imposed by states. They
then regress wage replacement rates for benefits, earnings
requirements, disqualification rates, unionization,
demographic variables, industry variables, and legislative
variables onto application rates among the estimated
eligible unemployed. They find:
* Higher benefit levels increase application
rates.
53 This idea is confirmed by Vroman's finding (1990) that
both application rates and recipiency rates are
strongly correlated with marital status for male job
losers as are application rates with married female job
losers.
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* Earning requirements don't significantly affect
applications.
* Higher disqualification rates correlate with
lower application rates. But disqualification
rates fell during the period, which would tend to
increase application rates.
* Falling unionization accounts for half the
decline in application rates.
* No demographic, industry, or party-political
effects were noted.
By their analysis, disqualification rates act in two ways:
they directly reduce the ranks of the unemployed who will be
insured and they have a chilling effect on application
rates.
Application rate studies (micro). Various studies have
also explored declining benefit recipiency rates by using
microdata, typically from the PSID. The second section of
Blank and Card (1989, 1991), for example, estimates a logit
regression for the probability of receiving unemployment
insurance based on demographics, education, unionization,
hours of previous work, brief unemployment duration, region,
occupation and industry of previous employment. Age and
gender proved significant; race and years of education did
not. As in their examination of state-level data,
disqualification rates are found to be a significant
impediment to receiving UI benefits.
Two findings from their microdata analysis conflict
with what Blank and Card found at the state level. First,
the wage replacement rate for benefits was found to be
insignificant and likely negative. They conclude that the
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measure is too crude for micro data (which it is), but fail
to note the more important problem that it is also
endogenous: the benefit/wage ratio for an individual is
determined at the time of application. The second conflict
between their micro and state-level findings is unresolved.
Unlike the state data, the micro data shows an increase in
benefit recipiency rates between 1980 and 1982.
Vroman (1991) was first to analyze a set of special
questions added to the Current Population Survey for
outgoing rotation groups in May, August, and November of
1989 and February of 1990. These surveys included detailed
questions about whether the unemployed person applied for
unemployment insurance and, if not, why not. Unfortunately,
20 percent of the respondents said they didn't know why the
didn't apply or rejected the survey list of reasons for not
applying and answered "other".
Despite the poor response rate, certain trends are
apparent. Following Burtless (1983) and others, Vroman
found the average application rate for job losers, those
most likely to apply and receive benefits, was only 53
percent. Of those who had not applied for benefits, 53
percent said they believed they were ineligible, further
evidence of the "chilling effect" of disqualifications and
eligibility requirements on application rates. About half
the non-applicants believed they were ineligible because
they hadn't worked enough in the previous year. No effort
is made, hw.ever, to estimate whether non-applicants were,
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in fact, ineligible. One implication of Vroman's findings
for later research is that monetary denial rates may not
rise with higher monetary qualifications because
applications fall faster than denial rates would increase.
Vroman found several demographic and geographic factors
that correlate with higher application rates. Longer
unemployment duration consistently relates to higher
application rates. As noted in the preceding chapter, there
is also a clear regional pattern in the data. Application
rates among job losers in the south are below average, so
national beneficiary rates will fall as unemployment shifts
more heavily to the south. In the absence of controls for
statutory variables, observations of regional differentials
are intriguing but not explained. A worthy project for the
future would be to merge the micro data from the special CPS
supplements and data from the statutory explanations
advanced below.
Statutory explanations for declining IU/TU. Although
the previous studies investigated declining application
rates, others have focused directly on the IU/TU ratio,
sometimes with application rates as an explanatory variable,
but always with changing statutory factors as essential
explanations.
The first specification of this nature was Blaustein
and Kozlowski (1978). Their primary goal was an explanation
of program costs and the relationship between legal
restrictions and cost of benefits per covered employee.
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They first test the role of the IU/TU in program cost,
finding it significant. They then ask which factors
influence the IU/TU, finding that statutory factors (weekly
benefit/weekly wage ratio, potential benefit duration,
qualifying requirements, quit disqualifications) are not
significant. They reach the intriguing conclusion that
legal restrictions on benefit recipiency rates will have
virtually no effect on program cost. Reducing unemployment-
- not limiting unemployment insurance claims-- holds the key
to low program cost.
Blaustein and Kozlowski were writing before the
tightening of eligibility requirements and extension of
durational disqualifications that occurred in the 1980s.
Corson and Nicholson (1988), in a study for the Employment
and Training Administration, provide both macro and micro
explanations for declining benefit recipiency rates. Their
data set includes a more comprehensive list of legal
provisions than any previous study.54 Unfortunately, they
do not apply their legal categories to a national sample
and, as with Vroman (1990), the detail on legal changes is
not incorporated into the micro analysis.
Corson and Nicholson first use demographic and economic
variables to explain changes in the IU/TU ratio in a
national time-series from 1971 to 1986. They then test the
54 A prior study that included Corson (Corson, Hershey,
and Kerachsky, 1986) is excellent background reading on
nonmonetary qualifications and their effects across
states.
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role of federal program changes and state legal changes in
explaining decline in the IU/TU ratio for state programs in
the 11 largest states. They find 30 to 40 percent of the
decline in IU/TU rates is due to state legal changes. The
explanatory variables in the 11 state sample includes
manufacturing unemployment and job losers in one
specification, but no individual characteristics such as
race or gender. Although more comprehensive than previous
tests of legal changes, the Corson and Nicholson study
excluded specific treatment of durational disqualifications
and was limited by the focus on 11 largest states.
The micro analysis of Corson and Nicholson used PSID
data and a logit regression of whether an unemployed person
received benefits. They found significant correlations with
manufacturing (+), race (Black, -), unionization (+), and
short spells of unemployment (-). They included
manufacturing, but not whether the individual was a job
loser. Correlation between these two categories is high and
could have been usefully modeled. The data holds further
clues about application rates: in 1982, almost half the
respondents hadn't applied for benefits because they (1)
expected to find work (22.3 percent), (2) don't like
unemployment insurance (16.6 percent), or (3) had
administrative access problems (10.2 percent). Almost half
of those who hadn't applied for benefits fell into these
three categories. Another 18.3 percent of those surveyed
applied but were denied benefits.
155
Picking up on the statutory analysis of Corson and
Nicholson (1988), Baldwin and McHugh (1992), writing for the
Economic Policy Institute, tested the role of legal
variables in declining UI claims from 1979 to 1990. Their
data set included state and year variables along with UI
program variables, demographics, and economic variation
across states. They were the first to examine the role of
durational disqualifications in lower benefit recipiency
rates, with both quit and work refusal disqualifications
found to be significant explanatory variables for declining
benefit recipiency rates. As with Corson and Nicholson,
they found race, manufacturing, job loser rates, and
unionization to be significant explanatory variables.
Benefit taxation was poorly measured in their model, as were
exhaustion rates, and there was no reported analysis of
application rates.
Table 3.1 summarizes the literature on declining IU/TU
rates and application rates.
[ Table 3.1 1
Data to Explain Benefit Recipiency Rates, Applications,
Duration of Unemployment.
To explain changes in the benefit recipiency rates,
application rates, and unemployment duration, a pooled
cross-section, time series database was built including
values for every year and state from 1979 to 1991. It
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includes variables to measure economic and demographic
differences across states, state legal changes, and federal
pressures on state unemployment insurance programs.
Dependent variables in the regressions that follow
include:
* The natural log of the insured unemployment to total
unemployment ratio (ln IU/TU) for all programs,
* The natural log of initial claims to total
unemployment (ln APPS/TU) to measure application rates,
* The percentage of all unemployment that is of 15
weeks or more duration (DURAT15).
Variables available to measure state context, economic
differences, and demographics include:
* Unemployment rate (UNEMRT) and previous
unemployment rate (UNEMRT-1),
* Percentage of the unemployed who are job losers
(LOSER),
* Percentage of employment that is in
manufacturing (MANU),
* Percentage of labor force that works part-time
(PCTPRT),
* Percentage of labor force that is female
employment (PCTFEM),
* Percentage of labor force that is black
employment (PCTBLK),
* Percentage of labor force that is teenage
employment (PCTTEEN),
* Union membership as a percentage of all
employment (UNION),
* AFL-CIO rating of Senate delegation (COPE).
This variable is intended as a proxy for political
climate, much like the Democratic variable was in
Blank and Card (1991). The COPE variable is a
better measure, however, because it more
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specifically relates to the behavior of elected
officials. Not all Democrats act like
Democrats...
* Right-to-Work state (RTW yes, no),
* Percentage of unemployment that is brief
(DURAT5, under 5 weeks),
* Percentage of unemployment that is lengthy
(DURAT15, over 15 weeks).
Federal changes are measured in three ways:
* Taxation of benefits (BENTAX2) discussed below,
* Changes in taxation of loans (HCMULT-1),
* Extended benefits (EB yes, no).
State legal changes are estimated with the following:
* Maximum potential duration of benefits, in
weeks (MAXWKS),
* Exhaustion rate as a portion of benefit
recipiency rates (EXRATE and EXRT2),
* Average number of benefit weeks actually paid
per claimants (WKSBEN),
* Average benefits as a percentage of average
weekly wages (BENWG),
* Percentage of first claims paid within 14 to 21
days (TIMELY),
* Waiting week (WAIT yes, no),
* Earnings requirements for minimum benefits
(BMIN), maximum benefits (BMAX), and maximum
benefits at maximum duration (MBEN),
* Durational disqualifications enforced for
quitting previous employment (DURQ), refusing
suitable work (DURR), or misconduct discharge
(DURD).
* Disqualification rates (DQ).
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Table 3.2 displays means and changes between 1979 and 1991
for the explanatory variables and dependent variables.
[ Table 3.2 1
Many of these variables have proven significant in
previous literature. Three variables are included for the
first time or measured more accurately: benefit taxation,
durational disqualifications, and exhaustion rates. First,
the measure for taxation of benefits is a more accurate
representation of the role of this federal change. Although
federal law regarding benefit taxes applies to all states,
variation in benefit levels and durations will mean that the
tax will fall with differing levels of severity across
states. Corson and Nicholson (1988) measure this change by
calculating the percentage of a state's population whose
incomes were above the threshold for benefit taxation. This
is then interacted with the wage replacement rate and both
wage replacement and the interaction variable were included
in their regressions.
The Corson and Nicholson measure for taxation will
capture some of the differential effects across states, but
miss variations in benefit duration which will alter the
earnings levels of recipients over the course of a tax year.
To more accurately measure the effects of benefit taxation,
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the database used here measures benefit taxation by first
assuming average earnings of the insured unemployed in a
state with this formula:
(WKSBEN*BEN) + (52-WKSBEN)*(AWW) = PRE-TAX INCOME
Yearly income of a UI beneficiary is the sum of income from
insurance (weeks of benefits times amount of benefits) plus
income before being unemployed (weeks worked, assuming no
delay in benefits, times average weekly wage). Two tax
estimates are generated with these figures, a pre-benefit
tax rate and a post-benefit tax rate based on changing
thresholds for benefit taxation over time and using federal
tax tables and standard deductions for single individuals. 55
In preparing regressions, estimated taxation was
initially incorporated in two ways. BENTAX is the
difference between post-benefit tax payments and pre-benefit
tax payments all divided by annual benefits (the first term
in the equation above). BENTAX2, the preferred measure,
expresses the difference in tax payments as a percentage of
total pre-tax income. Because figures are averages for each
state, either method is deficient for capturing the effect
of earlier thresholds which affected only higher income
recipients within a given state. It also understates the
additional tax burden imposed where states rely on federal
55 Some states include dependent's allowances in their
average weekly benefit calculations, leading to
mistakenly high estimates of benefit levels for single,
childless beneficiaries.
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definitions of income for their own income taxes, or where
states have no income taxes.
A second change involves measures of exhaustions. The
measure provided by the Employment and Training
Administration expresses exhaustions as a percentage of
first payments. It relates to flows into and out of the
program. From previous work and in preliminary regressions,
this measure of exhaustion rates consistently shows a
misleading positive correlation with benefit recipiency
rates: more exhaustions, higher IU/TU ratios. One
explanation for this relationship is that a claimant must be
insured in order to exhaust benefits, so the rates move
together, though not identically. To eliminate that
misleading positive relationship, exhaustion rates (EXRT2)
are expressed here as a ratio of exhaustions per first
payments all divided by the benefit recipiency rate. This
specification gives the desired result that a constant
exhaustion rate and lower benefit recipiency rates result in
higher EXRT2 values.
The third addition to previous work is the inclusion of
durational disqualifications as explanatory variables. It
has become common practice to include denial rates in
benefit recipiency rate and applications regressions.
Denial rates can be interpreted in two ways. High denial
rates will directly reduce the IU/TU ratio. But it is also
possible that low denial rates signify self-restriction on
the part of potential claimants. States with a reputation
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for tough administration may have low denial rates and low
application rates. As discussed in Chapter Two, the
database used here instead models a critical change in the
1980s, the expanded use of durational disqualifications.
This is modelled using a yes/no dummy for the presence of
this type of disqualification. Durational disqualifications
are expected to reduce benefit recipiency rates by excluding
many claimants from receiving benefits until they have
secured new employment. Durational disqualifications for
voluntarily leaving employment may also reduce unemployment
durations by influencing an employed worker's decision about
quitting.
Table 3.3 shows how these variables are expected to
influence benefit recipiency rates, application rates, and
unemployment duration.
[ Table 3.3 1
In some cases relationships are expected, but not expected
to be strong. For example, durational disqualifications are
likely to reduce unemployment duration but not
significantly, particularly given the presence of other
causal factors.
Many of the relationships anticipated in Table 3.3 are
not surprising, but some may be. The variable TIMELY, for
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timely first payments, is expected to have two kinds of
effects. First, it has the direct effect of putting money
into claimants hands in a short time, which is likely to
make applications more appealing. But it is also likely to
be strongly correlated with other administrative variables
which are not measured or cannot be measured, such as
stringency of work tests. The timely payment of benefits
may require administrative procedures and oversight that are
relevant in areas that are not measured here.
Table 3.4 is a rough test of the idea that timely
payments correspond to strict accounting and administrative
policies:
[ Table 3.4 ]
On the horizontal axis are measures of work test strictness
from an Employment and Training Administration study using
data from 1985 (Corson, 'Kerachsky, and Kisker, 1987). The
research team who compiled this data grouped 10 states into
three groups based on the "strictness" of their work search
requirements. On the vertical axis is the grouping of those
10 states into below average and above average for
timeliness of first payments. Although admittedly a rough
test on a severely limited sample, the crosstab results
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support the idea that the variable for timely payments will
correlate positively and significantly with stricter work
search requirements which are unmeasured for the larger
sample. 56 That being the case, a negative correlation
between timely payments and duration will be likely. The
speed of benefit payments may not affect unemployment
duration or the benefit recipiency rate, but the role of
work test requirements may reduce the length of unemployed
spells or reduce application rates.
Before turning to the regression results, it's
important to make several qualifying statements regarding
the data. All measures are annual averages, a fact which
poses several problems in the context of unemployment
insurance. The timing of legal and program changes will not
be captured exactly in annual data. This is particularly a
problem for the Extended Benefits variable given that states
"trigger" on or off at a given point in the year, but the EB
variable is 1 or 0 for an entire state/year observation.
Likewise, the duration variables are averages for the year
and will not correspond directly to unemployed individuals
across a given year. All measures are also state-level.
This level of data limits the applicability of the variables
56 A significant information gap exists for time series
research on unemployment insurance programs. Only in
the 1980s, with the quality control program, did
extensive collection of administrative, as opposed to
financial, data begin. Unsatisfying proxies for
important program characteristics such as job search
requirements are therefore common.
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for some questions, particularly relating to duration of
unemployment as discussed below.
Explaining Variation in Benefit Recipiency Rates.
It is clear to those who have observed trends in
unemployment insurance law during the 1980s that various
changes have been pursued to increase trust fund balances
and reduce program costs. The relationship between legal
changes and benefit recipiency rates can be measured with
some statistical accuracy through regression models, but a
more accessible portrait of interstate variation is shown in
Table 3.5.
[ Table 3.5 ]
It compares the 10 states with highest and lowest insured
unemployment rates in 1991. All the states with lowest
benefit recipiency rates paid benefits to one-fourth or
fewer of their unemployed workers. They tend, on average,
to pay a lower percentage of average weekly wages. They
tend to have higher minimum earnings requirements. And they
tend to have about half the unionization level of the five
best states for jobless beneficiary rates. Although the
picture is less stark, it is also noteworthy that every one
of states with lowest benefit recipiency rates has all three
types of durational disqualifications on their books.
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Alaska, at the other end of the spectrum, has no durational
disqualifications.
A snapshot of program differences and benefit
recipiency rates such as that in Table 3.5 was the original
impetus for building the database from which this study is
drawn. It begs the questions: how dramatically have
benefit recipiency rates varied during the 1980s, and how
can we isolate the effects of state legal changes in that
transformation? First, a look at benefit recipiency rates.
Graph 3.1 charts the decline and increase in benefit
recipiency rates between 1979 and 1991, illustrating several
characteriszics of the program.
[ Graph 3.1 ]
First, at no time during the period under study did more
than 43 percent of the unemployed receive benefits. Second,
the percentage of the unemployed receiving benefits declined
steadily from 1982 to 1984, stayed below about one-third for
five years, and then rose steadily to 1991, though never
regaining 1980 levels. Third, it is striking that a larger
percentage of the unemployed received benefits in 1980 than
in the deep recession years of 1982 and 1983.
The regressions that follow were weighted to account
for heteroscedasticity across state observations due to
differences in sample sizes. Observations were weighted by
the average total unemployment for each state from 1979 to
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1991. This weighting was chosen in part because total
unemployment is the denominator in the dependent variable of
two of the regressions. The average for the period was used
to smooth the unemployment series. Any weighting scheme
involves tradeoffs. In this case, the efficiency gains from
weighting the dependent variable should be considered in
light of also weighting the independent variables, of which
the majority are binomial and constitute values for the
total population. Results from unweighted regressions are
included in Appendix B and are not fundamentally different
from the reported findings.
Various versions of covariance models were tested and
rejected on the basis of F-tests and underlying theory.5 7
The goal was a model that would minimize the role of dummy
variables, particularly for the years 1983 to 1989 and for
the regions. Ideally, whatever variation would be captured
by these dummies would be directly modelled by the measured
variables.
Table 3.6 presents two models to explain declining
recipiency rates, the first with only regional dummies and
the 1983-1989 dummy (Column One) and the final regression
(Column Two).
[ Table 3.6 ]
57 The regressions that follow were also attempted with
covariance models. Fixed-effect models were rejected
with F-tests of F3 0 506 = 27.8, F3 0 4559 = 62.7,
respectively, for the benefit recipiency rate and
application regressions.
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The additional statutory and economic variables reduce the
coefficient on the 1983-1989 dummy in column one by 76
percent. All of the coefficients on regional dummies
decline dramatically and two (Rustbelt and Breadbasket)
cease to be significantly different from zero.
Some of the reported results are in keeping with
previous literature. Application rates and the percentage
of the unemployed who are job losers have the predicted
strong positive effect on benefit recipiency rates. Job
loser rates, the population for whom the system was
originally designed, are predictably, strongly correlated
with benefit recipiency rates.
An important finding is that high minimum earnings
requirements significantly reduce benefit recipiency rates.
Of the durational disqualifications tested, those due to
refusing suitable work are found to be significant and
reduce benefit recipiency rates. The positive sign on the
misconduct durational disqualification is anomalous, but may
indicate that states are less likely to apply this
disqualification given its severity. Disqualification rates
are found to be one of the most robust variables for
explaining changes in recipiency rates. At the other end of
a spell, high exhaustion rates explain a substantial portion
of the variation in the percentage of the unemployed
receiving benefits.
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Both the COPE rating and unionization are positive and
significant. These measure two different aspects of the
political context of unemployment insurance. COPE is a
proxy for the effect of pro-claimant legislative activity
that may not be modeled explicitly in other variables.
Unionization, on the other hand, is understood to play a
role in information provision. It is noteworthy that
unionization remains significant though job loser rates and
manufacturing are included in the equation. This buttresses
the perspective that unionization plays a role that is
distinct from the industrial context or layoff patterns
within which unions operate. The negative coefficient on
Right to Work captures the linkages among Right to Work
laws, lower unionization, and unmeasured anti-claimant
policies in Right to Work states.
One of the coefficients that proved significant has an
unexpected sign. Manufacturing is found to have a
significant negative correlation with benefit recipiency
rates. The Pearson's r for manufacturing and the insured
unemployment rate is positive, but very low (.03). The
effect of manufacturing on the percentage of the unemployed
receiving benefits is influenced by the impact of other more
significant variables with which manufacturing is highly
correlated: application rates, exhaustions, benefit
durations, wage replacement rates.
Although 88 percent of the variance in the log of the
percentage of the unemployed receiving benefits is
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"explained" by this model, it also illustrates the gulf that
exists between accounting for variation and pinpointing the
causes of change. Specifically, the dummies for the period
1983 to 1989 and for two regions remained significant.
Although the variable for measuring the effects of
gender does not prove significant, coefficients on variables
that affect men and women differently do prove significant,
supporting assertions that women are disproportionately
excluded by recent state behavior (Pearce, 1993; 1991).
Minimum earnings requirements, for example, reduce women's
benefit recipiency rates by more than men's because women
account for 45 percent of the labor force, but two-thirds of
minimum wage workers. Women are also more likely than men
to have quit a job (19.1 percent versus 15.7 percent,
respectively) (Wider Opportunities for Women, 1993). Only
eight states have statutes recognizing sexual harassment as
good cause of quitting. Case law in almost all states,
however, does include sexual harassment as just cause. More
significantly anti-female is the trend away from personal,
as opposed to work-related, good cause for quitting.
Table 3.7 uses the regression results to allocate the
fall in benefit recipiency rates among the explanatory
variables between 1979 and 1984, the year with lowest
benefit recipiency rates in the sample. Variables with
insignificant coefficients are not shown because their
impact cannot be predictably measured.
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[ Table 3.7
The change in the mean between 1979 and 1984 of an
explanatory variable is multiplied by the coefficient for
that variable to estimate the change that would have
occurred if that variable alone had changed. The second
column from the right computes the decline in benefit
recipiency rates from 1979 that would have occurred due to
change in a given variable alone. The final column divides
the estimated contribution of a given variable by the actual
change in the log of the IU/TU ratio. The fit between the
model and the change from 1979 to 1984 is not exact; the
model understates the decline by about 5.6 percentage
points. The variables are divided into categories. Some
legal changes act to directly exclude claimants
(exclusionary variables), while some reduce durations or
benefit levels (benefit standards). Background variables
include demographics and economic change.5 8
By this accounting, the largest effect of a single
variable on benefit recipiency rates was due to falling
application rates, as previous authors have concluded. The
exhaustion rate and minimum earnings requirements were
distant second and third among legal variables. Acting
alone, the fall in application rates, the rising exhaustion
rate, and higher earnings requirements would have decreased
58 The structure of these tables owes much to discussion
with attendees of the National Employment Law Project
conference in Washington, DC, March 30, 1993.
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IU/TU rates by 13.6 percent, 5.2 percent and 2.5 percent,
respectively, or 59.8, 22.7, and 10.9 percent of the actual
decline.
The increase in job losers among the unemployed would
have increased the IU/TU ratio by 8.9 percent, a substantial
39.0 percent of the recorded decline, if other changes
hadn't occurred. Declining unionization accounts for about
a 2.2 percent decline in benefit recipiency rates, or 9.5
percent of the total decline. As asserted, the exclusionary
variables explain the largest portion of the decline in
benefit recipiency rates (70.6 percent), all else held
constant. Change in the variables grouped as benefit
standards would have reduced recipiency rates by 5.7
percent, or 25.2 percent of what actually occurred.
This summary confirms the assertion that the current
unemployment insurance system is poorly designed for the new
economic context. Variables which relate to lengthy
unemployment spells (exhaustion rates, unemployment rates,
job loser rates) all prove significant and have large
impacts. Moreover, the regulatory responses of the states
is shown to have the expected negative impact: high minimum
earning requirements, durational disqualifications for
refusing work, and exhaustion rates are found to reduce
benefit recipiency.59
59 The fact that disqualification rates declined may be an
exception that proves the rule. Disqualification rates
declined, but the decline in application rates had a
larger impact, i.e., application rates fell faster than
disqualification rates.
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Taken together, changes in the identified demographic
and labor market variables would have increased the jobless
beneficiary rate by 9.4 percent if state action hadn't
contributed to reducing recipiency rates by 21.8 percent. 60
This table also shows that 20.8 percent of the decline in
the benefit recipiency rate is captured by a dummy variable
for 1983 to 1989, leaving a large gap in our knowledge about
causes of declining benefit recipiency.
Table 3.8 repeats the method used in Table 3.7 to
allocate change among the variables. This table, however,
is used to model the increase in benefit recipiency rates
during the late 1980s.
[ Table 3.8 1
This table addresses the sources of improvement in the
beneficiary rate and raises the issue of why the rate didn't
climb more substantially.
The most striking result in this table is the
outstanding role of application rates and job loser rates in
improved benefit recipiency rates. Application rates alone
among the legal variables (exclusionary and benefit
standards) account for almost all the improvement in benefit
60 If application rates are not counted as legal
variables, the remaining variables would still account
for a nine percent decline in benefit recipiency rates.
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recipiency rates during the period. All other legal effects
cancel out. Likewise, increasing job losers among the
unemployed account for substantially all the change due to
underlying economic conditions. These findings suggest that
the recent improvement in the percentage of the unemployed
receiving benefits should not promote complacency. The
downward pressure on recipiency rates imposed by high
earnings requirements, declining unionization, and
durational disqualifications remains intact despite the
apparent recent improvement in benefit recipiency.
Explaining Variation in Application Rates.
A graphic picture of application rates is provided in
Graph 3.2.
[ Graph 3.2 ]
Like benefit recipiency rates, application rates plummeted
between 1980 and 1983. Also like benefit recipiency rates,
application rates never returned to 1980 levels. But the
average for application rates across the sample fell between
1990 and 1991 while the benefit recipiency rate rose.
Table 3.9 shows the coefficients for variables that
explain variation in the log of application rates across
states and years.
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[ Table 3.9
The dummy for the period 1983 to 1989 is significant and
negative, showing that part of the significantly lower mean
benefit recipiency rate from 1983 to 1989 is due to
particularly low application rates, but still not explained
by the explicit variables present.
Most of the relationships are as anticipated. Job
losers, manufacturing workers, and union members are more
likely to apply for benefits than other potential claimants.
Teenagers are understandably less likely to apply for
benefits, confirming the negative correlation between
teenage employment and benefit recipiency rates.
Longer unemployment durations correspond to lower
application rates in the model. Benefit durations could
have had two effects on application rates. Positive
correlation would result if lengthy potential payments
induced higher application rates. This could have been
measured with the maximum potential weeks variable.61
Negative correlation is due to elimination of multiple
spells of unemployment and multiple applications (if, for
example, claimants who receive benefits find more stable
employment after longer insured spells or finish a year in a
61 Earlier results were criticized for including average
weeks received, instead of potential weeks, in the
IU/TU regression. That critique was valid and the
final regression reflects it. For the application rate
regression, however, weeks received is used to control
for the fact that lengthy spells with benefits will
reduce the need to re-apply.
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given spell). Lengthy benefit durations, long unemployment
spells (15 weeks or more), and high unemployment rates are
also associated with lower application rates because other
factors are isolated in the model. 62 After accounting for
unemployment among high-application rate groups such as job
losers, manufacturing workers, and union members, the
denominator of the application rate (total unemployment)
will climb without corresponding increases in the numerator
(applications) as durations lengthen and the unemployment
rate rises.
Factors which affect the level of benefits received are
found to significantly relate to application rates. Higher
wage replacement rates correlate with higher application
rates. Federal changes in benefit taxation, which
effectively reduce benefit levels, correlate with lower
application rates.63 The results indicate that potential
applicants weigh the costs and benefits of applying,
accounting for taxation and benefit levels, and decide not
to apply if benefits are "too low". This behavior may seem
strange given that not applying guarantees a zero wage
replacement rate. Even with wage replacements less than 50
62 In contrast, Vroman (1991) found a positive correlation
between lengthy unemployment duration and application
rates.
63 Discussants associated with National Employment Law
Project conference stated that they knew of no
instances where claimants did not apply because of
taxation. Even so, the correlation was significant and
negative under various specifications.
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percent and payment of taxes, benefits would be greater than
zero!
The riddle may be solved if the relevant comparison for
a potential claimant is not possible benefits versus no
benefits, but instead the potential for receiving any
benefits versus the effort of applying. Low benefits are
only part of a calculation that includes odds of receiving
benefits and effort to claim them. The regression results
show that higher earning requirements for maximum benefit
payments and maximum duration negatively affect application
rates. As this earnings requirement rises, application
rates fall. These results confirm behavior noted by Blank
and Card (1988) regarding non-applicants whom they calculate
would have been eligible. In their model, as qualifying
requirements and denial rates rise, the number of unemployed
who think they are eligible and should apply will fall--fall
faster, in fact, than the disqualification rate would have
risen (which may explain the insignificant coefficient on
denial rates in the result reported here).
Table 3.10 repeats the format of Tables 3.7 and 3.8
using the coefficients from the application rate regression,
the change in means from 1979 to 1984, and the same
categorization of variables.
[ Table 3.10 ]
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Only one of the legal variables changed in a manner that
would increase application rates. Thus, it cannot be said
that application rates, not state legal changes, are the key
to declining benefit recipiency rates; application rates are
themselves a function of tougher legal standards. Legal
variables explain 10.9 percent of the decline in application
rates, and economic and demographic variables explain 41.8
percent. Demographic variables, acting alone, would have
increased application rates by 2.7 percent during the time
period.
The taxation of benefits, reduction in wage replacement
rates, and higher earning requirements for maximum benefit
levels and duration account for 1.4 percent, 1.4 percent,
and 8.0 percent, respectively, of the decline that occurred.
The labor market variables had larger impacts. All else
being constant, falling unionization rates and manufacturing
employment would have combined to reduce applications by 7.9
percent, or about 48.8 percent of the actual decline in
application rates. Had the increase in job losers occurred
in isolation, application rates would have risen by 6.8
percent, again indicating the central effect of legal
changes on application rates. To a greater degree than in
the benefit recipiency regression, the dummy for 1983 to
1989 accounts for much of the change in applications (41.7
percent) without, again, suggesting specific causes.
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The application rate regression provides further
evidence of the role of a changed economic and legal context
in programmatic decline. Specifically, as noted at the
outset, the growth of long term unemployment has exceeded
the capacity of the existing system. In keeping with
findings of the recipiency rate regression, variables
relating to lengthy unemployment spells (long duration of
unemployment, earnings for maximum benefits and maximum
duration, durational disqualification for discharge, high
unemployment rates) all correspond to lower application
rates under the current system. Another core fact of the
new economy, declining unionization, plays a key role in
reduced application rates, as it did in reduced benefit
recipiency rates. And, as noted, almost every legal change
that proved significant had a negative effect on application
rates.
Table 3.11, like Table 3.8, allocates change among the
variables to explain recent improvement, in this case
relative to application rates.
[ Table 3.11 ]
Three facts are clear. First, the sum of the effects of
changes in the exclusionary and benefit standards legal
variables was negative, suggesting that legal changes would
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have continued to reduce application rates during the period
if economic and demographic factors hadn't come into play.
Second, the decline of manufacturing and unionization
continues to erode application rates, even though the
application rate has improved somewhat in recent years.
Third, the dummy variable accounts for a substantial portion
of the total change (55.8 percent) that would have occurred
if all else held constant. This suggests that we are still
a long way from understanding the factors that influence
application rates.
Explaining Variation in Duration of Unemployment.
The effect of unemployment insurance on duration of
unemployment has been tested ad nauseum (Munts and
Garfinkel, 1974; Ehrenberg and Oaxaca, 1976; Classen, 1977;
Welch, 1977; Fishe, 1982; Moffitt and Nicholson, 1982;
Grossman, 1989; Fallick, 1991). Despite the seemingly
exhaustive literature, it seems worthwhile to place that
discussion in the context of the current database. The
deleterious effects of unemployment insurance benefits will
only exist if potential workers are receiving benefits.
Perhaps the drop in claims during the 1980s would have been
responsible for a modest decline in unemployment duration if
other events had not occurred.64
64 State-level data is too broad to provide definitive
answers to questions of unemployment duration. The
remarks that follow are understood to be quite
speculative.
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Graph 3.3 illustrates the trend in the portion of the
unemployed who were jobless 15 weeks or longer.
[ Graph 3.3 1
The percentage climbed rapidly from 1979 to 1983, when over
36 percent of the unemployed in the sample were out 15 weeks
or longer. Note that, before controlling for other factors,
this graph bears little relation to the benefit recipiency
graph, Graph 3.1.
Table 3.12 presents the results of a regression using
the percentage of the unemployed who suffered unemployment
for 15 weeks or longer as a dependent variable.
[ Table 3.12 ]
Despite a limited range of variables to account for economic
change, the regression explains 83.9 percent of the variance
in percentage of unemployment that is 15 weeks or longer.
The demographic and labor market variables show that
union members, job losers, and part-time workers were more
likely to have long spells of unemployment. This finding
confirms previous studies and will play a role in the reform
program proposed in Chapter Four. Teenagers had fewer long
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unemployment spells, but the data does not suggest how many
left the labor force altogether rather than finding
employment. The result that quit disqualifications are
associated with lower unemployment duration is also not
surprising. This is presumably true because such
disqualifications increase the opportunity cost of delaying
job changes after quitting. The dummy for 1983 to 1989 is
significant, but only three of the four regional dummies
are.
It may be surprising to note that the coefficient for
the benefit recipiency rate is negative and significant.
This means that as more of the unemployed receive benefits,
the portion unemployed 15 weeks or more declines, all else
held constant. This unexpected result occurs despite the
fact that the data show long benefit durations and high wage
replacement rates lengthen unemployment durations, as most
economists would expect.
There are several possible explanations for the
negative correlation between the percentage of the
unemployed receiving benefits and lengthy unemployment
spells. First, as suggested by Ben-Horim and Zuckerman
(1987), unemployment insurance benefits may aid in job
search. Individuals with limited private resources may be
able to intensify their job search, and reduce their
unemployment duration, through benefit claims. Policies to
heighten this effect will be discussed in the concluding
chapter.
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Second, unemployment insurance programs do more than
pay benefits. They require various job search behaviors or
other qualifying factors in order for a claimant to receive
benefits. It is likely that, after controlling for benefit
levels and duration, the additional effect of benefit
recipiency is to reduce unemployment spells through pressure
for job search. In discussion of the benefit recipiency
regression it was suggested that timely first payments are
positively correlated with stringent job search
requirements. In the preliminary formulations of the
duration regression, the coefficient on timely first
payments was never significant but the sign was always
negative, as anticipated.
Third, many who analyze unemployment insurance data
report figures for the unemployed out of work 27 weeks or
longer (Kane, 1988; Corson and Nicholson, 1988), and it is
easy to assume that 26 weeks is the duration of most state
programs. Twenty-six weeks is, rather, the maximum duration
of most state programs. Most recipients receive benefits
for far less time. It may be that recipients wait until
their benefits are exhausted before searching for work. If
the unemployed found jobs rapidly after beginning their
search in earnest, but didn't begin looking until they
exhausted or were about to exhaust benefits, then the
duration of unemployment benefits would be positively
correlated with duration, but the benefit recipiency rate
would be negatively correlated with long unemployment spells
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because benefits tend to be less than 15 weeks. Further
evidence of this effect is present in the negative
correlation with exhaustions. Similarly, Fallick (1991)
provides estimates that the effect of unemployment benefits
disappear as the date of expiration nears.
Solon (1984) and others have estimated the effect of
benefit taxation in reducing the duration of unemployment
among high income recipients. Using the data under
discussion here, the coefficient on the benefit taxation
variable was always negative, but rarely significant, in
preliminary specifications of the duration regressions.
Although there are plausible explanations for a negative
effect of taxation on unemployment duration, particularly
given the positive role of wage replacement on duration, the
role of taxation is more ambiguous. If taxes were withdrawn
from each check, the case for taxation reducing duration
would be stronger. As it is, the findings reported above
are more logical: taxes may discourage applications by
reducing anticipated benefits, but they will have minimal
effect on unemployment duration because they reduce benefits
ex post.
Table 3.13, like Tables 3.7, 3.8, 3.10, and 3.11,
isolates the effects of changes in significant variables on
the dependent variable, in this case the percentage of all
unemployment that is 15 weeks or longer.
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[ Table 3.13 ]
The change in the mean of each variable from 1979 to 1984 is
estimated and multiplied by the coefficient on that
variable. The result is expressed as a percentage change
from 1979 and as a percentage of the actual change in the
mean of the duration variable. All legal variables combined
would have increased the portion of unemployment that is
long term by .8 percent, or 1.2 percent of the actual
increase. The decline in the benefit recipiency rate over
the period is estimated to add 5.6 percent to the portion of
all unemployment that is longer duration. The vast majority
of the increase in longer duration unemployment is
attributable to labor market changes (76.1 percent). The
change in job losers alone would account for a 16.2 percent
increase in longer unemployment spells, or 24.8 percent of
the actual increase. About 97 percent of the actual change
in durations during this period is accounted for by the
model.
Despite the seemingly exhaustive econometric dissection
of the effects of UI on unemployment duration, one must
wonder, based on the findings here, whether the role of
economic and programmatic context has been thoroughly
incorporated into previous models. In particular, it seems
clear that, during a period of declining benefit recipiency
rates and low wage replacement rates, the effect of labor
market disadvantages should easily dominate the the effect
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of UI in explaining unemployment durations. Summarizing the
findings of Corson and Dynarski (1990), the House Ways and
Means Committee put the case quite succinctly: "Most
workers who exhausted their UI benefits were still
unemployed more than a month after receiving their final UI
payment, and a majority were still unemployed two months
after receiving their final UI payment" (House Ways and
Means, 1992). Striking confirmation of this observation is
made by Robert Topel, whose earlier work linked experience
rating to increased unemployment. He recently countered his
earlier work by flatly stating: "In short, there is no
apparent connection between social programs and rising
joblessness" (Topel, 1993).
Summary.
Every President from Truman to Carter issued a call for
more federal standards to support the rights of unemployment
insurance claimants. In the 1980s, in contrast, all federal
activity worked against unemployment insurance claimants.
From benefit taxation to Extended Benefit triggers, the
federal government became an active participant in reducing
the percentage of the unemployed receiving benefits. This
chapter has tried to quantify the effects of state legal
changes, occurring with the encouragement or passive
approval of federal actors, in reducing benefit recipiency
rates and application rates. It has revealed, among other
things:
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* The large role in determining recipiency rates
attributed by many to falling application rates
and to changing numbers of job losers among the
unemployed is correct. But legal changes acting
alone would have reduced the benefit recipiency
rate by 21.8 percent between 1979 and 1984.
* Application rates are not exogenous, but are
themselves affected by legal changes. Between
1979 and 1984, legal changes, acting alone, would
have reduced application rates by 1.2 percent.
Only a 4.6 percent decline in application rates
(or 41.8 percent of the total decline) can be
attributed to labor market changes.
* Unemployment durations are not measurably
shortened by benefit taxation, though data
constraints limit the strength of that finding. A
stronger finding, however, is that higher benefit
recipiency rates are associated with unemployment
spells of less than 15 weeks. Clearer still is
the fact that economic variables, not legal
variables, explain most of the variance in lengthy
unemployment duration across states (76.1 percent
of the total change from 1979 to 1984). This
suggests that changes in unemployment insurance
law that restrict claimant access to benefits are
a poor tool for reducing long spells of
unemployment.
The statistical evidence presented here confirms the
idea that the dominant response of state actors to the
funding crisis they faced in the 1980s was exclusion of
claimants, not just reducing benefit levels for those
claimants who were eligible for benefits. When the National
Commission recommendations for federal standards were
ignored, states responded by excluding claimants to protect
their trust funds and enhance their business climate.
We now have the basis for advancing a reform program
that responds to the needs of claimants, enhances the
counter-cyclical capacity of the program, and sets the stage
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for deeper reform. The benefit recipiency rate can be
raised by relaxing earnings requirements, reducing benefit
exhaustions, and limiting the severity and rate of
disqualifications. These same changes, along with higher
benefit levels, will also increase applications. Such a
pro-claimant program, acting against the "race to the
bottom" by states, is a necessary precondition for moving
the unemployment insurance system into the 21st century.
But to effectively match this important social insurance
system to its economic context, reform will have to go
beyond quantitative changes and increased federal
monitoring. It is toward that project that we now turn.
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TABLE 3.1
TABLE 3. 1
Studies of Declining Benefit Recipiency Rates
BLAUSTEIN AND KOZLOWSKI, 1978
Dependent variable:
Method:
Variables:
Significant variables:
Note:
Analysis of applications?
Analysis of statutory variables?
Identifies regional component?
Insured unemployment rates, 1973, 1974, 1975.
OLS, cross-section with 52 jurisdictions.
Weekly benefits as percent of average weekly wage, potential
duration of benefits, work requirement in weeks, voluntary quit
durational disqualification.
None.
Authors argue that statutory provisions have no effect on
benefit receipt rates. IU/TU does alter costs of ui programs,
however, so lower unemployment, not tighter ui requirements,
is only way to control business taxes.
No.
Yes.
No.
BURTLESS. 1983: BURTLESS AND SAKS. 1984
Dependent variables:
Method:
Variables:
Notes:
Analysis of application rates?
Analysis of statutory variables?
Identifies regional component?
Insured/total unemployment ratio; initial claims.
OLS on CPS data from 1968 to 1982, dummy variables to
capture decline in the 1980s.
Short-term job losers among the unemployed.
Finds drop in application rates among likely eligible
population. Discusses tax policy and federal pressures as
possible explanations. Significant articles in part because they
were first to identify falling IU/TU and application rates as an
issue.
Yes. Discusses link to legal change.
Denial rates, legal changes.
No.
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Table 3.1, cont.
WUNNAVA and HENLEY, 1987
Dependent variable:
Method:
Variables:
Significant variables:
Notes:
Analysis of application rates?
Analysis of statutory variables?
Identifies regional component?
Insured/total unemployment ratio.
OLS, pooled cross-section time series, 50 states, 1966 to 1983,
fixed effect specification.
Average weekly benefit/average weekly wage, exhaustion rate,
percentage manufacturing, log of personal income, union
membership.
No insignificant variables reported.
Negative coefficient interpreted as lower unemployment among
manufacturing workers. Curious view of exhaustion rate as
proxy for disqualification rules.
No.
Only replacement ratio.
Yes (state level variables).
KANE, 1988
Dependent variables:
Method:
Variables:
Notes:
Analysis of application rates?
Analysis of statutory variables?
Identifies regional component?
New claims/job losers, denial rates,
Series of examinations of univariate statistics, decompositions,
and some OLS regressions.
Eligibility requirements, benefit reductions, experience rating,
industrial shifts, duration, multiple unemployment spells,
multiple earner families.
Changes in state programs, industry, and disqualifications are
said to be insignificant for explaining decline. Methodology
limits ability to identify inter-related factors. Concludes that
declining application rates, unrelated to explanatory variables
below, explains declining percentage receiving benefits.
Identified, not explained.
Yes.
No.
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Table 3.1, cont.
CORSON and NICHOLSON. 1988
Dependent variables:
Method:
Variables:
UI claims ratio: various measures, primarily use ui claims
under state programs divided by total unemployment (IU/TU).
Time series regression on national sample, quarterly, 1971 to
1986. Pooled time series/cross-section 11 largest states, state
dummies, and dummy for 1980-1986. Logit on PSID data for
1980 and 1982.
Economic and demographic (unemployment rate, percent
female, age distribution, industry distribution, job losers, job
leavers, proportion by duration), Federal (taxation of benefits,
pension and OASDI offset, extended benefits), State (monetary
eligibility, non-monetary eligibility, benefit generosity,
continuing eligibility), reserve fraction, old loan fraction, new
loan fraction, appeals/determinations.
Significant variables: Total unemployment rate, minimum
replacement, maximum duration, quit denial
earnings denial, work test denials, EB.
earnings, wage
rate, disqualifying
Notes:
Analysis of application rates?
Analysis of statutory variables?
Identifies regional component?
Extensive, useful discussion of measurement issues. 1980-
1986 dummy is used to compare fixed-effect regressions with
and without ui program variables. Change in coefficent on D
= 1980-1986 is interpreted as portion of decline in those years
attributable to ui program variables.
Yes.
Yes.
Yes (state level variables).
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Table 3.1, cont.
BLANK and CARD. 1989. 1991
1. "Takeup Rates": Fraction
(FIU), unemployed receiving
total unemployed. FEU:
Eligible. FIU/FEU, variable
of Insured Unemployed
regular state benefits over
Fraction of Unemployed
is logged.
Method:
Variables:
Significant variables:
Notes:
Analysis of application rates?
Analysis of statutory variables?
Identifies regional component?
2. UI recipiency among eligible individuals (microdata).
WLS, pooled cross-section time series, 1977-1987, 50 states,
dummy for 1985-1987.
Wage replacement, coverage, minimum earnings, other
eligibility requirements, disqualification rate, unionization,
Democratic house, demographics (young, black, female, self-
employed), weeks worked, duration of unemployment,
industry, year and state effects.
Wage replacement, coverage, disqualification rates,
unionization, weeks worked.
In addition to state-level data, authors used microdata from
PSID to estimate the percentage of the eligible unemployed
receiving benefits. The explanatory variables in this logit
model are primarily the same as above for program variables
and more extensive demographic variables. Found industry
effects insignificant to takeup rates.
Yes.
Yes.
Yes (state level variables), but not relevant in microdata.
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Dependent variable(s):
Table 3.1, cont.
VROMAN. 1990
Dependent variable:
Method:
Variables:
Six regressions, including application rates of job losers,
leavers, re-entrants; recipiency proportions of same.
OLS on microdata from a special CPS question series.
Unemployment duration, age, race, gender, marital status,
education, industry, occupation, union affiliation, region.
Across all six, recurring significant
durations, ages 16-19, ages
manufacturing, mining, agriculture,
unionization, region.
variables included shorter
20-24, married male,
all occupation variables,
No ui program variables specifically identified (regional
proxy). No regression explained more than 22 percent of
variance.
Analysis of application rates?
Analysis of statutory variables?
Identifies regional component?
Yes.
No.
Yes (census region).
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Significant variables:
Notes:
Table 3.1, cont.
Dependent variable:
Method:
Variables:
Significant variables:
Notes:
BALDWIN and MC HUGH, 1992
Ratio of insured to total unemployment.
OLS, pooled cross-section time series of 50 states, 1979 to
1990, dummies for years.
Average weekly benefits/average weekly wages; high cost
multiple; timely first payments; durational disqualifications;
maximum benefit earning requirement; minimum benefit
earnings; Right-to-Work state; federal tax on benefits; job
losers among unemployed; percentage manufacturing; lagged
unemployment; percentage of work force black, female, part-
time, teenage; unionization rate.
Right-to-Work, earning requirement, maximum benefit
earnings, maximum duration and benefit earnings, durational
disqualifications for quitting and work refusal, unionization,
manufacturing, job losers, black percentage of work force,
benefit duration, previous unemployment.
Imperfect measures of unemployment duration, federal
taxation, political climate. No accounting for exhaustions or
discussion of application rates.
Analysis of application rates?
Analysis of statutory variables?
Identifies regional component?
No.
Yes.
Yes (state level variables).
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TABLE 3.2
CHANGE IN MEANS, 1984-1979,1991-1987
UNEMRT IU/TU
0.0552
0.0726
0.0174
0.0626
0.0637
0.0010
0.3808
0.3003
(0.0805)
0.3088
0.3945
0.0857
EXRT2 BENTAX2 WKSBEN MAXWKS DURAT5 DURAT15 RTW
0.7111
1.1334
0.4222
0.9891
0.8628
(0.1264)
0.0000
0.0012
0.0012
0.0183
0.0190
0.0007
12.1860
13.4760
1.2900
13.6960
14.2776
0.5816
27.0600
26.2000
(0.8600)
26.1600
26.1200
(0.0400)
0.4997
0.4065
(0.0933)
0.4465
0.4114
(0.0351)
0.1809
0.2986
0.1177
0.2543
0.2647
0.0104
0.4000
0.4000
0.0000
0.4200
0.4200
0.0000
BENWG APPS/TU
0.3714
0.3675
(0.0039)
0.3735
0.3836
0.0101
0.0664
0.0495
(0.0169)
0.0440
0.0541
0.0102
EB LOSER MANU
0.3400
0.5800
0.2400
0.1400
0.1600
0.0200
0.4135
0.5046
0.0911
0.4654
0.5256
0.0602
0.2109
0.1764
(0.0346)
0.1659
0.1570
(0.0089)
TIMELY WAIT
0.8732
0.9081
0.0349
0.9152
0.9139
(0.0013)
0.4800
0.7800
0.3000
0.7600
0.7600
0.0000
BMIN BMAX MBEN
737.06
1,196.60
459.54
1,351.86
1,486.26
134.40
4,634.44
7,234.78
2,600.34
8,269.20
9,841.74
1,572.54
8,466.36
11,722.36
3,256.00
13,374.62
15,590.34
2,215.72
PCTTEEN PCTBLK PCTPRT UNION COPE
1979
1984
Change
1987
1991
Change
0.0810
0.0584
(0.0226)
0.0572
0.0485
(0.0087)
0.0778
0.0662
(0.0116)
0.0716
0.0748
0.0032
0.1726
0.1848
0.0123
0.1860
0.1677
(0.0183)
0.2117
0.1700
(0.0417)
0.1557
0.1477
(0.0081)
0.5143
0.4366
(0.0777)
0.6557
0.5317
(0.1240)
DQ DURQ DURD DURR D8389
0.2974
0.2781
(0.0193)
0.2654
0.2365
(0.0289)
0.8600
0.9400
0.0800
0.9400
0.9400
0.0000
0.6000
0.7200
0.1200
0.7600
0.7600
0.0000
0.5400
0.7200
0.1800
0.7200
0.7400
0.0200
b:avgchg.wq!
Ch.3 Disk
1979
1984
Change
1987
1991
Change
PCTFEM
1979
1984
Change
1987
1991
Change
0.3925
0.4062
0.0138
0.4214
0.4298
0.0084
1.0
0.0
-1.0
TABLE 3.3
VARIABLES AND EXPECTED RELATIONSHIPS
Insured
Unemployment
Rate
Application
Rates
Long
Unemolovment
ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC
AND STATE CONTEXT:
Unemployment Rate + + +
Previous Unemp. Rate +
Job Losers + + +
Manufacturing + + +
Part-Time +
Female +
Black + +
Teenage
Short Duration
Long Duration +
Unionization + + +
COPE Rating +
Right-to-Work -
FEDERAL CHANGES:
Benefit Taxation
Loan Taxation
Extended Benefits + +
STATE LAWS:
Exhaustions
Weeks of Benefits Received + + +
Maximum Potential Weeks + +
Wage Replacement + +
Timely Payments +
Waiting Week
Minimum Earning
Earning for Max. Benefit
Earning for Max. Ben., Duration
Disqualification rates
Quit Durational
Refusal Durational
Misconduct Durational -
0:\123POOL\TBL33.WQ!
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Table 3.4
The Relationship Between
Timely Payments and Work Search Requirements
(1985)
Above
Average
Timeliness
Below
Average
Timeliness
Source: Corson, Kerachsky, Kisker (1987);
Employment and Training Administration data for timeliness
O:\123P00L\CTTIME
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Stringent Less
Search Difficult
Requirements Requirements
ARIZONA
IOWA IDAHO
S. CAROLINA MARYLAND
N. CAROLINA
TEXAS UTAH
PENNSYLVANIA
WISCONSIN
Table 3.5
Portion of Unemployed Receiving Benefits
Best and Worst States
1991
5 Best States
Percent Durational Disqualification:
Receiving Wage Minimum Work
Benefits State Replacement Earning Quit? Misconduct? Refusal? Union
72.2% Alaska 29.5% $1,000 21.6%
60.9% Hawaii 49.3% $150 x x x 29.0%
57.8% Nevada 38.8% $600 x x 18.3%
56.7% R. Island 47.9% $1,700 x x x 20.8%
56.2% Oregon 41.3% $1,000 x x x 19.1%
5 Worst States
Percent Durational Disqualification:
Receiving Wage Minimum Work
Benefits State Replacement Earning Quit? Misconduct? Refusal? Union
25.0% Louisiana 28.2% $1,200 x x x 7.8%
24.2% Virginia 36.7% $3,000 x x x 8.7%
24.1% Texas 38.4% $1,369 x x x 6.5%
19.7% Oklahoma 39.3% $3,640 x x x 10.2%
19.7% S. Dakota 39.9% $1,568 x x x 8.9%
x=yes
Source: Employment and Training Administration, Ul Financial Handbook and updates
Unionization from Hirsch and MacPherson, unpublished.
Disqualifications from Monthly Labor Review, various annual issues on state UI law.
Minimum earnings from House Ways and Means, 1992 Green Book.
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TABLE 3.6
REGRESSION RESULTS
DEPENDENT = In INSURED UNEMPLOYMENT / TOTAL UNEMPLOYMENT
Cross Section, Time Series, 1979-1991, Weighted Least Squares.
(One) (Two)
LEGAL VARIABLES
Application rates 8.173 (14.8) **
Durational, Refusing Work -0.092 (6.1) **
Disqualification Rates -0.452 (5.3) **
Minimum Earnings -5.48E-05 (5.1) **
Exhaustion Rate -0.124 (4.8) **
Durational, Discharge 0.068 (4.0) **
COPE 0.076 (3.3) **
Right to Work State -0.052 (2.5) **
Extended Benefits -
Earnings for max. ben.
Maximum benefit weeks
Timely payments
Durational, Quitting -
ECONOMIC VARIABLES
Manufacturing -0.884 (7.5) **
Job losers 0.990 (7.5) **
Unemployment rate -2.276 (3.8) **
Unionization 0.523 (3.4) **
Percent Black 0.441 (2.9) **
Percent teenage -1.766 (2.1) **
Percent female --
Percent part-time
Long duration
Short duration
DUMMY FOR 1983 TO 1989 -0.196 (10.2) ** -0.048 (4.0) **
RUSTBELT -- --
BREADBASKET -0.122 (2.8) ** --
SOUTH ATLANTIC -0.438 (13.3) ** -0.192 (6.3) **
COTTONBELT -0.432 (14.0) ** -0.079 (2.9) **
CONSTANT -0.850 (35.7) ** -0.967 (3.2) **
R SQUARED 0.460 0.879
ADJ. R SQUARED 0.455 0.873
F= 105.1 152.67
Sig. F = 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: - indicates insignificant variables. They remain in equations as controls.
indicates significance of .05 <= x <.01
** indicates significance of .01 or greater.
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. A\utures.wq
Weighted by average total unemployment for each state, 1979 to 1991.
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TABLE 3.7
SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON LN IU/TU
1979 VERSUS 1984
Change Change % %
In Estimated Due to Change of Total
Variable Type Mean Coefficient Variable From 1979 Change
EXCLUSIONARY VARIABLES
Application rates -0.017 8.173 -0.138 -13.6% 59.8%
Minimum Earnings 459.54 -5.48E-05 -0.025 -2.5% 10.9%
Durational, Refusing Work 0.180 -0.092 -0.017 -1.6% 7.2%
Durational, Discharge 0.120 0.068 0.008 0.8% -3.5%
Disqualification Rates -0.019 -0.452 0.009 0.8% -3.7%
Right to Work 0 -0.052 0.000 0.0% 0.0%
BENEFIT STANDARDS
Exhaustion Rate 0.422 -0.124 -0.052 -5.2% 22.7%
COPE -0.078 0.076 -0.006 -0.6% 2.6%
DEMOGRAPHIC and ECONOMIC
Unemployment rate 0.017 -2.276 -0.039 -3.8% 16.7%
Unionization -0.042 0.523 -0.022 -2.2% 9.5%
Percent Black -0.012 0.441 -0.005 -0.5% 2.3%
Manufacturing -0.035 -0.884 0.031 3.0% -13.4%
Percent teenage -0.023 -1.766 0.041 4.0% -17.6%
Job losers 0.091 0.990 0.090 8.9% -39.0%
DUMMY FOR 1983 TO 1989 1 -0.048 -0.048 -4.7% 20.8%
Change due to exclusionary variables: -0.163 -16.1% 70.6%
Change due to benefit standards: -0.058 -5.7% 25.2%
Change due to economic variables: 0.096 9.4% -41.4%
Sum of Significant Variables: -0.174 -17.1% 75.2%
Actual Change: -0.231 -22.8%
Change Unaccounted For -0.057 -5.6%
a:\lnatt.wq!
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TABLE 3.8
SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON LN IU/TU
1987 VERSUS 1991
Variable Type
EXCLUSIONARY VARIABLES
Application rates
Disqualification Rates
Right to Work
Durational, Discharge
Durational, Refusing Work
Minimum Earnings
BENEFIT STANDARDS
Exhaustion Rate
COPE
DEMOGRAPHIC and ECONOMIC
Job losers
Percent teenage
Manufacturing
Percent Black
Unemployment rate
Unionization
DUMMY FOR 1983 TO 1989
Change
In Estimated
Mean Coefficient
0.010
-0.029
0
0
0.020
134.40
-0.126
-0.124
0.060
-0.009
-0.009
0.003
0.001
-0.008
8.173
-0.452
-0.052
0.068
-0.092
-5.48E-05
-0.124
0.076
0.990
-1.766
-0.884
0.441
-2.276
0.523
-0.048
Change due to exclusionary variables:
Change due to benefit standards:
Change due to economic variables:
Sum of Significant Variables:
Actual Change:
Change Unaccounted For
a:\Inatt2.wq!
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Change
Due to
Variable
0.082
0.013
0.000
0.000
-0.002
-0.007
0.016
-0.009
0.059
0.016
0.008
0.001
-0.002
-0.004
0.048
0.086
0.006
0.078
0.218
0.252
0.034
Change
From 1979
6.7%
1.1%
0.0%
0.0%
-0.1%
-0.6%
1.3%
-0.8%
4.8%
1.3%
0.6%
0.1%
-0.2%
-0.3%
3.9%
7.0%
0.5%
6.4%
17.7%
20.5%
2.8%
of Total
Chanae
32.4%
5.2%
0.0%
0.0%
-0.7%
-2.9%
6.2%
-3.7%
23.6%
6.3%
3.2%
0.5%
-0.9%
-1.7%
19.0%
34.0%
2.5%
31.0%
86.5%
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TABLE 3.9
REGRESSION RESULTS
DEPENDENT = In APPLICATIONS /TOTAL UNEMPLOYMENT
Cross Section, Time Series, 1979-1991, Weighted Least Squares
(One) (Two)
LEGAL VARIABLES
Wage Replacement Rate 1.018 (4.1) **
Waiting Week -0.081 (2.9) **
Benefit Taxation -4.313 (2.7) **
Durational, Discharge -0.077 (2.3) *
Earnings for Max Ben, Max Wks -7.36E-06 (2.1) *
Durational, Quitting 0.113 (1.9) *
Timely payments -
COPE
Minimum Earnings
Earnings for max. ben.
Benefit Weeks Received
Right to Work State
Durational, Refusing Work
Disqualification Rates --
ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
Manufacturing 2.831 (14.7) **
Job losers 2.054 (8.6) **
Unemployment rate -6.882 (6.3) **
Long duration -1.291 (4.6) **
Unionization 1.129 (3.7) **
Percent Black 1.499 (5.4) **
Percent teenage -4.020 (2.5) **
Percent part-time 2.417 (2.7) **
Percent female -
Short duration -
DUMMY FOR 1983 TO 1989 -0.238 (9.4) ** -0.125 (5.6) **
RUSTBELT -0.092 (2.7) ** -0.459 (11.0) **
BREADBASKET -0.118 (2.1) ** -0.287 (5.1) **
SOUTH ATLANTIC -0.227 (5.2) ** -0.352 (6.3) **
COTTONBELT -0.362 (8.9) ** -0.372 (7.7) **
CONSTANT -2.743 (87.5) ** -4.159 (7.2) **
R SQUARED 0.229 0.656
ADJ. R SQUARED 0.222 0.639
F= 36.61 38.72
Sig. F = 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: - indicates insignificant variables. They remain in the equation as controls.
indicates significance of .05 <= x <.01
indicates significance o .01 or greater.
Abso te vaie of e-statistics in parentheses.
Observations weighted by each state's average total unemployment from 1979 to 1991. &Aappsres.wq!
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TABLE 3.10
SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES AND
1979 VERSUS 1984
Variable Type
EXCLUSIONARY VARIABLES
Durational, Quitting
Durational, Discharge
Earnings: Max.ben., Max.wks.
Waiting Week
BENEFIT STANDARDS
Benefit Taxation
Wage Replacement Rate
DEMOGRAPHICS
Percent teenage
Percent Black
ECONOMIC CHANGE
Job losers
Percent part-time
Unionization
Manufacturing
Unemployment rate
Long duration
DUMMY FOR 1983 TO 1989
THEIR EFFECTS ON LN APPS/TU
Change
In
Mean
0.080
0.120
3256.00
0.300
0.001
-0.004
-0.023
-0.012
0.091
0.012
-0.042
-0.035
0.017
0.118
Estimated
Coefficient
0.113
-0.077
-7.36E-06
-0.081
-4.313
1.018
-4.020
1.499
2.054
2.417
1.129
2.831
-6.882
-1.291
-0.125
Change due to exclusionary variables:
Change due to benefit standards:
Change due to demographics:
Change due to economic variables:
Sum of Significant Variables:
Actual Change:
Change Unaccounted For
Change
Due to
Variable
0.009
-0.009
-0.024
-0.024
-0.004
-0.004
0.092
-0.018
0.187
0.029
-0.047
-0.099
-0.117
-0.152
-0.125
-0.024
-0.008
0.074
-0.200
-0.283
-0.300
-0.017
A:\lnapchng.wq!
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Change
From 1979
0.3%
-0.3%
-0.9%
-0.9%
-0.2%
-0.1%
3.4%
-0.7%
6.8%
1.1%
-1.7%
-3.6%
-4.3%
-5.5%
-4.5%
-0.9%
-0.3%
2.7%
-7.3%
-10.3%
-10.9%
-0.6%
of Total
Change
-3.0%
3.1%
8.0%
8.1%
1.4%
1.4%
-30.8%
6.0%
-62.3%
-9.7%
15.8%
33.0%
39.0%
50.8%
41.7%
8.1%
2.8%
-24.8%
66.6%
94.3%
Coeffici nt Vada le
TABLE 3.11
SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON LN APPS/TU
1987 VERSUS 1991
Change Change % %
In Estimated Due to Change of Total
Variable Type Mean Coefficient Variable From 1979 Change
EXCLUSIONARY VARIABLES
Earnings: Max.ben., Max.wks. 2215.72 -7.36E-06 -0.016 -0.5% -7.3%
Durational, Discharge 0.000 -0.077 0.000 0.0% 0.0%
Durational, Quitting 0.000 0.113 0.000 0.0% 0.0%
Waiting Week 0.000 -0.081 0.000 0.0% 0.0%
BENEFIT STANDARDS
Wage Replacement Rate 0.010 1.018 0.010 0.3% 4.5%
Benefit Taxation 0.001 -4.313 -0.003 -0.1% -1.3%
DEMOGRAPHICS
Percent teenage -0.009 -4.020 0.036 1.1% 16.2%
Percent Black 0.003 1.499 0.004 0.1% 2.0%
ECONOMIC CHANGE
Job losers 0.060 2.054 0.123 3.9% 55.0%
Unemployment rate 0.001 -6.882 -0.007 -0.2% -3.1%
Unionization -0.008 1.129 -0.009 -0.3% -4.0%
Long duration 0.010 -1.291 -0.013 -0.4% -5.8%
Manufacturing -0.009 2.831 -0.025 -0.8% -11.4%
Percent part-time -0.018 2.417 -0.044 -1.4% -19.4%
DUMMY FOR 1983 TO 1989 -1 -0.125 0.125 3.9% 55.8%
Change due to exclusionary variables: -0.016 -0.5% -7.3%
Change due to benefit standards: 0.007 0.2% 3.2%
Change due to demographics: 0.041 1.3% 18.2%
Change due to economic variables: 0.025 0.8% 11.4%
Sum of Significant Variables: 0.182 5.7% 81.2%
Actual Change: 0.224 7.0%
Change Unaccounted For 0.042 1.3%
A:\lnapchng2.wq!
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Graph 33 Long Term Unemployment
(15 Weeks and Longer)
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TABLE 3.12
REGRESSION RESULTS
DEPENDENT = PERCENTAGE UNEMPLOYED 15 WEEKS OR LONGER
Cross Section, Time Series, 1979-1991, Weighted Least Squares
LEGAL VARIABLES
Insured/Total Unemployment Rate
Durational, Quitting
Exhaustion Rate
Benefit Taxation
Waiting Week
COPE
Maximum benefit weeks
Wage Replacement Rate
Durational, Discharge
Durational, Refusing Work
Right to Work State
Disqualification Rates
-0.125
-0.025
-0.016
ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
Unemployment rate 1.673
Job losers 0.322
Percent teenage -1.345
Percent part-time 0.431
Unionization 0.097
Manufacturing --
Percent female --
Percent Black --
DUMMY FOR 1983 TO 1989
RUSTBELT
BREADBASKET
SOUTH ATLANTIC
COTTONBELT
0.023
0.051
0.061
0.032
(4.7)
(3.0)
(2.7)
(10.6)
(9.2)
(5.7)
(3.4)
(2.1)
(7.2)
(7.9)
(7.6)
(3.8)
CONSTANT
R SQUARED
ADJ. R SQUARED
F =
Sig. F=
0.839
0.832
123.69
0.0000
Notes: - indicates insignificant variables. They remain in equation as controls.
indicates significance of .05 <= x <.01
** indicates significance of .01 or greater.
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.
Weighted by average total unemployment for each state, 1979 to 1991.
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TABLE 3.13
SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON LONG
1979 VERSUS 1984
LEGAL VARIABLES
IU/ TU Ratio
Durational, Quitting
Exhaustion Rate
ECONOMIC VARIABLES
Percent teenage
Job losers
Unemployment rate
Percent part-time
Unionization
DUMMY FOR 1983 TO 1989
Change due to legal variables:
Change due to economic variables:
Sum of Significant Variables:
Actual Change:
Change Unaccounted For:
A:\durl 5ch.wq!
Change
In
Mean
-0.081
0.080
0.422
-0.023
0.091
0.017
0.012
-0.042
Estimated
Coefficient
-0.125
-0.025
-0.016
-1.345
0.322
1.673
0.431
0.097
0.023
UNEMPLOYMENT DURATIONS
Change
Due to
Variable
0.010
-0.002
-0.007
0.031
0.029
0.028
0.005
-0.004
0.023
0.001
0.090
0.114
0.118
0.004
Change
From 1979
5.6%
-1.1%
-3.7%
17.1%
16.2%
15.7%
2.9%
-2.3%
12.7%
0.8%
49.6%
63.1%
65.2%
-2.1%
of Total
Change
8.6%
-1.7%
-5.7%
26.2%
24.8%
24.1%
4.4%
-3.5%
19.5%
1.2%
76.1%
96.7%
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Chapter Four
Unemployment Insurance and
21st Century Labor Markets
The federal/state unemployment insurance system was
constructed on the basis of specific economic assumptions
and with built in tension around three goals: income
support for the unemployed, counter-cyclical impact, and
incentives to reduce layoffs. In the 1980s, debate around
these conflicting goals was largely set aside in a struggle
framed by "competitiveness" and "solvency". Despite
recommendations of a national commission on UI reform,
acting under interstate competition and stretched resources,
states used their vast prerogatives to exclude the majority
of unemployed workers and to reduce benefit levels for those
in the system.
Historically, the federal government intervenes in a
predictably short-sighted way when such crises arise,
enacting emergency benefit extensions but allowing states to
retain control over all other aspects of the UI system.65
Indeed, as this was written, the historic pattern is
repeating itself with renewed emergency benefit extensions
and vague hints of larger reform. Now we must ask: Can we
go back to the high counter-cyclical punch of previous eras,
through federal standards, or should we choose to do more?
What would it take to make the UI system more in tune with a
modern economy? And what would it cost?
65 See Chapter One.
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New Principles for a New Reality.
Having seen that the underlying assumptions of the
federal/state unemployment insurance system have been left
behind by a changing economy and that state and federal
actors have responded in counter productive ways, what new
approaches would better match the program to the economic
context in which it operates?
Lengthening unemployment durations, high unemployment
among older workers, a shifting industrial and occupational
mix, more open trade relations, vast cuts in the defense
budget -- this labor market "turbulence" (Doeringer, 1991)
calls for direct attention through the only existing income
support program intended for all unemployed workers attached
to the labor force. Instead, during the 1980s the
unemployment insurance system shifted heavily toward
encouragement of rapid re-employment at a time when rapid
re-employment was all but impossible for most unemployed
workers. Both state and federal activity went to great
lengths to exclude claimants from benefits, to reduce
disincentives to work by reducing benefit levels, and to
degrade the concept of "suitable work". All these trends
move in the wrong direction for a modern economy. If the
standard of living in the United States is going to improve,
the nation needs a range of programs that encourage the
growth of high wage jobs on the demand side and facilitate
the pursuit of such jobs through training and career
planning on the labor supply side. Unemployment insurance
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should be the floor under such a structure for rebuilding
competitiveness, one component of a strategy to reverse the
effects of "secular decline in the demand for less skilled
workers" (Topel, 1993).
The range of state regulations excluding most
unemployed workers from receiving benefits requires
immediate attention. Complete denial of benefits is the
most apparent inequity in the system, but reform must also
address the failure of UI with respect to those who are
exhausting their benefits during prolonged unemployment
spells. In 1990, before the recession took hold and before
the emergency benefit extension, 2.3 million claimants
exhausted their state benefits. Benefit durations must be
extended to match this new reality, but programs should also
be in place to reduce the causes of exhaustions and earnings
loss.
A look at the characteristics of UI exhaustees versus
other claimants provides clues about how to meet their
special needs through programs linked to UI. Table 4.1
compares the population of benefit exhaustees to other
claimants.
[ Table 4.1 ]
Workers with less than high school education and two years
or less previous job tenure are over-represented among
benefit exhaustees. Perhaps surprisingly, retail trade and
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services industry workers are over-represented among
exhaustees compared to non-exhaustees. This could have
several meanings. Their benefits could be expiring because
they had low prior earnings. It is also possible that these
industries are largely populated with workers who face labor
market disadvantages after they become unemployed.
Occupationally, managers and administrative support workers
are most likely to exhaust benefits. Administrative support
positions are heavily female-dominated, so high exhaustion
rates for those occupations explain some of the decline in
UI beneficiary rates among women.
The last four lines of Table 4.1 are most suggestive.
More than half (53.2 percent) of all benefit exhaustees were
from households earning $20,000 or less before layoff. More
than one in five benefit exhaustees came from a household
with income under $10,000. This suggests the need to link
unemployment insurance to JTPA Title II which serves the
"economically disadvantaged". Finally, workers who are
victims of plant closings or who are dislocated workers
(plant closing victims with at least three years seniority)
are, respectively, 7.1 percentage points and an astonishing
11.7 percentage points more likely to be exhaustees than
they are to be non-exhausting claimants. This suggests that
Title III, like Title II, should be more closely integrated
with unemployment insurance.
Although production workers are not disproportionately
represented among exhaustees relative to other claimants, we
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do know that exhaustees from manufacturing and from
production occupations are more likely than other groups to
change industries and occupations. Table 4.2 summarizes the
pre-unemployment and post-unemployment breakdown of industry
and occupation populations among exhaustees.
[ Table 4.2 ]
Post-exhaustion employment trends show that manufacturing
workers, machine operators, and precision production workers
are most likely to leave their previous industry or
occupation after exhausting benefits.
Data from the Massachusetts Reemployment Assistance
Benefits (RAB) unemployment insurance program (now known as
"Section 30" (McClory, 1993)) suggest that a focus on plant
closing victims will aid many of the groups associated with
declining UI recipiency rates and facing labor market
difficulties. The RAB program extended benefits for victims
of plant closings in Massachusetts. RAB claimants had the
following characteristics: more than half of the RAB
claimants were 45 years old or older compared to one in
three in the overall state claimant population; 55 percent
of the RAB claimants were women compared to 43 percent of
the UI claimant population; almost half the RAB claimants
had not completed high school though only one in four had
not in the state labor force. Again, the evidence suggests
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that there are distinct claimant populations who face
definable labor market difficulties and for whom
unemployment insurance can be important support during a
period of transition.
To meet the demands of these claimants and of the new
economic situation, unemployment insurance should be
embedded in a wide range of labor market policies for a
diverse claimant population facing a changing economy. It
should aid the transition from unemployment to new careers
and higher skill occupations, not just support the
unemployed as they struggle without guidance to find any job
before their benefits expire.
A vision based on these goals takes the program in a
profoundly different direction. Table 4.3 sketches the
different understandings of traditional reformers,
supporters of active labor market policy, and current
trends.
[ Table 4.3 ]
As this comparison indicates, the core principle of an
activist reform program -- that unemployment insurance is an
income support program for periods of transition -- has far
reaching implications.
The current program excludes too many claimants, pays
too little in benefits for too short a time, and makes
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insufficient demands on claimants in part because it offers
no support for claimants to achieve more desirable labor
market outcomes. In response, the reforms outlined below
channel the program in two important directions: (1) longer
potential support, particularly for claimants with labor
market disadvantages, and (2) new demands on claimants
relating to job search combined with strategies and programs
to meet those new demands. Rapid re-employment remains a
goal, but it is tempered by awareness that quick adjustments
are not always possible and that a claimant's standard of
living in new employment should be maintained or improved
whenever possible.
This is not the place to advance a public works program
or stimulus package to promote full employment, though such
programs may be warranted. Rather, the focus here is on the
unemployment insurance program and how this one policy tool
can better facilitate programs for labor market transitions.
The point of departure is different from two current trends
in social insurance.
The proposal advanced here does not suggest, as some
have recently, that the nation should raid the already-
strapped state trust funds to pay for training (Osterman and
Batt, 1993). The current fiscal crisis of the states has
spawned proposals to use UI trust funds for everything from
training to health insurance. Proposals along these lines
are particularly distressing given the evidence of how trust
funds have been "protected" from claimants: having kept the
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unemployed from drawing down reserves, we can now divert
these funds to other uses. Moreover, the funds themselves
are not so lush that they can be indiscriminately called
upon for new duties. At the end of 1992, four states had
outstanding loans to their trust funds. Connecticut owed
$437 per covered employee. Eleven states had less than six
months benefits in their funds. It is noteworthy, in this
regard, that California, which established a training tax
and reduced UI taxes by a corresponding amount, had a high
cost multiple of only .42 at the end of 1992 and ranked 37th
for trust fund reserves though they ranked first for
benefits paid out.
Nor does this proposal merely add job search assistance
or training requirements to the duties of Employment Service
workers. The reform proposed here strengthens the primary
role of unemployment insurance as an income support program
while making equitable, desirable employment transitions
more likely. Indeed, it treats UI reform as a precondition
for effective transition assistance during potentially
lengthy career change efforts.
Unemployment Insurance Innovations: Benefit Side.
The point of departure for this discussion is a plan to
address the needs of claimants experiencing reemployment
difficulties, the group most clearly failed by current
programs. The discussion of programs to combat lengthy
unemployment spells is followed by discussion of plans for
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brief spells, disqualifications and continued eligibility,
and benefit levels. The next section will discuss
financing, including a range of possible compromises and
cost estimates for a total package.
A. RESPONSES TO LONG SPELLS. Currently, the emergency
benefit extension provides 20 additional weeks of benefits
in all states and 26 weeks of benefits in six hard hit
states through October 2, 1993. Although this income
support is crucial to claimants who cannot find new
employment, it is clearly an incomplete response to a
bigger, underlying problem. Emergency benefit extensions
also play into the arguments of employer representatives
that UI is becoming a "welfare" program, not a temporary
insurance system. These employer arguments ignore the fact
that lengthy unemployment spells are unavoidable for many
claimants given insufficient demand for labor, generally, or
for claimants' current skills. Neither the advocates of
emergency extensions nor those who resist them are
addressing the issue of overcoming those labor market
difficulties that contribute to lengthy spells.
There are several experiments currently underway for
coping with labor market transformations: "profiling",
search assistance, training, bonuses, and supplemental
benefit durations. The Department of Labor is currently
pursuing "profiling" (discussed below) and targeted search
assistance, but not pressing for more adequate benefit
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levels or durations to ease difficult transitions. The plan
presented here integrates profiling into a broader framework
of income and transition assistance, making assistance
available to all claimants not anticipating recall. By
providing search assistance and developing search agreements
between claimants and case workers, the supposed
disincentive effects of long potential benefit durations are
addressed.
Longer maximum benefit durations and links to search
assistance and career counselling make intuitive sense and
have empirical justification. Evidence suggests that more
ample benefits (Holen, 1977; Ehrenberg and Oaxaca, 1976;
Burgess and Kingston, 1976) or benefit durations (Burdett,
1979) can improve re-employment earnings and/or reduce
unemployment durations (Gottschalk, 1988).66 Much of the
re-employment earnings improvement can be attributed to
increased search effort (Tannery, 1983) or search quality
(Kahn and Low, 1988). It should also be noted that findings
that dispute the link between benefit levels or durations
and improved post-employment earnings (e.g., Classen, 1977)
do not model the effect of linking search tests and search
assistance to heightened benefit levels.
Some states have taken the lead in developing programs
to link unemployment benefits to active labor market
responses. Two types of programs are worth highlighting.
66 Welch (1977) and others note that all such studies
assume a partial equilibrium framework and can only
provide partial conclusions.
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Five states (California, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, and New
York) have supplemental benefits programs to improve the
income maintenance function of unemployment insurance during
training. Eleven states (Florida, Georgia, Maine,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Tennessee, Vermont,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin) link unemployment insurance to
JTPA programs. These linkages range from interagency
cooperation (Florida) to supplemental benefits, training
advice, and customized training programs for dislocated
workers (Maine).
Table 4.4 summarizes the program characteristics of
five state-level supplemental income maintenance programs.
[ Table 4.4 ]
Some points should be noted about hese state efforts.
First, some of the programs allow substantial extensions of
benefits under state programs. Most offer up to 52 total
weeks benefits. Second, the cost of the programs is quite
modest and the funding mechanisms are similarly unobtrusive.
Third, most of the programs are limited to dislocated
workers. Finally, most require training as a condition of
extended benefit recipiency.
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These models can be taken a step further by changing
one key factor. Some of them require claimants to serve
lengthy unemployment spells as the primary test of a labor
market disability before a claimant can enter the
reemployment benefits program. This requirement can lead to
benefit exhaustions and futile search efforts because
claimants must use up a specified number of weeks benefits
before they enter what could be a lengthy training program
or guided job search strategy. California, in contrast,
excludes claimants who have been receiving benefits for more
than 16 weeks. Massachusetts also excludes applications
after 15 weeks (McClory, 1993). The program described below
permits all claimants to have access to reemployment
services, but changes the nature and funding of those
services as spells lengthen. It also broadens the range of
signals that trigger expanded service opportunities during
profiling.
The few states that offered benefit extensions to
selected groups of workers were attempting to fill a void
left by federal inaction or hostility. At its best, the
pre-1982 EB program merely provided a few additional weeks
of income support during periods of exceptionally high
unemployment in particular states. The current EB system is
virtually non-existent (see Chapter Two). As proposed
below, EB becomes an essential income support during
training for employment transitions, but standards must also
ensure that benefit levels are sufficient and claimants are
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not unduly excluded from state programs. As a training
support, as state experience suggests, EB cannot be allowed
to trigger on and off unexpectedly; claimants should know in
advance that they will have income during their training
program.
A 1990 Congressional Budget Office report on Extended
Benefits noted that
"another approach consistent with this perspective of
UI as social insurance would allow all unemployed
workers exhausting their regular UI benefits to receive
extended benefits, but would link receipt of extended
benefits to the willingness of recipients to
participate in work-related programs, such as job clubs
and training" (Congressional Budget Office, 1990).
The program proposed below extends that suggestion to all UI
programs, state programs as well as EB. It makes
qualitatively new demands on claimants instead of increasing
the quantity of current demands.
To provide income support during potentially lengthy
transitions, EB should be available for 26 weeks and, to
facilitate training participation, should not be triggered
by state unemployment levels. If this level of protection
proves too expensive to legislate, 26 weeks should be
available to high-risk claimants (dislocated workers, Group
One below) with a 26 week extension available to all other
claimants based on a revised EB trigger (6.5 percent state
or national TUR). Triggered EB, at least, is essential
given the probability that pre-claim screening may not
identify all claimants who will face labor market
difficulties.
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Another innovation that should be part of a renewed UI
system is employment bonuses. Notable bonus experiments
have taken place in New Jersey (Corson, Decker, Dunstan, and
Gordon, 1989; Anderson, Corson, and Decker, 1990),
Washington (Spiegelman, O'Leary, and Kline, 1992), Illinois
(Spiegelman and Woodbury, 1987a, 1987b), and Pennsylvania
(Corson, Decker, Dunstan, and Kerachsky, 1991). Some states
have paid bonuses directly to claimants, some to employers.
The literature on the financial effects of these efforts is
uniformly positive: the provision of bonuses for
reemployment increases search effort, reduces benefit
durations, and saves trust fund reserves. 67 In New Jersey,
the bonus at two weeks was quite high, averaging $1,644
(Corson, Decker, Dunstan, and Gordon, 1989) whereas the
Illinois bonus was a modest $500, but both reduced net cost.
A follow-up to the New Jersey experiment estimated that
claimants who received search assistance and a bonus
realized a net gain of $427, comprised of a $591 increase in
earnings, a $124 increase in fringes, and a loss of $279 in
UI benefits (Corson, Decker, Dunstan, and Gordon, 1991). It
is not clear, however, how robust the findings are with
respect to bonus levels and underlying economic conditions.
67 The report on the Washington experiment is positive but
more cautious than the rest. It makes particular
reference to different effects among claimant
populations and suggests that benefit/cost ratios are
highest for workers over 45 years of age (Spiegelman,
O'Leary, and Kline, 1992). The benefit cost ratio in
Illinois would have fallen by almost 50 percent if
take-up rates for the bonus had been 100 percent
instead of 14 percent (Woodbury and Spiegelman, 1987).
223
In general, bonus plans must operate in a context that
includes significant claimant protections. In most
experiments, bonus programs should link job search
assistance to bonuses so that claimants make informed,
rather than just rapid, reemployment decisions. Bonuses
should encourage work search effort, but not the securing of
sub-standard work in pursuit of a lump sum payment. If
suitable work is stringently defined (as described below)
and higner benefit levels reduce the pressure to take any
minimum wage job, bonus plans will have positive effects.
To avoid paying bonuses to those who would be reemployed
quickly without intervention, bonuses should not be paid to
claimants expecting recall.
Some subsidiary issues on the benefit side should be
raised before moving on. As the National Commission
recommended, partial benefits should be available for those
with low hours of employment. Similarly, if claimants
receive income from a part-time job during a training
program they should be allowed to keep the additional income
with no reduction in benefits. This serves several
purposes. It supplements income during training so that
claimants can more easily complete their course of study.
It encourages time management and labor force attachment.
Finally, it provides a signal to future employers that the
claimant is ambitious. These positive results outweigh the
monitoring cost and punitive costs of disqualifying income.
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B. SHORT UNEMPLOYMENT SPELLS. Most claimants who
anticipate recall are, in fact, recalled (Corson and
Dynarski, 1990). The lengthy potential benefit durations
proposed here would actually be used by only a portion of
all unemployed workers. Many state programs dispense with
job search requirements for claimants on layoff expecting
recall. Even so, in the program proposed here, these
claimants are assigned a Counsellor to monitor whether
recall actually occurs. This is to ensure that career
alternatives are explored as soon as possible in case
layoffs become permanent.
There are positive responses to short term layoffs that
can be integrated into the program. "Worksharing" or "short
time compensation" (STC) schemes have convincing advocates
(Vroman, 1993; Abraham and Houseman, 1993; Wong, 1993;
Selfert, 1993), though some argue that STC schemes lead to
underemployment in Europe (Burdett and Wright, 1989). The
potential for work sharing arrangements to boost employment
levels and reduce work time have been too little explored in
the United States, though the internationally exceptional
amount of worktime spent in this country makes the plans
appealing (Schor, 1992). Such plans are well integrated
into European unemployment insurance schemes (Abraham and
Houseman, 1993; Selfert, 1993).
Seventeen states currently have worksharing programs. 6 8
Typically, these programs pay proportionally reduced
68 Connecticut added a program in 1992.
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unemployment insurance benefits to workers facing reduced
work hours as an alternative to layoffs. Table 4.5
summarizes state provisions in 1992.
[ Table 4.5 ]
To ensure equity and effectiveness, short time compensation
programs should be organized around six principles. First,
they should have significant employee protections such as
benefit continuation and mutual agreement of labor and
management before a program begins. Second, benefit levels
will need to be increased so that income losses are not
extreme under STC. Third, if the program is linked to
training (so that short time is compensated while a training
program is pursued), the training program must be accredited
in some way and monitored. Fourth, they should run up to 52
weeks, but beyond that the firm needs more significant
intervention. Fifth, because short time compensation is
often just a stay of execution for a firm, STC programs
should be integrated into industrial extension services. 69
Where firms expect substantial layoffs, it may be
appropriate to make extension service intervention a
precondition for an STC agreement. Finally, experience
69 European experience suggests that STC has more
structural than cyclical character (Selfert, 1993;
Gray, 1993) and also has a seasonal component that was
not designed into the program (Vroman, 1993).
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rating systems will need to be modified if the program
becomes extensive. Some states imposed additional taxes in
the early days of their STC programs, but found the
additional revenue was not needed. That will change if the
program expands.
C. BENEFIT LEVELS. As Chapter One showed, there is
ample historic precedent for setting benefit standards of a
50 percent replacement rate for most claimants, up to a
maximum of 2/3 of the state average weekly wage. This was
the call of all presidents from Truman through Nixon. Some
states (Nevada, New Mexico) currently use 50 percent of the
average weekly wage as their maximum benefit level. Federal
requirements could set a 50 percent wage replacement rate
and leave states free to determine their own mix of benefit
dispersions, i.e., either raising their maximums or
compressing the distribution around 50 percent. As the
National Commission recommended, this standard could be
phased in over four years.
In the past, this level of benefits, which all states
provided in the early days of UI, was defended on the basis
of claimants rights and counter-cyclical impact. The case
remains strong, but there are additional reasons to support
higher benefit levels. Under an active labor market policy,
benefit levels of at least 50 percent are also seen as
necessary to sustain families during employment transitions,
particularly during training periods. Claimants need
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substantial, predictable income during training periods so
they can concentrate on their training and job search
efforts without experiencing financial difficulties. In the
New York experiment with supplemental training benefits, 96
percent of the surveyed recipients who finished training
said that supplemental benefits "made a difference" in their
ability to undergo training. Of those who did not complete
training, 48 percent dropped out for financial reasons when
their benefits stopped (New York Department of Labor, 1990).
A 50 percent wage replacement is a reasonable compromise
between the need for adequate support and any supposed
disincentive to work.
Taxation of benefits effectively reduces benefit
levels, ex post. There are three problems with the current
taxation of benefits. First, benefit taxation reduces
benefit levels when they are already only about a third of
prior earnings for most claimants. Second, it is quite
regressive. Taxes as a percentage of total benefits are
actually higher for those earning $20,000 to $25,000 (18.3
percent) than they are for those earning $40,000 to $50,000
(15.8 percent) (House Ways and Means Committee, 1992). If
benefits are to be taxed at all, they should be taxed only
for upper income recipients. Third, taxes are removed at
year end, not at the time of payment. An unemployed
claimant receives benefits for several months, struggling to
make ends meet, and suffers a substantial income drop at tax
time. At the very least, claimants should have the option
228
of tax withdrawal on an ongoing basis to facilitate
budgeting. Another option would be to dedicate the revenue
from taxing benefits to a pool for unemployment-related
programs.
D. UNIFORM MAXIMUM POTENTIAL DURATION OF BENEFITS. As
noted, most claimants do not currently use their maximum
benefit allowances. In 1983, when the national average for
benefit durations peaked, the average duration of benefits
received was 17.5 weeks. Yet the average for benefit
exhaustees was 23.6 weeks. The presence of long potential
benefit durations is less of a draw to remain unemployed
than most economists assume. Instead, the experience of
unemployment is polarized between those facing brief spells
and those facing significant reemployment difficulties.
The program proposed here has admittedly generous
potential benefit durations, but in return claimants face
both incentives and requirements to limit lengthy insured
unemployment spells. They are given the tools to find
employment, the skills to be employable, and financial
incentives to search hard. Overall, it's a fair bargain:
claimants will find it relatively easy to enter the program
and the incentive structure of the program encourages them
to find suitable jobs quickly. If, in practice, the plan
proves too expensive to legislate, the maximum durations
could apply only to selected, disadvantaged claimants. But
those who are offered training must be pre-selected, knowing
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in advance that they will have 52 weeks benefits, or they
will be reluctant to enter intensive training.
What comes after 52 weeks? The Committee on Economic
Security (1935) originally recommended a program of public
works for those who exhausted their unemployment benefits.
Such a program, however desirable, is almost certainly
beyond the political boundaries of the United States in
1993. The National Commission proposed a unique extended
benefit program for older workers based on their higher
likelihood of lengthy unemployment. Another option is a
means tested "dole" as most European countries and some
states have. These General Assistance monies are under
heavy fire with constrained state budgets and will require
federal support if they are to be part of the social
insurance landscape in the future.
E. MONETARY ELIGIBILITY. During the 1980s, states
raised their monetary eligibility requirements and redefined
"labor force attachment" in the process. The UI system is
currently available only to those who are judged to have
made a significant contribution to the insurance fund prior
to their unemployment. This need not be the case with a
social insurance program. Workers compensation, after which
unemployment insurance was modeled in some states, is
typically available from the beginning of employment.
To counter state trends and because part-time and
contingent employment are increasingly prevalent,
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eligibility should be based on definitions of labor force
attachment that do not preclude low income job losers from
receipt of UI. There are four ways that states define labor
force attachment: weeks of work, multiples of weekly
benefit amounts, multiples of high quarter earnings, and
flat minimum earnings (Employment and Training
Administration, 1978). Currently only Oregon has a
qualifying formula based solely on weeks of work.
Washington state requires 680 hours of work and does not
specify wages.
Most policy prescriptions for UI advocate using weeks
worked, not monetary requirements, as a measure of labor
force attachment (Haber and Murray, 1966; Unemployment
Insurance Research Advisory Committee, 1975; Employment and
Training Administration, 1978; National Commission on
Unemployment Compensation, 1980). In that vein, the
National Commission found that "the time-at-work criterion
is sound and should be encouraged" (p. 37). The National
Commission recommended that states adopt a minimum of not
less than 14 weeks work for claimants to receive maximum UI
benefits (p. 38). But there are tradeoffs to this measure.
In reviewing state practice, the Department of Labor
concluded that "weeks of work is both the most theoretically
attractive and, administratively, the most expensive method
for measuring attachment" (Employment and Training
Administration, 1978).
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Both the required level and the chosen measure of labor
force attachment are contentious. Table 4.6 shows the range
of labor force attachment measures among states that provide
a uniform duration of benefits (26 weeks). It also shows
the average duration of benefits received, which will be
discussed later.
[ Table 4.6 ]
The table is informative because it shows the range of
earnings requirements among states which currently provide
the duration of benefits proposed here. Among states that
provide a uniform 26 weeks of benefits, the toughest
monetary eligibility requirement is just $2,800. Working 40
hour weeks for minimum wage it would take about 16 weeks to
be eligible for benefits, two weeks more than the National
Commission minimum recommendation. It would take only five
weeks in Maryland. The National Commission standard of 14
weeks is more than the average for all uniform duration
states, but slightly less than the toughest state. On
balance, the National Commission recommendation of a labor
force attachment requirement of at least 14 weeks work is a
reasonable standard to suggest for the new program. The
Commission did not specify the number of hours worked to
qualify as a benefit week. Using the Bureau of Labor
Statistics definition for more than half a part-time work
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week (35 hours or less), a reasonable standard would be 18
hours of work or more to count as a week worked. At the
very least, as an interim measure, states should include the
last quarter of employment in their earnings calculations,
reducing the effect of lagged quarters on reentrants and
seasonal workers.
F. CONTINUED ELIGIBILITY. For purposes of continued
eligibility, the "suitable work" definition should be
derived from the Title III definition governing performance
of dislocated worker programs. Under Title III, a Service
Delivery Agency (SDA) must show that a client attained a
given wage replacement rate upon reemployment or the client
will not count as a "placement" for contract compliance.
This encourages SDAs to place claimants in high wage jobs.
The requirement is around 80 percent wage replacement.
Applied to unemployment insurance, a claimant would not have
to accept a job paying less than 80 percent of previous
earnings. This is definition currently in use in New York.
New York also applies a standard that an offered job must
require skill levels equal to or greater than a claimant's
previous employment or the claimant may refuse the offer
(Hodges, 1990). Trade Adjustment Assistance operates on a
similar standard. Currently, one-third of all dislocated
workers find jobs that pay below 80 percent of their
previous wage (Congressional Budget Office, 1993). Most of
these claimants would still permitted to accept such jobs,
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but a suitable work standard should be in effect to keep
them from being disqualified from benefits if they don't.
Instead of requiring a claimant to be available and
actively seeking work to retain benefit rights in all cases,
an active labor market policy also allows continued
eligibility for benefits if there is progress toward a
training regime agreed upon by the claimant and his or her
caseworker. Being in a training program currently absolves
claimants from actively seeking work in most states, but the
income from UI is currently insufficient for a sustained
training program and brief benefit durations make longer
training programs unmanageable. Also, states have wide
discretion to define "training".70
In the reform proposed here, a claimant who is not in a
training program must attend job search workshops and work
with an Employment Counsellor. Current job search
requirements are typically underenforced and lack a job
search training component. This should be replaced by
personal attention and evaluation. Here, too, the bargain
is fair: the system would impose heavy pressure to look for
work if a claimant has marketable skills, but the pressure
would be mitigated by tough standards for suitable work.
The requirement that claimants be "able and available"
for work should also be waived for self-employment programs.
70 The only federal regulation is that JTPA Section 302
programs must count as training (National Foundation
for Unemployment Compensation and Workers'
Compensation, 1991).
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Currently Washington state (Employment and Training
Administration, 1989) and Oregon, Minnesota, and
Massachusetts, through the Three-State Self-Employment
Demonstration Project, (Kerachsky and Corson, 1989) are
pursuing experiments in self-employment. These projects pay
claimants a lump sum (Washington) or weekly payments (Three-
State) to support themselves during business development.
They also provide business support services of various
kinds. Judgment on extending these programs should be
withheld until the program results are known in late 1993.
One area of concern in such programs is continued
eligibility for benefits should the claimant's business
fail.
G. DISQUALIFICATIONS. Disqualifications are limited
to fraud, misconduct, suitable work refusal, quits.71 As
most presidential administrations and the National
Commission recommended, durational disqualifications should
not be permitted. A federal maximum disqualification period
of six weeks should be enforced, but states could have
briefer disqualification periods if they covered additional
cost. Some administrative cost savings will result from
less cumbersome disqualification structure. Also, as noted
71 The range of behaviors which are grounds for
disqualification are remarkably similar across
industrial countries. What varies is the severity of
the punishments.
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previously, personal reasons, such as sexual harassment,
should be included as just cause in state statutes.
The change in disqualifications for quitting could
prove particularly controversial. Employer advocates argue
that someone who quits his or her previous job is not
"involuntarily" unemployed or unemployed "through no fault
of their own." That may be true at first, but after several
weeks of unemployment if that individual has not found
employment they should be entitled to benefits (if they meet
the prior labor force attachment requirement proposed
above). They are, arguably, involuntarily unemployed at
some point after quitting a job if no new job is found.
H. SUMMARY OF BENEFIT-SIDE PROPOSALS. Although many
specific changes are discussed above, a minimal program
would be:
1. "Profiling" to identify service levels needed.
2. Career guidance, job search assistance, and
workshop requirements for all claimants not
expecting recall.
3. Potentially long benefit durations (for
trainees at the very least; triggered at a low
level for all).
4. Elimination of durational disqualifications.
5. Lower monetary eligibility requirements.
6. Adequate wage replacement rates.
Profiling and job search assistance for dislocated workers
are on the political agenda as this is written, but only to
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serve dislocated workers. Because we know the programs are
cost-effective, they should be extended to more claimants.
Indeed, the Washington experiment showed greater net savings
for claimants who received search assistance and were not
dislocated workers (Johnson and Klepinger, 1991). To be
equitable and facilitate maximum participation, reforms such
as search assistance and bonuses should not stand alone;
they require sufficient benefit levels and durations to make
training possible.
Although the reform proposed here goes beyond
traditional demands for quantitative federal standards,
federal standards are unavoidable if the program is to
include most of the unemployed and replace significant
spending power. The following areas should be subject to
federal standards as advocated above:
1. Benefit durations (26 weeks for states),
2. Extended benefits (26 weeks),
3. Wage replacement rates (50 percent of Average
Weekly Wage),
4. Labor force attachment requirements (14 weeks
work),
5. Six week denial periods (no durational
disqualifications),
6. Work search requirements (employment plan,
monitoring, workshops),
7. "Suitable Work" (80 percent wage
replacement).
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In the past, this level of federal intervention has proven
impossible to legislate, but the reform proposed here has
two advantages. First, although federal intervention is
increased, many aspects of it will save states money.
Second, states are feeling the impact of lengthy
unemployment durations but feeling powerless to act against
them. Many state experiments in the late 1980s were deemed
successful by program administrators, but suffered along
with other programs when state budgets were cut. In return
for some relinquished prerogatives, states will gain
substantial resources (for administration, for Extended
Benefits, for worksharing) and the opportunity to implement
some proven strategies. Worksharing, in particular, could
be fostered with a targeted subsidy from general revenues,
as in most foreign examples, thus avoiding the complications
of experience rating.
Illustration of the program.
A clearer image of how a new program would operate can
be gained by illustration.72 If unemployment insurance is
to underlie an active labor market strategy, the program
should work like this:
A potential claimant enters the Employment Service
office. They are asked a series of questions relating to
eligibility. If they are eligible for UI benefits (see
72 The discussion of dislocated worker programs owes much
to conversations and work with Carolyn Peckham of E.J.
Malek and Associates.
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requirements above), they are assigned an Employment
Transition Counsellor. They take a brief (20 minutes) skill
assessment exam to see if they can read and write. This
test is a requirement for benefits and benefits are
immediately available after its completion. One week later,
after the reading test is processed, a more detailed "skill
inventory" is done. The program proceeds in one of two
directions depending on the results of the Skill Assessment.
The two groupings relate to six types of intervention. From
most intervention to least, the six treatments are:
remedial education, lengthy training, skill upgrade, OJT,
job search assistance, monitoring of job search.
The level of intervention available to a claimant will
depend upon his or her anticipated employment search
difficulties due to low skill levels or personal
characteristics. Teenagers should be granted access to
guidance and/or some training to avoid situations in which a
teenager loses a job, draws lengthy unemployment benefits,
and gets shunted onto a low wage career path either because
the unemployment spells are a stigma or because they see no
career alternatives. 73 Those who have received WARN notices
are included because they are currently automatically
available for Title III services.74 As noted previously,
73 The proposal assumes no new teenage apprenticeship
programs are in effect. If (when?) such proposal reach
fruition, the role of unemployment insurance for
teenagers should be re-evaluated.
74 A rule of thumb among dislocated worker program
administrators is that training programs currently run
twice as long as anticipated because UI must be
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dislocated workers are over-represented among benefit
exhaustees and are prime candidates for the types of
intervention outlined below.
GROUP ONE. Those with identifiable labor market
disadvantages (no marketable skills, received WARN notice,
"dislocated") are eligible for a maximum 52 weeks of
benefits and free entrance into one of the two most indepth
training interventions (remedial education, career change
training) for up to 52 weeks. They can opt for the lesser
interventions, but they will be discouraged from doing so by
their Counsellor. Workin:g with their Counsellor, they
develop a personal plan of action for career development and
employment search. They choose accredited training
programs. When training starts, they are contacted once a
month to ensure continued participation in training programs
in order to receive UI. During the last six weeks of
benefits, job search training begins.
GROUP TWO. Those without identifiable labor market
disadvantages are only eligible for free involvement in the
less intensive interventions. They receive job search
training and one 26 week training credit. If they choose
not to enter a skill upgrading training program of up to 26
weeks, they must attend two sessions of job search workshops
supplemented by part-time employment (Neuenfeldt,
1992). Although training costs are not estimated in
this proposal, a rule of thumb in grants for dislocated
worker funding is that 26 weeks costs about $3,500 per
dislocated worker.
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to continue receiving benefits. They must accept "suitable
work" when they are not in training, as defined below.
Assuming for now that EB is not subject to a trigger,
at the end of 26 weeks a Group Two claimant who has not
found work gets a reassessment. They are allowed to enter
longer training programs when they enter the program, at the
end of 26 weeks, or at any other time, but longer programs
are not free for them after 26 weeks. They are offered low
interest loans for training costs related to programs
lasting more than 26 weeks. Income support lasts up to 52
weeks, subject to continued eligibility requirements,
regardless of training option chosen, and both skill upgrade
and long term training allow them to avoid the "able and
available for work" requirement.
Note that under the maximum proposal there is no
difference in the potential maximum duration of benefits for
different groups. Both receive benefits out of EB funds
after 26 weeks, which is currently half federally funded.
All training programs are voluntary. Attendance at job
search workshops is a requirement when training is completed
or if it is not undertaken. Alternatively, EB could be
triggered for all but at-risk claimants.
It should also be noted that this reform offers
opportunities to humanize the treatment of claimants and the
perception of the Employment Service. Peer counsellors,
recruiters from among plant closings victims, job search
clubs -- these initiatives are vital elements of program
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reform. The personal experience of the author in work at
the General Dynamics Employee Transition Center and evidence
from the Industrial Services Program in Massachusetts
suggests that peer contact and support can make the
difference between successful search strategies and
alienating failure.
Financing the New System.
Many of the reforms proposed here will save money, but
states have been reluctant to make the programmatic down
payment. The profiling and search assistance programs
suggested here have proven themselves. But what is the cost
of a reform package that also includes needed duration and
benefit level increases?
In addition to the usual vagaries of costing social
insurance reforms, this proposal has two elements that make
accurate cost estimates difficult to forecast. First,
although many aspects of the proposal appear in state
experiments or national programs, the unique combination
advanced here has not been tested. Interaction among
program elements makes outcomes difficult to foresee.
Second, one goal of the program is to alter the way
unemployment insurance responds to shocks (e.g., NAFTA,
defense cuts) and cycles. A snapshot of estimated cost at a
point in time is necessary, but program cost will vary
dramatically with cycles, shocks, and institutional learning
over time. To simplify, the costing pursued here will
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assume 1991 program levels (the most recent year for which
all data is available) and allow a generous range of
uncertainty (plus or minus five percent).
Having said all that, if we set aside the cost of work
sharing and bonus programs, the basic elements of program
cost are constant regardless of specific legislation: the
number of workers claiming benefits, the level of benefits
received, the duration of benefits, and the administrative
costs of the program. These four determinants of program
cost are influenced in different ways by five elements of
the program. The magnitude of each change, and the net
effect of them all, is uncertain in advance, but the
direction of influence is as follows:
1. The number of claimants is increased by the
lower earnings hurdle, potential increases in
applications, less stringent disqualification
penalties (though not rates).
2. Durations will increase somewhat with
potential durations.
3. Durations il fall due to search help and
post-training employment opportunities.
4. The higher wage replacement rate will increase
benefit costs.
5. Administrative cost will increase with
"profiling", counselling for training and career
planning, and search workshops.
In the costing that follows, some explicit assumptions will
be made to estimate the relative effects of these changes on
numbers of claimants, benefit levels, and durations.
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I. The Number of Claimants.
A central goal of reform is to increase the percentage
of the unemployed receiving benefits. One shortcut toward
an upper bound estimate of the number of claimants in the
reformed system is to ass- .e the post-war high of 1975
benefit recipiency rates (75 percent) and apply that to 1991
unemployment. This is an admittedly blunt instrument, but
provides a high estimate given the effort proposed to
reverse declining recipiency rates. At 1975 recipiency
rates, 6.3 million unemployed workers would have claimed
benefits in 1991, about double the actual number of
claimants.
Although not a bad approximation of the largest
potential effect of the reform proposal on new claims, some
of the specific elements of the proposal can be estimated
with more accuracy. As this paper has shown, benefit
recipiency rates vary dramatically across states and minimum
earnings requirements have played a key role in that
variation. Table 4.7 shows the effect on each state program
of the federal minimum earnings requirement proposed here.
The table compares current state earning requirements with
the experience of a worker earning the federal minimum wage
at a part-time (18 hours/week) job. This provides an
extremely conservative estimate of states above the minimum
given that the standard is hours and weeks worked and most
of those weeks are at average, not minimum, wages.
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[ Table 4.7 1
By this conservative measure, the new standard is already
met by twelve states (who could then raise their earnings
thresholds).
Changing current disqualifications from durational to
denial periods has more complex effects. Assuming that the
number of disqualifications is unchanged, but the severity
of penalties varies, the effect is as follows:
New Claimants = DQ - (.4) (DQ)
Where DQ is the number of disqualifications (counting all
disqualifications as durational for simplicity) and the
coefficient is the percentage of the unemployed out five
weeks or less, i.e., unemployed for less time than the six
week denial period would have run. The adjustment assumes
(1) that disqualified claimants have a distribution of
potential unemployment that matches the total population of
unemployed, and (2) that they cannot intentionally lengthen
their unemployment spells beyond five weeks to receive
benefits after the denial period. It also includes suitable
work refusal disqualifications at the 1991 level, though
such disqualifications will decline with higher wage
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replacement suitable work definitions. 75 By this
accounting, 1.9 million more claimants would have received
some benefits in 1991.
Although the absolute number of new claimants is
important to know, this proposal includes different
treatment levels for different subpopulations. Cost
estimates will depend heavily on the populations of Groups
One and Two, the high treatment and standard treatment
categories of claimants. Group One is essentially all
dislocated workers. Estimates of this population range from
100,000 (Bendick, 1983) to between 1.5 and 2.7 million a
year through the 1980s (Congressional Budget Office, 1993).
By any definition, all are job losers and, hence, more
likely than most unemployed workers to already be receiving
benefits. About 60 percent of all dislocated workers
receive UI (Congressional Budget Office, 1993). Using the
CBO definition of dislocated workers (which is used in the
profiling process for this reform proposal) and a marginal
increase in the percentage receiving benefits of 15
percentage points, the total number of Group One claimants
would have numbered around 1.7 million in 1990, the last
year of the Congressional Budget Office survey.
Group Two, the less expensive category of claimants,
will expand by more than Group One because the category
75 Data constraints make it impossible to estimate the
exact effect of an 80 percent wage replacement rate for
"suitable work". It would be necessary to know how
many of the unaccepted job offers met the 80 percent
criteria.
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includes more potential claimants who are currently denied
benefits. Subtracting dislocated workers from total
unemployment leaves 6.2 million potential claimants. Based
on Congressional Budget Office estimates of dislocated
workers and their recipiency rates, working backwards from
known 1991 benefit recipiency rates and calculating a
weighted average reveals that only 19 percent of non-
dislocated worker claimants received UI in 1991. If their
recipiency rate had been 56 percentage points higher (75
percent), 4.65 million new Group Two claimants would have
been in the reformed system in 1991.
II. Benefit Levels.
Again, this reform proposal does not affect all states
to the same extent. The wage replacement standard is 50
percent of average weekly wages in covered employment.
Weekly benefit amounts will increase, on average, by the
difference between half of average weekly wages (AWW) and
current average weekly benefits (AWB), or:
Net New Benefit Cost = .5 (AWW) - (AWB)
On a state by state basis, Table 4.8 shows the result.
[ Table 4.8 ]
The unweighted average increase in state weekly benefit
amounts is $50, ranging from $117 in Alaska to $3 in Hawaii.
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III. Durations.
By far the most difficult change to estimate is
durations. The task is complicated by the existence of two
treatment groups and proposals that lengthen potential
durations while promoting briefer spells with search
requirements and assistance. Assumptions about duration
increases are built in to the first rows of the costing
table (4.9). Assumptions about duration reductions are
included in the "potential savings" rows.
Those claimants unemployed more than 26 weeks would be
eligible for Extended Benefits, which is half federal and
half state. In 1991, 1.1 million claimants were unemployed
27 weeks or longer. Unfortunately, there are no published
figures on the mean duration of benefits received by
claimants within the 27 week and over population. We do
know that benefit durations received do not expand to
exactly match the new maximums when EB is in effect: when
New York added 13 weeks for vocational training, the mean
additional duration received was 8.2 weeks (Employment and
Training Administration, 1990).
All state programs currently provide at least 26 weeks
maximum benefits, but many claimants exhaust benefits before
meeting the maximum threshold. Among states that have
uniform 26 week durations, as proposed here, the average
duration of benefits received was 17.9 weeks. An upper
bound assessment of the effect of uniform durations is to
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compare benefit weeks paid per claimant in uniform 26 week
states and in the remaining states. Table 4.6 has those
numbers, showing a 3.1 week differential between states with
uniform 26 week durations and those with varying durations,
not controlling for other differences. We will assume the
higher average duration of benefits received in the 26 week
states will apply to Group Two claimants in all states under
the proposal.76
The work disincentive effects of higher benefit levels
can be expected to lengthen spells, however slightly. But
the search assistance and monitoring provisions are known to
reduce spells. Although not always reported in terms of
weeks, the New Jersey reemployment experiment indicates
significant potential benefit savings. Profiling and search
assistance saved $134 per claimant. Profiling, search
assistance, and a reemployment bonus reduced benefit
durations by 1.6 weeks in New Jersey. The Washington
experiment with intensive job search assistance, but no
bonus, found reduced durations of .7 weeks, a 6.8 percent
reduction in weeks of benefits compared to a control group
(Johnson and Klepinger, 1991). Under the reform proposed
here, net cost savings will be greater because reductions in
duration are multiplied by larger benefit amounts, but for a
conservative estimate existing experience will be used.
76 The average of 17.9 weeks is likely to be too high
given that the 26 week state average includes
dislocated workers and their lengthier spells.
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IV. Administration
Administrative costs fall into three categories:
profiling, search assistance, special workshops, training.
Profiling was recently added to federal UI program expenses
for two years, so it adds no net new costs to states.
Profiling is also easily integrated into current processing
routines for processing claimants.
Search assistance costs will depend on the time spent
with each client. Search assistance will cost 1/2 hour per
client every two weeks maximum at roughly $20.00 an hour per
employee. Across all claimant populations, the average
duration of unemployment is 23.5 weeks, or 5.9 staff service
hours per claimants for search assistance. Special
workshops in the New Jersey experiment lasted three hours
each morning for a week (Department of Labor, 1993). If 20
claimants attend each weekly workshop, and only one, then
the cost will be: ( claimants /20 ) * ( staff compensation
* 15 hours ) + the cost of materials.
Full discussion of reforming training delivery systems
and funding is beyond the scope of this discussion. For
costing purposes, classroom training is assumed to be
provided under some variant of the Job Training Partnership
Act (JTPA). A rule of thumb for training programs under
JTPA Title III is that a 26 week training program costs
between $3,000 and $5,000 for training and administration.
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Claimants, Benefits, Duration, and Administration
Table 4.9 is an attempt to estimate the additional
effect of the programs proposed here based on the
assumptions discussed above. The costing assumes all
claimants receive benefits in only one spell of
unemployment. It excludes work sharing costs.
[ Table 4.9 ]
The figures in the box indicate that under some specific
assumptions, before accounting for training expenses, the
program could save money. This will be true because the
increase in potential durations is partially offset by
programs to reduce durations. Also, the reforms proposed
have proven cost effective in state experiments. The high
estimate net cost ($5.7 million) is still only .28 percent
of taxable payrolls and that percentage will fall with the
higher proposed taxable wage base.
Any proposal for reform of unemployment insurance
financing must address the quintessential element of the US
financing system, experience rating. No other advanced
industrial nation has experience rated unemployment
insurance taxes (Social Security Administration, 1992). As
noted in Chapter One, experience rating has been a
contentious issue since the founding of the program. An
early opponent of the process, Eveline Burns, described
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experience rating as "the most significant obstacle to the
adoption of a consistent unemployment insurance" which
reflects "social and economic realities" (Burns, 1945).
Burns spells out the preconditions of an experience
rating system that would accurately match tax rates to
employer merit. To be an equitable and effective economic
stabilizer, experience rating would have to: (1) provide
tax breaks only where employers can prove that they took
decisive action, not when accidental fluctuations in
employment or action to avoid compensable claims reduces
benefit payments; (2) classify industries and individual
employers by their capacity to influence employment levels;
and, (3) withstand pressure from groups of firms that would
alter the system to their advantage (Burns, 1945). Clearly,
these preconditions do not exist under the current system.
Even if such a system could be implemented, it is not
clear that complete experience rating, as it is known in the
UI trade, would actually be desirable. Experience rating is
essentially a throw back to old systems with employer
reserves. It is arguable that, in fact, the "socialization"
of layoff unemployment and "adverse incentives" of partial
experience rating are desirable. Cross-subsidization by
industries means that unavoidable cyclical pressure on high-
layoff industries does not disproportionately cost those
employers (particularly in manufacturing). Literature on
incomplete experience rating shows that employers who have
reached the maximum tax rate have more short term layoffs
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(Kaiser, 1987; Fitzroy and Hart, 1985; Burdett and Hool,
1983; Feldstein, 1978; Feldstein, 1976). But the
alternative could be worse if they didn't enjoy such
incentives. Average employment levels in manufacturing, for
example, will be higher under incomplete experience rating
because the subsidy for brief layoffs allows equilibrium
employment levels to be artificially high. Short layoffs
are a sign of labor hoarding: workers face brief
unemployment spells but remaining on-roll with a given
employer. Short time compensation schemes have been
advocated for the same reason: human capital investment is
facilitated and encouraged by such labor hoarding.
Worksharing and Short Time Compensation should be
implemented to reduce the effect of experience rating on
short layoffs and to encourage bargaining over work time and
higher employment levels.
Dramatic change, such as eliminating experience rating,
may be desirable but unnecessary. First, the only
additional burdens on the UI system under this proposal is
the EB entitlement (half state expense) and an increase in
administrative costs (100 percent federal). Second, states
could be granted considerable leeway in financing given that
benefit levels, durations, and disqualifications are
federally mandated. It may be desirable to allow states to
establish their own funding mechanisms if federal standards
for program quality ensure that program goals are not
compromised (as they have been in the past).
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Interstate competition would play out in the mix of
taxes, but not in the mix of program provisions. For
example, a tension exists between high wage and low wage
employers with respect to the taxable wage base. All else
being equal, a high wage employer will face a lower
effective tax rate than a low wage employer at a constant
taxable wage base. Given that a state must meet certain
spending requirements that are roughly equivalent across
states, the specific mix of tax bases and tax rates can be
left to state discretion without undue downward pressure on
program standards. If necessary, a federal standard for
minimum experience rated taxes, perhaps one percent as
proposed by the Committee on Economic Security, would
provide a further safeguard against downward pressure from
interstate competition.
Federal guidance could be used to foster state
activity, if not impose requirements. One alternative to
suggest is triggering wage base and/or tax rates changes in
response to low reserve ratios. A second is to index the
taxable wage base (perhaps to the social security wage base)
and reduce tax rates accordingly. A third, more
controversial option, would be to assess employee
contributions (as in Alaska and New Jersey) or trigger
employee contributions in the event of low trust fund
reserves (as in Pennsylvania and West Virginia). The "Ohio
Plan" in the 1930s suggested this financing option, in part
because it changed the political balance between workers and
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employers (who currently argue that they should have more
control given their sole-source financing). As with most
payroll taxes, the incidence of the tax varies and it is
incorrect to say that employers bear the full burden. As
part of the bargain over a new system, however, it is fair
to put modest employee contributions on the table, as they
are in other industrialized countries.77
Will this hurt US "competitiveness"?
It would be surprising to find that UI taxes affect
competitiveness, given the small portion they are of total
cost to a firm. In Michigan at the beginning of 1993, and
throughout the states during the 1980s, the argument took
concrete form when Republican legislators proposed lower
minimum UI tax rates as an economic development tool. Can
lower minimum UI taxes improve the employment picture?
The scatterplot (Graph 4.1) shows state experiences
during the recovery of the 1980s, comparing changes in
minimum UI taxes on one axis and changes in employment on
the other.
[ Graph 4.1 ]
77 For example, Canadian employees pay 2.35 percent of
payroll; Germans, 2.15 percent; French, 2.31 percent.
Germans split the cost between employee and employer.
Other countries charge employees about one-third.
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The relationship between tax changes and employment change
is tenuous at best. The states are not only widely
dispersed. They also fall heavily on the negative side of
both the minimum tax rate axis and employment change axis,
meaning that most states reduced taxes but got none of the
anticipated employment boost that "competitiveness"
advocates had declared. Instead, in a pattern familiar from
Chapter Two, states ratcheted their programs downward
together.
A brief look at international competitors further
indicates that fears of over-generous unemployment insurance
in the United States are baseless (Congressional Research
Service, 1992). Table 4.10 compares some salient
characteristics of other national programs.
[ Table 4.10 ]
Perhaps most important, other countries promote both
unemployment insurance for cyclical downturns and
"unemployment assistance" (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991)
for the extremely long term unemployed, an expensive but
common proposition. No other countries except the United
States have experience rated programs. Many programs rely
heavily on general revenues. All told, the program proposed
is not more burdensome for employers than programs in other
countries and, in fact, will benefit employers through labor
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market efficiency, higher consumption, and reduced
cyclicality of demand.
Toward the 21st Century.
This dissertation has charted the course of
unemployment insurance in the United States, from the Social
Security Act of 1935 to the onslaught against claimants that
marked the 1980s. Against a backdrop of economic
transformation, the federal/state unemployment insurance
system was only marginally changed in almost 60 years.
Despite clear patterns of downward convergence across the
states, the federal partner sat dormant until, in the early
1980s, it awoke to add its weight to the forces working
against claimants. Now there is an opportunity to bring
about a Twenty-First Century unemployment insurance policy
to match the new needs of the workforce and employers. If
the nation pursues effective trade and industrial policies
on the demand side, a renewed UI system can play a crucial
role on the labor supply front.
The system proposed here is a series of compromises
that advance the UI system. Current program administrators
(the Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies)
retain substantial control and enjoy expanded authority in
some areas. Employers will resist the lengthy maximum
durations and higher benefit levels, but the "welfare"
aspect of long durations is reduced through job search
assistance and testing. Claimant advocates have long argued
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for longer benefits and higher replacement rates, but
claimants, with appropriate safeguards, must take additional
responsibility for charting their future and moving toward
renewed employment.
As this is written, a new Federal Unemployment
Insurance Advisory Council has held its first meeting to
identify a new course and fashion a consensus. Perhaps the
damage of the 1980s will be reversed.
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TABLE 4.1
Selected Characteristics of UI Exhaustees and Other Claimants
Other Points
Characteristics Exhaustee Claimants Difference
Less than HS Education: 22.6% 20.9% 1.7%
Two years or less
previous tenure: 46.3% 41.7% 4.6%
Industry:
Manufacturing 30.9% 42.7% -11.8%
Retail Trade 11.6% 8.6% 3.0%
Services 19.0% 13.8% 5.2%
Occupation:
Managerial/Professional 11.6% 8.3% 3.3%
Admin. Support 19.4% 12.2% 7.2%
Service Occupations 9.6% 6.4% 3.2%
Precision Production 2.3% 2.8% -0.5%
Machine Operators 16.2% 25.9% -9.7%
1987 Household Income:
Under $10,000 21.2% 14.5% 6.7%$10,000- $20,000 32.0% 32.9% -0.9%
Plant Closing: 16.2% 9.1% 7.1%Dislocated Worker (3yr tenure): 20.7% 9.0% 11.7%
Source: Corson and Dynarski, 1990.
a:\excomp.wq!
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TABLE 4.2
Post-Exhaustion Industry and Occupation Change
Selected Industres and Occupations, 1989
Pre-UI Post-Exhaustion Point
Job Job Change
Industry
Durable Manufacturing 16.2% 9.8% -6.4%
Nondurable Manufacturing 14.3% 11.3% -3.0%
Retail Trade 10.8% 16.0% 5.2%
Services 18.2% 24.1% 5.9%
Occupation
Sales 6.4% 10.2% 3.8%
Service Occupations 8.5% 13.4% 4.9%
Precision Production 2.4% 1.4% -1.0%
Machine Operators 15.8% 11.1% -4.7%
Handlers 8.6% 10.1% 1.5%
Source: Corson and Dynarski, 1990.
a:\exchng.wq!
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TABLE 4.3
Policy Perspectives
Issue
Lengthening
Unemployment
Spells
Falling Wage
Rates
Suitable Work
Financing
Crisis
Disqualification
Wage Replacement
Rates
Current
Trends
Traditional
Reform
Response
Limit Receipiency
Rates
Lower
Benefits
Minimum Wage,
Physically Capable
Raise Maximum
Tax, Cut Benefits
Durational
Work
Disincentive
Increase Duration
Emergency Benefits
Lower Eligibility
Requirements
High Wage
Replacement
Raise Wage Base
Denial Periods
Income
Maintenance
Active
Response
Link to Dislocated
Worker Programs
Redefine Labor
Force Attachment
Wages, Benefit,
Package Skill Levels
General Revenue
and Employer Tax
Denial Periods
Reflect Market
Facilitate
Training
ON123poolW BRTC
TABLE 4.4
State Supplemental Benefits
Eliaible Population
California
Training Extension Program
Iowa
Maine
Dislocated Worker Benefits
Massachusetts
DET
Massachusetts
RAB
New York
Title 11, Title Ill,
Handicapped, tech impact.
Employer out of business.
Laid off; eligible or
exhaustee; unlikely to
return to industry or
occupation; age.
Title 11, Title 111,
WARN, 15 wks unemployed,
no recall.
Full or partial
plant closing.
Tech change, plant closing,
seasonality, handicap.
52 wks max.
26 more weeks max.
26 more weeks.
Up to 52
more weeks.
Up to 13 more
weeks.
Up to 13 more
weeks.
Income during
training.
Only Benefits.
Benefits.
Must be in
training.
Must be in
training,
employment
planr ung.
No training
requirement.
Health benefits.
Must be in
training.
Almost 1/3 denied
benefits due to
marketable skills.
Can't apply after
16 wks benefits.
Avg. 18 wks
duration.
Max. $97/wk
benefit.
Avg. 34.2
weeks total.
Source: Employment and Training Administration,
Occasional Paper 90-2, 1990.
O\123poolWIBsup.WQ!
State Duration Services NotesState
Table 4.5
Short Time Compensation Programs
1992
Maximum
DurationState
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Florida
Iowa
Kansas
52
104
52
Louisiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
Missouri
New York
Oregon
Rhode Island
Texas
Vermont
Washington
Hours
Reduction
10 to 40%
10 to 40%
10% or more
10 to 40%
20 to 50%
20 to 40%
20 to 40%
10 to 50%
10 to 60%
20 to 40%
20 to 60%
20 to 40%
10 to 50%
10 to 40%
20 to 50%
10 to 50%
Benefit
Maintenance
Optional
Required
Optional
Optional
Optional
Optional
Required
Optional
Health Required
Optional
Required
Optional
Optional
Optional
Optional
Health Required
Source: Vroman, 1992. New York '
a:\stc.wq!
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Special
Max.
Tax Rate
2.0%
None
None
1.0%
None
None
None
None
None
1.17%
None
3%
None
None
None
None
updated.
TABLE 4.6
Earnings Requirements and Benefit Durations
Uniform Duration States, 1991
Base Average
Period Benefit
Earnings Duration
Requirement (weeks)
Connecticut $600 16.2
Hawaii $150 13.0
Illinois $1,600 17.2
Maryland $900 16.7
New Hampshire $2,800 12.4
New York $1,600 20.0
Vermont $1,437 16.1
West Virginia $2,200 15.1
Average for 26 week states: 17.9 *
Average for other states: 14.8
Difference: 3.1
* Averages weighted by unemployment in those states.
Source: Earnings requirements from NFUCWC, 1992.
Durations from Unemployment Insurance Service, 1992.
a:\earndur.wq!
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Table 4.8
Effect of Proposed Wage Replacement Rate
1991, Sorted by Replacement Rate Below Standard
State
CA
LA
IN
AK
NH
AL
TN
MO
GA
NY
MS
AZ
NE
CT
IL
VA
SC
NM
KY
MD
FL
DE
WA
Current
Average
Benefit
$143.61
$110.63
$112.48
$169.77
$130.45
$119.44
$118.36
$142.56
$148.91
$190.37
$115.62
$143.05
$126.32
$206.32
$179.86
$156.81
$140.65
$134.53
$144.76
$178.77
$157.69
$183.33
$175.16
$170.11
$153.17
$168.28
$152.73
$217.59
$172.68
$176.57
$121.67
$159.57
$142.89
$157.37
$139.54
$167.32
$152.71
$161.49
$212.42
$143.98
$175.82
$164.33
$222.49
$197.10
$194.47
$167.96
$176.10
$166.85
$204.38
$213.78
Average Increase:
Note: Proposed benefits replace 50 percent of average weekly wage.
Source: Employment and Training Administration, 1992.
a:awbprop.wq!
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Current
Wage
Replacement
28.0%
28.2%
28.3%
29.5%
30.0%
30.4%
30.5%
34.0%
34.1%
34.1%
35.0%
35.2%
35.3%
36.0%
36.0%
36.7%
37.2%
37.3%
37.4%
37.5%
37.8%
38.1%
38.2%
38.4%
38.6%
38.8%
39.3%
39.5%
39.6%
39.9%
39.9%
40.3%
40.5%
41.1%
41.3%
41.3%
41.5%
42.1%
42.2%
42.2%
422%
42.7%
42.9%
43.3%
44.0%
44.1%
44.7%
45.4%
47.9%
49.3%
Proposed
Average
Weekly Benefit
$256.45
$196.15
$198.73
$287.75
$217.42
$196.45
$194.03
$209.65
$218.34
$279.13
$165.17
$203.20
$178.92
$286.56
$249.81
$213.64
$189.05
$180.34
$193.53
$238.36
$208.58
$240.59
$229.27
$221.50
$198.41
$216.86
$194.31
$275.43
$218.03
$221.27
$152.47
$197.98
$176.41
$191.45
$168.93
$202.57
t183.99
$191.79
$251.68
$170.59
$208.32
$192.42
$259.31
$227.60
$220.99
$190.43
$196.98
$183.76
$213.34
$216.82
Increase
$112.84
$85.52
$86.25
$117.98
$86.97
$77.01
$75.67
$67.09
$69.43
$88.76
$49.55
$60.15
$52.60
$80.24
$69.95
$56.83
$48.40
$45.81
$48.77
$59.59
$50.89
$57.26
$54.11
$51.39
$45.24
$48.58
$41.58
$57.84
$45.35
$44.70
$30.80
$38.41
$33.52
$34.08
$29.39
$35.25
$31.28
$30.30
$39.26
$26.61
$32.50
$28.09
$36.82
$30.50
$26.52
$22.47
$20.88
$16.91
$8.96
$3.04
$49.84
TABLE 4.9
Net Cost of Reform Program
Weekly Average
Claimants Benefits Duration Subtotals
GROUP ONE: 1,700,000 $177.16 39.0 $11,745,708,000
GROUP TWO: 4,650,000 $177.16 17.9 $14,745,912,600
Hours/
ADMINISTRATION: Claimants Claimant $/Hr.
Profiling NA
Search Assistance 6,350,000 5.9 $20.00 $749,300,000
Workshops 317,500 15 $20.00 $95,250,000
TRAINING: (a) 1,700,000 $3,000 $5,100,000,000
Saving/
POTENTIAL SAVINGS, Estimate #1 Claimant (b)
Group One: 1,700,000 ($134.00) ($227,800,000)
Group Two: 4,650,000 ($134.00) ($623,100,000)
Reduced
POTENTIAL SAVINGS, Estimate #2 Duration
Group One: 1,700,000 $177.16 -1.6 ($481,875,200)
Group Two: 4,650,000 $177.16 -0.8 ($659,035,200)
Bonus Expenses:(c) 20% $500 $170,000,000
Total Proposal Cost (1991): Plus 5%
Estimate #1 $31,585,270,600 $33,164,534,130
Estimate #2 $31,465,260,200 $33,038,523,210
Benefits Paid (1991): (d) $27,505,400,000 $27,505,400,000
Net Cost (savings) of Proposal, Estimate #1: $4,079,870,600 $5,659,134,130
Net Cost (savings) of Proposal, Estimate #2: $3,959,860,200 $5,533,123,210
Percentage Increase in Program Cost, Estimate #1: 14.8% 20.60/
Percentaae Increase in Proaram Cost. Estimate #2: 14.4% 20.1*4
Taxable Payrolls (1990): (e) $2,021,126,852,000
Net Cost as % of Taxable Payrolls: (f)
Estimate #1 0.20% 0.280/c
Estimate #2 0.20%o 0.270/
(a) Trainng cost wi vary widely due to assumptions about duration, courses, and take up rates.
(b) Estimate #1 is net sawigs, iduding bonus, based on state experiments.
(c) Take ti rates and espenses based on state experimerts.
(d) Benefits paid in 1991 does not ickde adinistration expenes.
(e) Most recert year avaie.
(f) The average errployer tax as a % o taxable payros was 1.95% in 1990.
Note: See text for detA on methodology.
ch4 &
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TABLE 4.10 UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
International Comparison
USA
Waqe ReplacementEligibility
Vares by State. Minimum earnings
vanes from about $150 to $3640.
Cannot be jobless due to voluntary
quit, misconduct, labor dispute,
or refusing suitable work. Some
states pay no benefits if ineligible
for these reasons.
6 months employment during previous
year. Same reasons as U.S. for
ineligibility, but briefer penalties.
Up to 12 weeks disqualification.
Varies with regional unemp. rate.
10-14 weeks during previous year
for min. benefits, 20 or more weeks
for full benefits. 7 to 12 weeks
disqualification for same reasons
as in U.S.
6 months employment during last
12 months. Disqualification for
same reasons as U.S. Denial period
of 1 to 3 months.
Duration
No state paid benefits of even
half of average wages. Best
was RI at 46%. Louisiana only
27%.
68% of after-tax earnings. Low
income get 58% if ineligible for
regular U.I.
60% of average earnings, up to $408
a week. 50% of average earnings
if initially disqualified.
60 to 80% of wages. Minimum
3,170 yen.
SOURCE: "Social Security Programs Throughout the World," Social Security Administration (1991)
Updated through Heinx Mathieson, German Embassy; Canadian Unemployment Insurance Commission, Ottawa
Prepared by UAW Research Dept.
opeiu494\bMl23datdunempins.wq3-25-93
Up to 26 weeks.
Currently emergency extended
unemployment compensation
covers additional 20 or 26
weeks in some cases.
12-30 months. Must be 50 or
older for 30 months coverage.
17-50 weeks with 2 week waiting
period.
90 days to 43 weeks. Extended
to 48 months for sickness,
injury, matemity, and "hard
to employ" cases.
Germany
Canada
Japan
Appendix A
ACTIONS TAKEN ON
MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
AS REPORTED IN JULY,1980
The National Commission on Unemployment Compensation (NCUC),
which had been established under the provisions of the
Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976 (Public Law 94-566,
approved October 20, 1976), issued its Final Report in July,
1980. That Report included the unanimous and majority
recommendations of the Commission for the improvement and
strengthening of the unemployment compensation system.
Following is a recapitulation of the major recommendations of the
NCUC together with a statement of the action taken to date on the
recommendations. The listing of recommendations is from Chapter
1 of the Commission's Final Report, pages 2 through 5.
MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS
I Removal of unemployment compensation accounts from the
unified Federal budget.
No action has been taken on this recommendation.
II Financing: recommendations for putting the Federal-State
program on sound financial footing.
A. Increase in Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) taxable
wage base.
The FUTA taxable wage base was increased to $7000
effective January 1, 1983 (P.L. 97-248, the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982). No action has
been taken on the Commission's recommendation for
establishment of the FUTA taxable wage base as a
percentage of the national average total wage in
covered employment.
B. Reduce employer payroll taxes for past debts.
No action has been taken on this recommendation. The
0.2% increase in the net Federal tax rate established
by P.L. 94-566, the Unemployment Compensation
Amendments of 1976, which was to be terminated when all
advances to the Federal extended unemployment
compensation account had been repaid (December, 1987),
has since been extended through December 31, 1996.
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C. Strengthen requirements for borrowing from loan fund to
assure prudent financial policies.
Except for cash flow loans, interest was made payable
on all loans made to States after April 1, 1982 , under
the provisions of P.L. 97-35, the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981. Additional revisions were
made in the loan mechanism by this law -- the majority
of which were not in accordance with the
recommendations of the Commission.
D. Reinsurance: provide States protection against
unusually heavy benefit costs in order to maintain
State solvency.
No action has been taken on this recommendation.
E. Establish Board of Trustees for unemployment insurance
(UI) trust funds.
No action has been taken on this recommendation.
F. Correct FY 1982 (sic.) shortfall in funds for State
costs of administration.
Establishment of a "true contingency" fund has helped
alleviate this problem to some extent. This action,
however, is substantially different from that
recommended by the Commission.
G. Recommendations to the States on financing (not Federal
law changes).
The Commission's recommendations presented a series of
recommendations for State action. Action on these
recommendations varies by State.
III Remove unemployment benefits from being subject to Federal
income tax.
Rather than remove the partial taxation of unemployment
benefits under the income tax provisions (as was the
case at the date of this recommendation), P.L. 99-514,
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, made all UI benefits
received after December 31, 1986, subject to inclusion
in taxable income for purposes of the Federal income
tax.
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IV Benefits: recommendations for ensuring a sound benefit
structure.
A. Repeal current Federal standards.
P.L. 102-164, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation
Act of 1991, amended FUTA to permit States, at their
option, to pay benefits between school years and terms
to certain school employees, No action taken on other
recommendations of the Commission on this issue.
B. Establish Federal basic minimum benefits standards.
No action taken on this recommendation.
C. Greater protection during periods of heavy unemployment
and to older workers.
Rather than provide greater protection during periods
of heavy unemployment, P.L. 97-35, the omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981, revised the triggers for
the Extended Benefit (EB) program to make them more
difficult to achieve. The National trigger was
eliminated and the State triggers were increased from
4.0% IUR and 120% of average IURs in the preceding 2
years OR 5.0% IUR at State option to 5.0% + 120%
factor or 6.0%. No permanent standby program or
lifetime reserve program has been established.
During the period 1980 - 1993, two temporary, emergency
programs have been enacted: the Federal Supplemental
Unemployment Compensation Program (FSC) came into being
with P.L. 97-248, the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982, and was in place from
September 1, 1982 through March 31, 1985 (this program
was modified eight times during this time period); The
Emergency Unemployment Compensation program (EUC) came
into being with P.L. 102-164, the Emergency
Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991, and has been in
place since November 17, 1991 (This program has been
modified four times to date).
D. Program for displaced homemakers.
No action has been taken on this recommendation.
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E. Recommendations to States (not Federal law changes).
The Commissions recommendations presented a number of
recommendations for State action. Action on these
recommendations varies by State.
F. Extend and maintain coverage.
No action has been taken on these recommendations.
V. Initiatives for income maintenance of the longer-term
unemployed.
A. Increase in CETA job slots.
The Public Service Employment program under CETA has
been eliminated.
B. Financing of unemployment compensation benefits for
CETA workers.
The proposal to repeal funding of UI benefits for CETA
PSE workers from general revenues was not enacted.
C. Unemployment assistance.
No action has been taken on this recommendation.
VI. More efficient administration.
A. Permit U.S.Treasury Department to delegate State
collection of FUTA taxes.
No action has been taken on this recommendation.
B. Allocate additional Federal funds to improve techniques
and develop special procedures for detection of fraud,
error, and tax delinquency.
A nationwide program of Benefit Quality Control is now
in place; a similar program for Revenue Quality Control
has been developed, tested, and will be mandated during
the next few months.
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T
C. Require quarterly wage reporting to assist
crossmatching and prompt payment of benefits.
P.L. 98-369, the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,
required that all States have in effect a requirement
that employers make quarterly reports of wages to a
State agency (which might be the agency administering
the State UI law) as a condition for compliance with
Federally aided assistance programs.
D. Strengthen appeals process.
Modification of the appeals process is a product of
State law and administrative procedures. Actions in
this area vary by State.
E. Strengthen and implement procedures aimed at speeding
the processing of interstate claims and appeals.
The INTERNET automated system has been implemented to
improve the interstate claims processing.
F. Increased Grants-to-States for administrative financing
for unemployment compensation and employment service.
Administrative Financing reforms have met some of the
goals of the Commission: establishment of the "true
contingency" fund, flexibility for carryover and
retention of contingency funds, and the permanent
availability of Reed Act funds (P.L. 101-508, the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation act of 1990). No action
has been taken on full funding of the cost model.
G. Strengthening and improving the United States
Employment Service (USES).
The Wagner-Peyser Act was amended by P.L. 97-404, the
Job Training Partnership Act, to put in place a
modified block grant program for the Employment
Service. No specific action has been taken on the
Commission recommendations for increased USES staffing.
H. Administrative costs of non-FUTA-subject employers
(State and local government and nonprofit employers).
No action has been taken on this recommendation.
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VII. Special employee protection programs (Trade Adjustment Act,
etc.).
A. Special Federal programs should not be paid
concurrently or be a supplement to UI.
This procedure is currently in place.
B. Total costs of such programs should be paid from
general revenues.
This procedure is currently in place.
C. Amount and duration of special program benefits should
not be considered a precedent or a pattern for UI.
No such precedents or patterns have emerged.
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APPENDIX B
REGRESSION RESULTS
DEPENDENT = In INSURED UNEMPLOYMENT / TOTAL UNEMPLOYMENT
1979-1991, Unweighted
(One) (Two)
LEGAL VARIABLES
Application rates 9.607 (18.8) **
Disqualification Rates -0.511 (6.6) **
Minimum Earnings -5.87E-05 (5.3) **
COPE 0.117 (4.9) **
Durational, Refusing Work -0.066 (4.1) **
Timely payments -0.658 (3.9) **
Exhaustion Rate -0.068 (2.8) **
Maximum benefit weeks 0.011 (2.7)
Durational, Discharge 0.044 (2.6) **
Durational, Quitting -0.056 (2.0) **
Right to Work State --
Extended Benefits
Earnings for max. ben. --
ECONOMIC VARIABLES
Job losers 1.059 (8.1) **
Manufacturing -0.700 (6.2) **
Unionization 0.601 (4.1) **
Unemployment rate -2.387 (3.7) **
Short duration -0.070 (3.1) **
Percent teenage -2.441 (2.9) **
Percent part-time 1.009 (2.3) **
Long duration -
Percent female
Percent Black -
DUMMY FOR 1983 TO 1989 -0.194 (9.3) ** -0.040 (3.0) **
RUSTBELT 0.172 (5.9) ** -
BREADBASKET -- --
SOUTH ATLANTIC -0.188 (5.6) ** -0.128 (4.4) **
COTTONBELT -0.212 (6.3) ** 0.044 (2.6) **
CONSTANT -1.004 (41.0) ** -1.265 (4.5) **
R SQUARED 0.317 0.828
ADJ. R SQUARED 0.312 0.820
F= 57.43 101.22
Sig. F = 0.0000 0.00
Notes: - indicates insignificant variables.
* indicates significance of .05 <= x <.01
*indicates significance of .01 or greater.
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. Autures.wq!
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APPENDIX B
REGRESSION RESULTS
DEPENDENT = In APPLICATIONS /TOTAL UNEMPLOYMENT
1979-1991, Unweighted
(One) (Two)
LEGAL VARIABLES
Wage Replacement Rate 1.483 (5.5) **
Benefit Taxation -8.611 (5.0)
Benefit Weeks Received -0.022 (3.2) **
Earnings for max. ben. -7.8E-06 (2.0) *
Durational, Discharge -0.062 (2.0) *
Right to Work State -
Waiting Week
Disqualification Rates
Durational, Refusing Work
Durational, Quitting
Timely payments
Minimum Earnings
COPE
Earnings for Max Ben, Max Wks --
ECONOMIC VARIABLES
Manufacturing 2.141 (11.2)
Job losers 2.066 (9.3) **
Unemployment rate -6.590 (5.9) **
Long duration -1.278 (4.7) **
Unionization 1.065 (4.0) **
Percent Black 0.888 (3.3) **
Percent teenage -4.867 (3.2) **
Percent part-time 2.450 (3.1) **
Percent female -
Short duration --
DUMMY FOR 1983 TO 1989 -0.239 (9.2) -0.133 (5.6)
RUSTBELT 0.170 (4.7) ** -0.241 (5.6) **
BREADBASKET -- -0.249 (5.7) **
SOUTH ATLANTIC - -0.215 (4.0) **
COTTONBELT -0.101 (2.4) ** -0.231 (4.9)
CONSTANT -2.892 (94.8) ** -4.325 (8.7)
R SQUARED 0.184 0.582
ADJ. R SQUARED 0.178 0.561
F= 27.94 28.28
Sig. F = 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: - hidcates insignifcant variables.
* indicates signiicance o.05 <= x <.01
** indicates signficance of.01 or greater.
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. A:appsres.wql
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